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A Multilevel Model of Police Corruption: 
Anomie, Decoupling, and Moral Disengagement 
 
Ruth Zschoche 
ABSTRACT 
Police corruption is a primary concern for law enforcement agencies.  The 
purpose of this study was to identify factors that could predict the likelihood of police 
officer susceptibility to corruption.  Data was collected through surveys of 1083 officers 
within eight U.S. police agencies that were participating in the National Police Research 
Platform funded by the National Institute of Justice.  The data were analyzed using 
multilevel structural equation and base multilevel models.   
The theoretical model for this study addressed susceptibility to corruption on both 
the departmental (clusters) and individual officer levels.  Four main constructs were 
utilized in this study.  Acceptance of deviant norms was the outcome variable 
operationalizing susceptibility to corruption.  Anomie was a departmental predictor 
operationalizing expectations that socially accepted goals could not be accomplished 
through socially acceptable means.  Decoupling was a departmental predictor measuring 
the extent to which departmental pragmatic goals were out of alignment with official 
ethical codes.  Moral disengagement was the individual predictor operationalizing the 
ability to use cognitive mechanisms to excuse unethical decision-making.   
Departments higher in anomie and decoupling were hypothesized to have higher 
acceptance of deviant norms that condone corruption.  Officers with higher levels of 
moral disengagement were also expected to have a greater acceptance of deviant norms.  
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The departmental environment was expected to have more influence than individual 
officer traits such that anomie and decoupling would moderate the effects of moral 
disengagement within departments. 
 The results demonstrated the promise of the multilevel theoretical model.  
Anomie was a strong predictor of acceptance of deviant norms. Moral disengagement 
was also a moderately strong predictor of acceptance of deviant norms in the base 
multilevel models.  Anomie moderated the effect of moral disengagement to some 
degree, although it had no impact on the slope between acceptance of deviant norms and 
moral disengagement.  Differences between departmental subgroups indicated how 
officer assignments and demographic characteristics may impact susceptibility to 
corruption.   
Study limitations related primarily to the multilevel structural equation model, 
scale construction, and sampling.  Limitations are addressed as regards their general 
relevance to theory and methodology.  Implications of the results for policy and future 
research are discussed. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
Police corruption is a key concern for law enforcement agencies.  It betrays public 
trust, reflecting, at best, a deviation from professional codes of conduct, and at worst, a 
violation of criminal law on the part of those who have sworn to uphold and enforce it.  
Corruption may involve expedient actions taken in pursuit of occupational goals or 
actions taken only for personal gain, and occurs both as an individual act and as an 
institutionalized form of deviance.  It is thus necessary to explore the organizational and 
individual characteristics that may contribute to corrupt practices in police departments.   
Prior research has taken different approaches to measuring and explaining police 
corruption.  These works have focused on either the individual as the unit of analysis, 
with individual or environmental predictors; or on the organization as the unit of analysis, 
using organizational factors to explain incidence of corruption.  Unlike past approaches, 
the current study integrates individual traits, environmental factors, and organizational 
factors in a multilevel model.  This model seeks to explain corruption at both the 
individual and organizational levels.  Corruption in this study is operationalized as the 
inclination to engage in corrupt behavior—or more specifically as the acceptance of 
deviant norms. 
The current study tests a multilevel model of police deviance.  This model will 
test whether and how organizational features may promote a criminogenic environment 
in departments as measured by acceptance of deviant norms outcomes.  It will also test 
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how individual characteristics may determine an officer’s level of susceptibility to a 
given department’s criminogenic environment as measured by acceptance of deviant 
norms. Thus the organization influences the criminogenic environment, and the 
environment in turn influences individual characteristics. Based on concepts from 
anomie, moral disengagement, and organizational theories of deviance, it is hypothesized 
that agency “decoupling” produces organizational anomie that, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of susceptibility to corruption at both the individual and organizational levels.  
It is also hypothesized that likelihood of susceptibility to corruption at the individual 
level is influenced by moral disengagement, the effect of which is, in turn, moderated by 
agency levels of anomie and decoupling.  Support for these hypotheses and details of the 
current study are presented below. 
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Police Corruption: Challenges for Typologies, Data, and Control 
 Corruption is a key problem in law enforcement agencies because it erodes 
professional codes of conduct and betrays public trust.  Corruption is considered a form 
of police deviance (Punch, 2000).  Police deviance is a broad term, and encompasses a 
range of behaviors from acceptance of bribes to abuse of force to drinking on the job 
(Chappell & Piquero, 2004).  Broadly speaking, police deviance can be defined by 
understanding the use of the word “deviance,” which means an action that is in 
opposition to or not in keeping with the norm or the rule (Ericson, 2007).  In the case of 
police behavior, this translates to behavior by a police officer that is in opposition to the 
accepted norms of departmental behavior, in breach of official policy guidelines, or a 
violation of the legal codes governing officer behavior.   
 In the literature, there is no one accepted definition of corruption.  Punch (2000) 
categorized police corruption as one form of police deviance, along with two other forms: 
police misconduct and police crime.  In his definition, police corruption was “taking 
something . . . against your duty, to do or not to do something, as an exchange for money 
or gifts from an external corruptor” (p. 302).  He defined police misconduct as an action 
in violation of internal department rules, while police crime involves a violation of 
criminal law. 
 Roebuck and Barker (1974) defined police corruption as “any type of proscribed 
behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive, by 
virtue of his official position, an actual or potential unauthorized material reward or gain” 
(p. 424).  Aultman (1976) defined it as “a mode of behavior that is chosen because it will 
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lead to money or other personally desirable rewards and involves a misuse of the 
authority of a police officer’s occupational role” (p. 323).   
Ivkovich (2005) argued that what separated corruption from other forms of police 
deviance was that the primary motivator was “achievement of personal gain” (p. 547; see 
also Perez & Moore, 2002).  She went on to define police corruption as “an action or 
omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempt of action or omission, 
committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police 
officer’s misuse of the official position motivated in significant part by the achievement 
of personal gain” (Ivkovich, 2005, p. 549).  In this understanding, then, corrupt actions 
are in pursuit of anything considered personal gain, including occupational successes or 
monetary rewards.  Punch (2000) refers to an additional form of corruption, “noble 
cause” corruption, in which expedient action is taken in pursuit of a socially or 
organizationally approved goal such as catching a criminal.  In this case, the goal is 
officially sanctioned but the action taken in pursuit of the goal is a misuse of the officer’s 
official position (Punch, 2000).  In such a case, then, this would not be personal gain but 
rather occupational or institutional gain.   
Variations in definitions of corruption in the literature can also be found by 
examining the types of behaviors that have been categorized as corruption in various 
typologies.  In police corruption typologies, behavior is often categorized for seriousness 
based on who is involved, norms or laws broken, peer support, how organized the 
behavior is, the reaction of the department (sanctions), and the underlying motivations of 
the actor (Barker & Roebuck, 1973).  Corruption typologies tend to vary in their 
inclusion of overt forms of illegal conduct like theft or excessive force, less severe forms 
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of misconduct like altering records, or unethical actions committed for the purpose of 
furthering an investigation or indicting a criminal (Ivkovic, 2005, p. 547).  However, 
many behaviors that fall into the middle range of seriousness are included in most 
typologies. 
Barker and Roebuck’s (1973) typology is still the most widely cited in the 
literature after more than 30 years.  Barker and Roebuck were incredibly thorough and 
used fairly broad categorizations.  In defining police corruption, they included behaviors 
that reflected all ranges of seriousness.  This included the less severe forms of corruption 
such as any corruption of authority, gratuities, or kickbacks.  They also included the more 
serious forms of corruption, such as opportunistic theft, shakedowns, protecting illegal 
activities, fixing tickets, or direct criminal behavior.  Their definition of the category of 
direct criminal behavior is actually broad enough to encompass excessive use of force.  
Compiling both explicit definitions and the definitions implied by the Barker and 
Roebuck typology, the following is the definition to be used for the present study.  It is 
meant to encompass noble cause corruption, but exclude excessive use of force. 
Excessive force is excluded because such behavior is not always committed in pursuit of 
a specific outcome with a definable gain or reward.  Police corruption is thus defined as a 
behavior by a police officer, officers, or department in pursuit of a specific outcome that 
is desirable to the actor(s) and offers a definable gain or reward, whether tangible, such as 
money, or intangible, such as a sense of power. The behavior itself must be in context 
either ethically, professionally, or legally deviant and must constitute a misuse of 
authority.   
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Approaches to Explaining Police Corruption 
There are several approaches for trying to predict, understand, or explain police 
corruption.  These approaches differ on two main factors: units of analysis and predictors.   
Past explanatory models, some of which have been tested empirically, have considered 
either individuals or organizations/agencies to be the units of analysis.  Predictors of 
corruption have varied based on the units of analysis considered.  Models with 
individuals as the units of analysis have used or proposed predictors based on individual 
characteristics, predictors based on environmental factors, or a combination of both.  
Models with organizations as the unit of analysis have used or proposed organizational 
structure or other organizational characteristics as the predictors.   
Environmental predictors and organizational predictors are similar concepts, but 
vary in definition based on the unit of analysis considered.  Environmental factors are 
external pressures that are characteristic of a culture, agency, or group, having an impact 
on individuals operating within the given culture, agency, or group.  Organizational 
characteristics are features of a company or agency or other structured entity, determining 
how the organization functions and behaves.   Hiring, financial decisions, development of 
employee policies, mergers, and acquisitions are examples of organizational behaviors.  
These are all attributes and behaviors of the central and controlling infrastructure of the 
given organization.  Although individuals comprise organizations, in the organizational 
approach they are considered secondary actors.  The organizational approach is discussed 
in more detail below. 
Using each of these units of analysis and predictors, the following example 
demonstrates how an organization and the individuals that comprise it may be considered 
  9 
unique but conjoined entities, and how organizational and environmental predictors may 
be linked, but distinct:   
Organization X has a complex hierarchical structure (organizational predictor) 
that is believed to be the cause of recent low productivity rates (organizational 
outcome/unit of analysis).  This structure is hypothesized to be causing poor 
communication between superiors and line-level workers (environmental 
predictor) creating dissatisfaction in the workers (individual outcome/unit of 
analysis).  Personal dissatisfaction with the company (individual predictor) is 
proposed to be the cause of workers putting less effort into completing 
assignments on time (individual outcome/unit of analysis).   
In this example, the organizational predictors impact organizational outcomes, but 
are also believed to create the environmental pressures that may predict individual 
behaviors. 
Explanatory models of police corruption in the extant literature have tended to fall 
into one of four categories:  
• Category 1: individual units of analysis with individual predictors only;  
• Category 2: individual units of analysis with environmental predictors 
only;  
• Category 3: individual units of analysis with both individual and 
environmental predictors; or  
• Category 4: organizational units of analysis with organizational predictors.   
The first three categories of models, with individual units of analysis, examine 
differences in the causes of corruption within departments, explaining individual 
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behavior.  The fourth category, with organizational units of analysis, has the advantage of 
being able to compare causes of corruption between departments.  In these models, the 
organization is the primary actor and organizational predictors can be evaluated as they 
vary across multiple agencies.   
To explain the distinctions using common police corruption descriptors (Barker, 
1977), models using individual units of analysis and only individual predictors (Category 
1) can be considered “bad apple” approaches.  They tend to focus on the individual 
defects of morality or personality as the source of the deviance.  Until the last few 
decades, departments commonly relied on the assumption of a “bad apple” as the cause 
of internal problems and resolved matters by attempting to punish or remove them 
(Klockars, Ivcovich, Harver, & Haberfeld, 2000).   
In the literature, this “bad apple” approach was replaced in popularity as early as 
the 1970’s by the “bad barrel” approach, which focused on group causes, including peer 
pressure and subculture, instead of on individual causes (Barker, 1977).   
Studies/proposals with environmental predictors (Category 2) fall into the “bad barrel” 
approach.  They provide environmental explanations for the deviance of officers within 
individual police departments.  However, the “bad barrel” approach often ignores the 
distinctions between individuals in the same environment or “barrel.”  The 
studies/proposals in Category 3 that have both individual and environmental predictors 
try to address both the “bad barrel” and the “bad apples in the barrels,” but all focus on 
single departments.  They are not able to compare departmental factors between agencies.   
Models in Category 4, with organizational units of analysis and organizational 
predictors, take neither “bad apple” nor “bad barrel” approaches.  Instead, they consider 
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the “barrel” (the organization or environment itself) to be the primary unit of analysis, not 
the “apples.”   The goal is to measure organizational predictors that can distinguish 
between agencies on the outcome of organizational corruption. 
Before moving on to examples, it is important to note that many of the authors of 
the explanatory models presented below propose strategies to predict corruption or 
prevent it, but only a few actually test their theories.  These theoretical proposals and 
commentaries present valuable contributions to the conversation on police corruption and 
propose interesting ideas about the prediction and categorization of behavior; they do not 
provide empirical tests.  There is a lack of studies that directly test causes of the 
incidence of corruption.   
This lack of empirical testing is due in great part to the problems researchers face 
when attempting to measure corruption.  Some researchers attempted to measure 
corruption directly, asking individuals or departments about corrupt behavior to 
determine incidence rates.  Others measured corruption in departments using archival 
data, such as history of citizen complaints, legal cases, or public scandals.  Still others 
attempted to derive a measure of corruption from questionnaires, soliciting police 
perceptions of departmental attitudes toward or responses to corrupt behavior.  Incidence 
estimates based on attitudes are an indirect means of gauging the likelihood that 
corruption would be accepted and allowed to flourish in a department.  Such methods 
have been adopted more recently in response to the inaccuracies associated with attempts 
to obtain direct rates of corrupt activities from departments or individuals (Klockars et 
al., 2000; see the discussion on organizational units of analysis).   
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Below are examples of each of the four categories of explanatory models 
attempting to understand or explain corruption: 1) individual units of analysis with 
individual predictors only, 2) individual units of analysis with environmental predictors 
only, 3) individual unit of analysis with both individual and environmental predictors, 
and 4) organizational units of analysis with organizational predictors.  More detail is 
provided on the organizational approach, including the prime example of an attempt to 
more accurately gauge the incidence of corruption within an organizational unit of 
analysis using indirect measurement tools.   
Individual Units of Analysis/Individual Predictors Only 
 Taking an approach using individual units of analysis and only individual 
predictors is rare in police corruption literature.  One of the few examples is the model by 
Arrigo and Claussen (2003) who suggested the use of personality screening to predict job 
performance and susceptibility to police corruption, based on officer ability to cope with 
emotional and situational stressors.  Arrigo and Claussen (2003) discussed the ability of 
the Inwald Personality Inventory and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory to test if 
antisocial behavioral tendencies and the trait of conscientiousness could be used to 
predict which officers might be more likely to commit police corruption.  They posited 
links (a) between antisocial behavior and likelihood of engaging in illegal activities, and 
(b) between conscientiousness and positive/productive job performances and other 
occupational behaviors.  While they did not empirically test their proposal, they made a 
strong theoretical argument for how this type of personality screening might prevent 
persons most likely to commit corrupt behaviors from being hired by police agencies. 
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Individual Units of Analysis/Environmental Predictors Only 
 The “bad apple” approach led departments to limit their response to corruption to 
the punishment of individuals caught breaking the rules.  As a response to the limited 
nature of the assumptions underlying the “bad apple” approach, “bad barrel” approaches 
became quite popular in the literature.  These explanatory models had individual units of 
analysis but measured or proposed measurement of environmental predictors instead of 
individual predictors.  They focused on how the environment of a police department, its 
subculture, and peer influences may be responsible for individual officers engaging in 
corrupt activities.   
In one of the earliest such works Aultman (1976) examined police corruption as a 
form of occupational deviance, using the theories of symbolic interactionism, role theory, 
and social learning theory.  He proposed that anomie and subcultural pressures, such as 
the reinforcement of reference groups, could motivate officers to engage in corrupt 
behavior as part of an adaptive role.  He proposed two paths to corruption (p. 327).  In the 
first, police officers could have pressure from the informal subculture, learning roles from 
other officers and inappropriately expressing occupational authority though minor forms 
of corruption.  In the second, they could be pressured by the anomie of the occupational 
environment, where financial rewards fell short of desired material gain.  This would lead 
police officers to seek the illegitimate achievement of financial goals to attain the 
expected highly paid professional role.  Based on reference theory, within both paths an 
interaction would occur in which an officer would choose an adaptive role in response to 
the occupational environment and the expectations and reactions of others.  The adaptive 
role chosen would be based on role requirements and the reinforcement of the 
  14 
occupational group.  In sum, while their proposal was not empirically tested, the authors 
suggested that “the police officer learns to behave corruptly because such behavior is 
effective in satisfying the requirements of major roles and because significant groups may 
control reinforcements” (p. 330). 
Reed, Burnette, and Troiden (1977) presented a model with a similar focus on the 
social dynamics of deviant roles which they qualitatively tested through observations of 
police behaviors.  Instead of looking at causes for corrupt behavior, they investigated 
how police agencies can make use of socially marginalized police officers who may be 
exhibiting corrupt behavior.  They focused on the individual actor and on the 
environmental influences that supported the individual-level behavior.  Based on 
Burnette’s personal experiences and a series of informal interviews with small-town 
police officers, the authors defined and discussed three types of deviant roles found in 
small agencies: (1) the “door man” who “cozies up” to the upper brass in an attempt to 
attain position and standing, literally frequenting the doors of the administrative offices; 
(2) the “mouth man” who talks to the press and spreads gossip; and (3) the “wheel man” 
who “hot-rods” and is likely to engage in reckless high speed chases and other dangerous 
or unprofessional behavior in the attempt to pursue criminals.   
Reed et al. (1977) reported that while officers in deviant roles are sometimes 
social pariahs and avoided by peers, they are rarely officially censored.   Each serves a 
useful role―meeting the needs of the department, especially the administration.  Higher 
officials may use these “deviant” persons to do unpleasant or corrupt tasks or promote 
deviant expectations while they maintain an outwardly acceptable normative identity.  
Tasks of deviant actors may include informing on fellow officers (door man), passing 
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unofficial information or expectations through the ranks (mouth man), or promoting a 
romantic and threatening image of police officers (wheel man).  The authors concluded 
that, “Deviant roles . . . can be used as institutionalized means for evading or directly 
violating . . . norms” (p. 573). 
In the same year, Barker (1977) published a paper with a parallel theme of peer 
group support for occupational deviance.  He proposed three main elements of police 
corruption as occupational deviance: examining opportunity structure, socialization 
through occupational experiences, and group support for deviant behavior.  He made 
convincing arguments for the roles of each in understanding how police deviance is 
supported and developed in a department.  He reported, from the examination of the 
literature, that the police officer role offered many opportunities for deviant and corrupt 
actions, that the police occupational environment socialized new recruits into corrupt 
activities and isolated members of the police force from the rest of society, and that there 
was group support for rule violations in most police departments with little expectation of 
sanctions.  Though he did not empirically test his proposals, he concluded from the 
review of past works that environmental forces were considerably stronger predictors of 
officer behavior than any individual characteristics that officers may bring with them into 
the occupational role. 
Waddington (1999) examined police subculture in the lower ranks, looking for 
how to best assess the environmental influences on police deviance, including corruption.  
He defined subculture as a concept that sought to link what officers did and said in 
private to their public actions.  He argued that a police subculture was far from 
homogeneous even within the same department, and that the realities of policing were 
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less reflected in the subculture than was the glorification of ideals and delusions.  Further, 
he believed that the power of the subculture on individual officer actions was weakened 
by contextual factors.  While acknowledging the influence of peers, he argued that based 
on the results of past qualitative analyses of police culture, the influences most frequently 
portrayed as being the primary forces in police deviance and corruption, namely the 
“canteen subculture” of talk and peer appraisal, had less to do with what an officer did on 
patrol than with the conditions of the immediate environment. 
Finally, in the last decade, a few authors attempted to fit existing criminological 
theories of environmental influence to the topic of police corruption.  Hickman, Piquero, 
Lawton, and Green (2001) attempted to connect Tittle’s (1995) control-balance theory to 
the probability of police deviance and the specific types of deviance chosen.  They 
proposed that an imbalance between the control that a police officer can exert on their 
environment and the control that a police officer is subjected to by their environment will 
result in either autonomous or repressive deviance.   
Conformity occurs when the two types of control are balanced.  However, “as the 
amount of control one can exercise exceeds the amount of control to which one is 
subject” one is likely to commit increasingly more autonomous forms of deviance 
(Hickman et al., 2001, p. 498).  Conversely, “as the amount of control to which one is 
subject exceeds the amount of control one can exercise” one is likely to commit 
increasingly more repressive forms of deviance (p. 498)  The main determinants of how 
this imbalance translates to behavior include motivation, constraint, and opportunity.  
Related to police corruption, the authors proposed that, as the police occupational 
environment creates unbalanced control ratios, police officers have the opportunity and 
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motivation to act out in deviant ways, mitigated by the constraint of the situation.  Thus, 
under the control-balance theory, yet to be empirically tested, the structure of the 
environment would determine the behavior in which individual officers are likely to 
engage. 
Chappell and Piquero (2004) applied Akers’ social learning theory to police 
deviance, using the social learning predictors of “differential association, definitions, 
reinforcement, and modeling” (p. 93).  They proposed that social isolation in the policing 
occupational role results in greater peer influence on behavior, with the subculture 
allowing for the learning and transmission of deviant cultural values to new recruits.  
They predicted that differential reinforcement could explain group influences on the 
deviant beliefs of new officers (Aultman, 1976).  Chappell and Piquero (2004) 
empirically tested their model with data from a survey of the Philadelphia police 
department, looking at how “peer, definition, and reinforcement variables” impact police 
misconduct as the dependent variable, operationalized using citizen complaints.   They 
used scenarios from Klockars, Ivkovic, Harver, and Haberfield (1997) to measure 
perceptions of deviance as independent variables.  Results indicated that certain minor 
forms of corruption were considered normative, and that attitudes about excessive force 
were stronger indicators of citizen complaints than were attitudes about more minor 
forms of corrupt behavior.  Results implied that officer attitudes about deviance had a 
strong correlation with actual deviant behavior. 
Individual Units of Analysis/Individual and Environmental Predictors 
 Only a couple of models used individual units of analysis with both individual 
and environmental predictors.  Each offered explanations of environmental influences on 
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police corruption, while still seeking to explain individual differences between officers in 
the same environments.   
Girodo (1991) examined the causes of corruption in undercover drug officers, 
looking at both personality traits and the situational and environmental pressures of the 
job.  He proposed that officers doing undercover work were more prone to corruption due 
to occupational opportunities than those assigned to certain other law enforcement jobs.  
While he believed that the corrupting features of the environment could create 
opportunities and motivations for corrupt behavior, he predicted that different facets of 
personality might determine who takes these opportunities (Person-Environment fit 
model, p. 365).  He noted that his theories were in contrast to the “rotten barrel” 
perspective for explaining deviance in undercover drug investigations (citing the 1989 
report by the International Association of Chiefs of Police on drug corruption and its 
causes), since he included individual personality predictors in his assessments.   
Girodo (1991) used a random sampling of officers nationwide to empirically test 
his perspective combining individual and environmental predictors.  Subjects reported on 
exposure to undercover work and answered items from three prominent personality 
questionnaires, including the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, the Zuckerman 
Sensation-Seeking Scales, and the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire.  They also 
completed the Hilson Career Satisfaction Index that surveyed behaviors considered 
indicators for drug corruption.  Girodo (1991) found that undercover work, along with the 
personality traits of high extraversion, high neuroticism, and disinhibition, were all 
significant predictors of risk for corruption.  This study supported the value of both 
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environmental and personality predictors for understanding why officers might engage in 
corrupt behaviors. 
 Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) applied deterrence theory to police corruption while 
also measuring the personality trait of impulsivity.  In deterrence theory, a deviant act is 
more likely to be committed if the benefits and rewards of the act outweigh the costs or 
punishment in a rational evaluation of the situation.  The authors characterized the costs 
of police corruption as (1) social disapproval or self-disapproval, both considered extra-
legal sanctions (p. 375); or (2) legal sanctions such as prosecution or suspension.  They 
controlled for impulsivity as a mediator as they measured the deterrent effect of 
sanctions.   
Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) empirically tested their model using a sample of 
police officers from a single mid-sized police department.  Officers were asked to 
evaluate hypothetical scenarios and determine what severity of sanctions they believed 
each warranted.  They were also given a scale to measure impulsivity.  Self-reported 
likelihood of offending in certain deviance categories was used as the dependent variable.  
The results indicated that deterrence (likely sanctions) influenced the choice to commit 
corruption in hypothetical situations, but that extralegal sanctions were more significant 
deterrents than legal sanctions.  Also, impulsivity reduced the deterrent effect of both.  
This study integrated environmental and individual predictors, showing the importance of 
both and the likelihood that individual characteristics may mediate the effect of the 
environment, or perceptions of it, on corrupt behavior. 
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Organizational Units of Analysis and Organizational Predictors Only 
 All of the previous approaches considered the individual to be the sole behavioral 
actor (unit of analysis) in police corruption.  A complementary, but rare, approach in 
police corruption literature uses the organization as the unit of analysis and seeks 
organizational level predictors to explain tendencies in a department or differences 
between departments.  Its rare use necessitates an introduction to arguments for its value 
and proper usage.  
Using Organizational Units of Analysis 
Primarily, one can argue that understanding and preventing organizational 
corruption is valuable because the organization is the “basic unit of corrupt practice” with 
many forms of corruption not just conducted within individual transactions or actions, but 
by large groups of occupationally interconnected individuals (Luo, 2004, p. 120).  It is of 
great concern that many corrupt activities are instigated or driven by the actions of high 
ranking officials in an organization.  Also, organizations are much more difficult to deter 
or sanction than individuals.  As deterrents, organizations face economic sanctions rather 
than criminal prosecution (Luo, 2004).  Thus, as individual actors are prosecuted and 
removed, the organization may still continue corrupt practices without censure.   
Even with all the benefits of studying organizational corruption, there are risks 
associated with viewing organizations separately from the individuals that comprise 
them.  As argued by Monahan and Quinn (2006), there are many examples of ways in 
which “deviant behavior by individuals is shaped by organizational context and 
processes” (p. 362).  And while considering the behavior of organizations as entities is 
helpful within certain research or economic contexts, treating them as individuals is only 
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a convenient fiction.  An organization is composed of individual persons, and the 
structure of an organization is indeed the creation of individuals.  Monahan and Quinn 
(2006) thus argued for the exploration of “the relationship between (1) strategically 
designed and implemented structures and (2) deviant and criminal acts perpetrated at 
lower levels of the organization” (p. 363).  In line with this approach, within the police 
corruption literature, the study of the organization as the unit of analysis has not 
discounted the role of individuals or the impact of the organization on the environmental 
context in which individuals act.   
Organizational Units of Analysis in Police Corruption Literature 
There has been some support for the study of police corruption on the 
organizational level.  Punch (2000) argued that “corruption and police misconduct” are 
“persistent and constantly recurring hazards generated by the organization itself” (p. 
301).  He believed that organizational structure and practices could either restrict 
corruption from developing or promote it.  He stated that an “organization may condone 
deviance either by a lax indulgency pattern of slack management with low control and 
weak supervision or else collude in it by stimulating results” (p. 315).  Punch (2000) 
proposed that organizational research was thus valuable because it could identify flaws in 
the organizational structure, with institutional reform as the goal rather than attribution of 
individual blame.  Additionally, Klockars et al. (2000) argued that the organizational and 
occupational deviance approaches were easier to study quantitatively than individual 
approaches, mainly because of the difficulty in directly measuring corruption. 
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Indirect Measurement of Organizational Police Corruption  
When examining organizational corruption in police departments, the first 
challenge is how to measure it.  Most researchers acknowledge the inherent difficulties in 
attempting to measure the actual incidence rate of police corruption.  There is little 
motivation for officers or citizens who participate in corruption to report their own illegal 
activities, and group solidarity within the policing ranks reduces the likelihood that 
officers will report on the deviant behaviors of fellow officers (Ivkovic, 2003).  Further, 
records of official actions taken by departments against corruption, or incidence of citizen 
complaints against officers, are poor research measures, representing both bias and 
underreporting.  Most forms of corruption are too minor to be reported or punished, and it 
is often in the best interest of departments to have little official accountability for more 
severe forms, unless they garner public notice (Klockars et al., 2000). 
Due to these problems with measuring incidence rates, researchers such as 
Klockars et al. (1997, 2000) have begun to use indirect methods.  Indirect instruments 
measuring likelihood of corruption based on police perceptions have increased the 
response rate for corruption research while still providing important information for 
research and reform efforts.     
Klockars et al. (1997, 2000) examined the differences in integrity between 
departments.  The study did not evaluate the causes of police corruption, but rather 
focused on the means of measuring police corruption with organizations as the unit of 
analysis.  This was accomplished through officer opinion surveys of how agencies were 
likely to respond to corrupt officer behavior.  Klockars et al. (1997, 2000) claimed that 
the use of organizational units of analysis had many advantages for comparison between 
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departments, and that their methodology enhanced police cooperation through the use of 
opinion surveys rather than direct incidence reports.  Using an organizational perspective, 
the researchers assumed that a police agency with high integrity is one “whose culture is 
highly intolerant of corruption” (Klockars et al., 2000, p. 3).  Thus, they designed an 
instrument that attempted to measure the culture of the department as related to 
corruption, deviance, and integrity through the perspectives of the officers. 
Klockars et al. (1997, 2000) surveyed officers in 30 US police departments.  For 
11 hypothetical corruption scenarios varying in severity, the researchers solicited 
officers’ opinions on the seriousness of the corruption, their willingness to report the 
corruption, and their willingness to support punishment for the behavior.   They then used 
a scaling system to compare departments and rank them on these three responses.  These 
outcomes were used to distinguish between departments on likelihood for corruption 
based on the expectations and values of their officers.   
External information on corruption levels in each department, such as court cases 
or history of public corruption scandals, was compared to rankings to determine the 
validity of the instrument.  The authors found that agencies with lower levels of reported 
corruption tended to have officers who believed that deviant behavior was more likely to 
result in discipline and more deserving of discipline.  Conversely, agencies with higher 
levels of corruption were consistently unwilling to report corrupt behaviors of other 
officers, even in the most severe scenarios (Klockars et al., 2000, p. 8).   
Klockars et al. (1997, 2000) thus succeeded in creating a viable indirect method 
for estimating likelihood of organizational corruption, using individual officer 
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perceptions that could be aggregated to create estimations of the behavior of each 
department as an organizational entity.    
Testing Organizational Predictors of Police Corruption 
While Klockars et al. (1997, 2000) contributed a valuable instrument for 
measuring organizational police corruption, they did not empirically test organizational-
level predictors.  Few studies have.  Herbert (1998) examined theories of subcultural 
influences in police departments, but used ethnographic observations rather than 
empirical testing in his study.  His concept was similar to that of Waddington (1999) 
except that Herbert used the department, the organization, as the unit of analysis.  Herbert 
(1998) used ethnographic observations of the Los Angeles Police Department to evaluate 
proposed ways to distinguish likelihood of corruption between departments based on 
normative values.  He believed that to understand deviations from the normative order, it 
was important to first understand the normative order more fully.   
Herbert (1998) proposed the existence of six main normative orders within police 
organizations based on the values of “law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo, 
safety, competence, and morality” (p. 351).  Each of these orders served to enable and 
constrain officer behavior.  He believed that, “these normative orders structure the world 
view of the police and infuse it with emotive significance” (p. 361) influencing the 
actions of individual officers.  Herbert (1998) proposed that each police department 
develops a unique subculture based on the comparative predominance of these six 
normative orders.  He acknowledged departmental differences in how these normative 
orders might translate to police deviance, and recognized the influence of external 
political bodies on the behavior of individual departments.  His observations might make 
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for interesting future empirical tests comparing levels of normative values across 
departments and correlating them with perceived levels of corrupt behavior. 
 Marche (2009) appears to be the only researcher who has attempted to empirically 
test organizational predictors of police corruption with the organization as the unit of 
analysis.  Conducting secondary analysis of the data produced by Klockars et al. (1997, 
2000), he attempted to create an explanation for police corruption based on economic 
theories.  His goal was to “develop an economic model and empirical estimates of how 
factors related to organizational structure, such as scale of operations and police culture, 
predict and explain how specific acts of corruption are related to different sizes of police 
agencies” (Marche, 2009, p. 463).  His model included the factors of leadership, 
organizational structure, and culture as predictors.  Marche (2009) focused on incentive 
structures and agency scales of operations, hypothesizing that greater bureaucratic control 
offered more opportunities for corruption at the departmental level.  He believed that 
scale of operations would have a consistent effect on corruption regardless of internal 
departmental features, such as subcultures, group norms, or contextual situations.   
Marche’s (2009) analyses drew upon the subject officers’ responses to the 
hypothetical deviance scenarios, their personal characteristics such as rank and duties, 
and the size of the agencies for which the officers worked.  He found that size of police 
agency (organizational structure) and new officer status were both significant predictors 
of likelihood for corrupt behavior.  His results suggested that an established police culture 
may have more influence on likelihood to commit corrupt behavior than the training and 
educational features implied by new officer status.  He also proposed that corruption may 
be more prevalent in larger police agencies because centralized supervision is more 
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difficult to implement.  While using the Klockars data required Marche (2009) to 
“construct” theoretical variables of questionable validity, he did at least try to explain 
police corruption with the use of organizational predictors and provided a starting point 
for similar future efforts.   
A Multilevel Approach – Organizational and Individual Units of Analysis 
  The approach not yet represented in the literature is a multilevel approach that 
operationalizes Monahan and Quinn’s (2006) argument.  This approach would consider 
organizational units of analysis and organizational predictors while also evaluating how 
these organizational predictors create the environment which then impacts individual 
behavior.  This would include individual units of analysis with both environmental and 
individual predictors.  The need for this new approach is implied by the weaknesses 
inherent in the past approaches and the representative studies. 
Weaknesses in Past Studies: Approaches and Methodologies 
Each of the works represented under the four approaches added some theory or 
empirical knowledge to help understand the causes and correlates of police corruption.  
However, each explanatory model was limited.   
First, in the category using individual units of analysis and individual predictors, 
external influences were not addressed.  Arrigo and Claussen (2003) ignored the role of 
exogenous variables, and did not answer the question of whether the proposed personality 
traits could significantly improve resistance to an already criminogenic environment.   
Second, in the category of individual units of analysis and environmental 
predictors, some authors did not consider individual predictors and some ignored the 
possibility of comparing environmental features between departments.  For instance, 
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while both of Aultman’s (1976) paths to corruption could work to explain individual 
motivations for corruption and appropriate environmental influences, neither could 
predict differences in behavior between individuals exposed to the same environmental 
pressures.  Reed, Burnette, and Troiden (1977) merely discussed peer-perceived police 
deviance, and did not seek to explain differences in the individual choices to fill deviant 
roles.  Barker (1977) did not offer much to distinguish between the behaviors of 
individual officers subject to the same structures, and Waddington (1999) failed to 
distinguish either organizational determinants or individual distinctions between how a 
subculture would translate into officer decisions.  He thus failed to propose a means to 
distinguish the cause of deviance between departments or between individuals within the 
same department.   
Hickman et al. (2001) measured both individual and environmental influences on 
behavior, but did not measure individual differences in motivation and control, did not 
properly draw on subculture as an environmental influence, ignored organizational 
elements, and provided very limited results (they could only account for likelihood that 
officers might report the behavior of others).  And, while Chappell and Piquero’s (2004) 
theoretical proposals were sound, their research was limited, especially with their use of 
citizen complaints as a measure of police misconduct, a notoriously biased and unreliable 
source of information on police misbehavior.  Perhaps due to methodological problems, 
they were unable to account for the causes of normative beliefs, find an impact of these 
beliefs on citizen complaint outcomes, or adequately explain differences in corruption 
either within or between departments. 
  28 
Third, while the models of individual units of analysis using both environmental 
and individual predictors integrated predictive factors, they were unable to consider the 
organization as a unit of analysis and did not attempt to compare predictors between 
departments.  Each empirical test of the models also had methodological problems. For 
instance, Girodo (1991) discussed the role of situational factors, but only empirically 
assessed the relationship between personality and drug corruption risk (p. 365 – 366).  He 
assumed environmental influences as a part of undercover work, but failed to 
operationalize them.  Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) measured only a limited range of 
corrupt behaviors, only studied officers in a single department, and were not able to 
address why specific officers found punishment to be more or less likely for certain 
scenarios.  They could not determine the cause for differences within the department on 
perceptions of deterrent factors.   
Lastly, in the category of organizational units of analysis and organizational 
predictors, most of the work has been purely theoretical in nature. The single empirical 
test of a model involved secondary analysis, which limited the researcher’s ability to 
measure his key theoretical constructs.  And only Marche (2009) considered 
characteristics of individuals within organizations and how organizational structure may 
contribute to environmental influences.   
Herbert (1998) acknowledged departmental differences in how normative orders 
might translate to police deviance, and how external political influences may influence 
the behavior of individual departments, but he did not attempt to translate the influence of 
normative roles into a distinction between individuals within departments.  He came 
close to proposing an organizational theory of police deviance, but stopped short of 
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operationalizing between-department distinctions.  Klockars et al. (2000) did not explore 
individual or organizational predictors of differences in opinions of seriousness, 
discipline, and reporting within or between departments.   
 Marche (2009) improved on previous studies by including some individual level 
variables in his model, such as rank and entry-level status.  However, his approach still 
had several weaknesses.  The individual-level variables were only used to approximate 
organizational constructs.  He did not attempt to specify characteristics of new officers 
that might impact behavioral choices, or make them more open to cultural influences.  
Also, he made the assumption that scale of operations would have a consistent effect on 
corruption regardless of internal departmental features, such as subcultures, group norms, 
or contextual situations.  This study thus remained at an organizational level of 
explanation without tying in some of the individual characteristics that might have 
distinguished between officers in the same department, or explaining how organizational 
features may create criminogenic environments that influence individual officer behavior.   
Arguments for a Multilevel Approach 
These examples of problems in the studies representing the four approaches 
demonstrate the difficulty of adapting a criminological theory to the study of police 
corruption.  Many theorists were unable to test their theories empirically.  Some of the 
research had methodological weaknesses, such as limited sample sizes or faulty measures 
of police corruption.  None of the studies implemented a methodology that included both 
organizational and individual units of analysis and considered organizational and 
individual/environmental predictors.   
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An integrated multilevel approach, combining individual and organizational units 
of analysis, would address these weaknesses in past studies and could be vital to 
understanding the nature and causes of police corruption.  An integrated approach would 
measure corruption on the level of the organization, acknowledge how organizational 
factors may create corrupt environments, analyze how these environments may impact 
individuals, and control for individual differences that may explain why certain persons 
respond differently within the same environment. 
As mentioned previously, there are risks associated with evaluating corruption at 
only the organizational level or only the individual level.  A sole focus on organizational 
factors runs the risk of ignoring individual culpability and the value of identifying 
warning signs of deviant behavior in certain officers.  Reliance on the structural view, 
when taken too far, leads to rationalizing and excusing individual police misconduct 
(Muscari, 1984), negating the importance of personal accountability.  As this relates to 
issues of police corruption, it is important to recognize that police officers are moral 
agents with independent opportunities for action, regardless of environmental or 
organizational influences.  It is shortsighted to assume that “events that take place can be 
both defined and considered without reference to the individual” as some proponents of 
the organizational approach have claimed (Muscari, 1984). 
A sole focus on the individual ignores the clear link between persons and 
organizations in police departments.  Individuals are replaceable and fill existing social 
roles within the departmental structure, while the informal and formal rules guiding these 
roles survive any individual occupants (Lundman, 1979, p. 84).  Also, most decisions 
made by departments are not made by any single person, but instead are made by 
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interacting elements within the department.  Work group norms supporting certain 
discretionary actions are taught to new recruits during early socialization, and are often 
supported by administrative action (Lundman, 1979).  Accepting deviance on an 
organizational level requires that research evaluate departmental characteristics rather 
than just focus on the actions of the potential “bad apples.”    
  Research is needed that addresses both the organizational features of 
departments that may promote a culture of corruption and the individual attributes of 
officers that may make them more or less susceptible to a cultural environment of 
corruption.  The current study addressed this need with an integrated multilevel approach 
that considers both organizations and individuals as units of analysis for police 
corruption.  It also sought to improve on the methodological weaknesses of previous 
research. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Proposing a Multilevel Model of Police Corruption:  
Organizational Anomie/Decoupling and Individual Morality 
The multilevel model used in the current study suggests that organizational 
features may promote a criminogenic environment in departments.  It offers a theoretical 
explanation for how these organizational features may interact with individual 
characteristics to determine an officer’s level of susceptibility to a given department’s 
criminogenic environment.  Thus, the present study seeks to explain likelihood of 
susceptibility to corruption both between and within police departments using both 
individual and organizational units of analysis and individual, environmental and/or 
organizational predictors depending on the analysis level. 
Police corruption, or more accurately the likelihood of susceptibility to police 
corruption, is measured in this study as acceptance of deviant norms, conceptualized on 
both the organizational and individual levels.   On the organizational level 
(organizational units of analysis), deviant group norms are expected to vary between 
police departments.  These deviant norms are hypothesized to result from anomie and a 
decoupling of the organizational structure (organizational predictors), increasing the 
likelihood of corruption on both departmental and individual levels.  On the individual 
level (individual units of analysis), police officers within departments are expected to 
vary in their susceptibility to the environmental pressures (anomie and decoupling as the 
environmental predictors) to accept deviant group norms.  This susceptibility, which can 
  33 
be considered the likelihood for unethical decision-making, is hypothesized to vary by 
individual officer due to weakened social controls, determined by personal levels of 
moral disengagement (an individual predictor).   
These theoretical constructs, supporting literature, and the proposed relationships 
between them in the multilevel model are discussed below.  The discussion introduces 
acceptance of deviant norms as the operationalization for corruption, addresses anomie as 
a potential cause of deviant norms, proposes anomie’s development from the 
organizational deviance concept of decoupling, and supports the use of moral 
disengagement to predict individual deviant choices.   
Operationalizing Corruption: Klockars et al. and Acceptance of Deviant Norms 
The literature detailed in Chapter 1 informed the theoretical basis of the current 
study, specifically the need for an approach for measuring corruption that considers the 
organization as a viable unit of analysis while still measuring corruption likelihood on the 
individual level.  The approach taken by Klockars et al. (1997, 2000)–measuring 
corruption in departments on an organizational level and indirectly through officer 
perceptions of departmental policies and practices–is applied to the proposed multilevel 
outcome of police corruption.  The need for an indirect measurement of corruption is 
supported by weaknesses or biases found in direct approaches such as self-reports, citizen 
complaints, or departmental actions (Klockars et al., 1997).  Use of this measure is also 
supported by other literature.  For instance, Barker (1977) supported the idea that the 
occupational environment of a police officer may present unusually high levels of 
opportunity for corruption.  He argued that corruption risk in many police departments is 
increased by social isolation, group support for rule violations, low perceived risk of 
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sanctions, and a subculture of corruption that socializes rookies into deviant norms.  He 
believed that the perceived culture of the department, whether one of integrity or 
corruption, may increase actual corruption incidents.  This is precisely what is measured 
in the Klockars instrument.   
Using the Klockars scenarios, Chappell and Piquero (2004) found that corrupt 
tendencies were more strongly shaped by features of the environment than by individual 
differences.  Their results supported the use of the scenarios to measure the outcome of 
corruption likelihood.  Also, Marche (2009), the only study to use organizational factors 
to try to predict likelihood of corruption as measured by the Klockars scenarios, found 
that there was more corruption in larger departments.  He used an economic theory to 
explain this, citing the difficulty of maintaining central leadership in an organization with 
a large and overextended scale of operations.   
Building on this past research, the Klockars scenarios will be used in the proposed 
study as the outcome variable representing police corruption, called here the “likelihood 
for acceptance of deviant norms.”  This police corruption variable is more accurately the 
susceptibility to police corruption.  On the individual level, officers who accept deviant 
norms are considered to be more likely to be susceptible to corruption.  On the 
organizational level, police departments that accept deviant norms are considered to be 
more likely to be susceptible to corruption in their ranks.2
                                                 
2 The Klockars scenarios focus on various forms of deviance.  As will be covered in the review of 
instruments, the corruption construct as operationalized through the Klockars scenarios includes both 
normative and noble case forms of corruption.  In both forms, behavior of officers is not ethical or legal, 
and violates departmental guidelines.  The forms differ on the motivations and goals of the corrupt 
behavior.  Normative corruption tends to have monetary or status goals, while noble cause corruption had 
occupational success goals. 
   
 
  35 
Lending support to acceptance of deviant norms as the operationalization of 
corruption, Bent (1974) noted that “because compatibility is deemed essential in view of 
the dependence that police officers have on their partners for their survival, the pressures 
to accept and adopt institutional norms are great” (p. 36).   Thus, there is significant 
pressure in departments on individual officers to accept norms, deviant or non-deviant, 
due to characteristics of the policing occupation, and mental acceptance of deviant norms 
can lead to actual deviant behavior–the adoption of the norms in practice.  As such, this 
operationalization is also supported by studies linking the deviant actions of police 
officers to the deviant work norms supported by the departmental structure, such that 
reported norms will likely be reflected in actual officer behavior (Lundman, 1979; see 
also Barker, 1977; Harris, 1973; Van Maanen, 1973).   
Organizational and Environmental Predictors 
Anomie 
Anomie is used in this study’s multilevel model as an organizational predictor of 
organizational corruption (departmental acceptance of deviant norms), and as an 
environmental predictor of individual corruption (individual acceptance of deviant 
norms).  This choice finds support in the police corruption literature.  For instance, 
Aultman (1976) detailed how anomie within the environment of a department may 
encourage corruption on the part of employees.  Hickman et al. (2001) also proposed that 
the structure of the environment in a police department can influence likelihood of 
corruption through motives, opportunity, and constraint.  He believed that the more 
unbalanced the types of controls experienced by officers within a department, such as the 
imbalance of anomic conditions, the higher the likelihood for deviance.   
  36 
Anomie, as described by Merton (1968), is produced in societies where there is 
not equal emphasis placed on important goals and the moral or ethical means of reaching 
those goals.  Anomie is a condition of “normlessness and social disequilibrium” that can 
“foster a sense of futility, alienation, mistrust and powerlessness at the individual level,” 
resulting in greater likelihood for higher levels of deviance and unethical behavior in the 
affected society (Cohen, 1993, p. 344).  When the ends become more important within 
the societal culture than following legitimate paths to those ends, deviant and unethical 
behavior in the pursuit of goals becomes more likely.  In society as a whole, Merton 
(1938) focused on economic and material attainment as the predominant cultural goal, 
arguing that high rates of criminal and other unethical behavior resulted from a lack of 
comparable emphasis on using legitimate means to attain economic wealth.  Also, while 
anomie increased in society as a whole, persons who were lower on the socioeconomic 
ladder were more likely to use illegitimate means to reach goals of economic attainment 
due to lower access and fewer opportunities. 
Merton’s theory applied to police departments would predict deviance from an 
inordinate emphasis on institutionally sanctioned goals over the legitimate means to reach 
these goals.  Institutionally sanctioned goals might include apprehension of criminals, 
deterrence of crime, maintenance of order, and the attainment of personal status (e.g., 
through rank, power, money) (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998).  Legitimate means to 
achieve these goals are set forth by laws and agency policy.  Anomie would manifest 
when goal achievement becomes so important within the culture of a department that it 
ignores or de-emphasizes, through lax enforcement or informal expectations, the 
legitimate means to achieve these goals.   
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In an anomic organizational structure, there is dissociation between formal norms 
or legal guidelines and the informal norms that govern activity in the lower ranks of the 
department.  When this dissociation occurs, informal deviant norms will tend to dominate 
over formal codes of conduct (Herbert, 1998).  Certain forms of corruption are then 
perceived as normative (Chappell & Piquero, 2004).  As Merton (1938) explained, when 
there is disproportionate emphasis on goals over regulatory norms and moral imperatives 
governing how to achieve these goals, cultural malintegration–called anomie–results 
from the imbalance.  In the extreme case, the achievement of goals becomes the only 
consideration and institutional norms become completely irrelevant.  In sum, anomie in a 
police agency can result in deviance, as deviant means are allowed or even promoted to 
achieve goals. 
Anomie may differentially impact on different forms of deviance or corruption, 
with the greatest distinction likely to be found between noble cause and normative 
corruption due to a distinction in prescribed goals.  For normative corruption, goals tend 
to be clearly directed at personal gain, typically of a monetary or social nature.  These 
goals tend to be promoted by the departmental subculture, rather than by the official 
departmental policy.  Alternately, the goals relevant to noble cause corruption tend to be 
those promoted by the official departmental policy, such as criminal apprehension, 
criminal conviction, or showing decreased crime rates.  In both cases, anomic conditions 
could result in deviant means taken to reach these goals, depending on which goals exert 
the most pressure on officers and which are the most difficult to achieve through official 
or ethical means.  However, the behavior of departmental leadership would have the most 
effect on the dissociation of formal and informal norms for goals that would be 
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considered of “noble cause,” such that official departmental attitudes and policies could 
directly impact the development of anomic conditions that result in noble cause 
corruption. 
When there is a dissociation of formal and informal norms, an anomic condition 
can produce strain on the organization, and thus on members of the organization.  Strain 
results because the members of the organization, who are producing deviant behaviors, 
are still confronted by the power of the formal laws imposed by external controlling 
agencies, and these norms do not mesh with formal expectations.   
Decoupling 
The dissociative anomic condition, and the means to manage the strain it produces 
in an agency, may be created through a process called decoupling, a concept that comes 
from neo-institutionalist and organizational theories of deviance.  Decoupling is used in 
the proposed multilevel model as the second organizational predictor of organizational 
corruption, and the second environmental predictor of individual corruption.  Decoupling 
is defined as “the organizational practice of disconnecting structure from action” 
(Monahan & Quinn, 2006, p. 368) that takes place in organizations that have become 
“institutionalized.”  An organizational structure of an agency, such as a police 
department, becomes institutionalized if the official (usually written) code of conduct 
does not impact occupational behavior on all levels of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).  Formal rules become more symbolic than substantive.   
Decoupling, empirically observed as both an outcome and a strategy, resulting in 
flexibility of behavioral controls at the “ground level,” can be accomplished through 
complicated lines of communication, “vague and conflicting statements of policies and 
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procedures,” or “underground practices that exist alongside official practices” (Monahan 
& Quinn, 2006, p. 369).   
A decoupled police department would “satisfy environmental demands by 
demonstrating appropriate structure and policies while simultaneously freeing lower-level 
employees to effectively and efficiently meet the organization’s technical goals” 
(Monahan & Quinn, 2006, p. 364).  Decoupling encourages lower-level employees to 
violate formal rules, yet provides deniability of responsibility for the higher-level 
management.  The management can make reference to the formal rules that they have in 
place and claim that the corruption in the agency is the work of a few “bad apples.”  For 
instance, Reed et al. (1977) found that corruption in the lower ranks of a police agency 
could be purposefully sustained and utilized by higher ranking officials who want to keep 
clean images.  This type of dynamic can be seen in cases of police corruption, in which a 
few officers are prosecuted while the agency itself is not required to take steps to reform 
the organizational structure that may have contributed to the corrupt behavior (Girodo, 
1991).   
Decoupling can purposefully or unknowingly create anomic conditions.  When an 
organization purposefully decouples, it is often the result of a finding that they can 
function more efficiently if they do not burden their employees with having to act in 
accordance with formal guidelines.  They still present these formal guidelines to 
constituents to maintain environmental–or in the case of policing, political and popular–
support.  Even when an organization unknowingly decouples, it may accept the resulting 
dissociation of informal norms from formal codes of conduct in order to take advantage 
of the resulting efficiency without public censure.   
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Decoupling may also demonstrate different interaction effects with different 
forms of corruption, specifically noble cause and normative corruption, in a similar 
manner to that previously discussed for anomie.  Decoupling, stemming from action, or 
inaction, of the police organization itself, and resulting, as it does, in greater efficiency in 
accomplishing departmental goals, is likely to be a stronger predictor of noble cause 
corruption than normative corruption.  Unlike normative corruption, noble cause 
corruption’s goals are directed at the accomplishment of occupational directives while 
bypassing official guidelines for accomplishing them.  As such, while decoupling 
weakens official ethical guidelines and thus would be likely to increase incidence of all 
forms of deviance, it may have a stronger impact on deviance related to official goals. 
Congruity between Decoupling and Anomie 
Decoupling and anomie are congruous concepts and as such are used together as 
Level 2 predictors.  The decoupling construct is based on the concept of coupling 
mechanisms, which are the “practices (e.g., rules, norms, values) or processes (e.g., 
supervisions, coordination by plan or standardization) that cause elements to function 
together” (Beekun & Glick, 2001, p. 387).  To be decoupled, an organization must have 
structural mechanisms that are separated from each other in practice, such that officially 
prescribed practices do not correlate to actual processes taking place on varying levels of 
the organization.  This separation can be created to achieve efficiency, or to unburden 
operations from external review.  The anomie construct requires universally prescribed 
success goals, and the inability by some to achieve these success goals through legitimate 
means (Menard, 1995).   
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Decoupling and anomie are complementary not merely because they share the 
expected organizational outcome of acceptance of deviant norms, but more importantly 
due to their potential causality and their similarities in processes leading to a deviant 
outcome.   
First, decoupling is thought to cause anomie within an organization.  While 
anomie can be caused by many factors, depending on the prescribed goals that the actors 
are trying to achieve, decoupling is a potential path to anomie.  Decoupling would be 
likely to result in anomie specifically for goals that are related to organizationally 
encouraged and mandated outcomes (encompassing goals considered to be of noble cause 
and hence most strongly related to decoupling as noted above).  When an organization 
decouples, employees are given mandated modes of occupational behavior in order to 
achieve professional goals that are in conflict with the officially sanctioned behavior of 
the organization.  It is understood on the lower levels of the organization that the goals 
that the organization expects employees to achieve may not be accomplished by the 
official governing guidelines, and moreover, that employees are expected to take 
alternative and unofficial paths to the desired goals.   
When decoupling occurs in an organization such as a police agency, which is 
governed not just by internal company policies but by legal codes and legislative 
directives, the employees are left “holding the bag.”  They are expected to perform at a 
certain level and achieve certain goals; they are expected to use less than officially 
acceptable methods to achieve those goals, and yet, were a problem involving external 
review or public violation of the official guidelines to arise, it would be the individual 
employees that would be primarily held responsible.   
  42 
In this situation, the decoupling of the official and unofficial occupational 
behavior guidelines creates anomie, a situation of normlessness in which employees do 
not expect to be able to achieve desired goals through ethical or official means.  They are 
encouraged, due to the pressure of the occupational situation, to choose unofficial and 
perhaps unethical or deviant means to accomplish prescribed goals.  The situation that is 
created requires individuals to publicly seem to uphold and subscribe to ethical and legal 
guidelines while actually using alternative means to accomplish goals.  As covered 
previously in the discussion on anomie, this situation can cause employees to experience 
feelings of discontent, normlessness, and disillusionment, and lead to a wider range of 
deviant behaviors. 
Second, while decoupling and anomie are not completely parallel concepts, they 
have similarities in processes proceeding towards a shared outcome.  This outcome is 
deviant behavior—specifically behavior that is taken in pursuit of a goal that is generally 
acceptable within the prevailing culture, while the behavior to achieve this goal is not in 
line with officially accepted norms, at least not those publicly promoted by the 
organization.  These officially accepted norms are typically legal, ethical, and moral 
guidelines, and may be part of the organization’s bylaws or codes of operation or part of 
official policy mandated by an external governing agency (Westphal & Zajac, 2001).  
Decoupling and anomie have similar processes in part because they share certain 
factors in their progression to the outcome of deviant behavior.  These factors include the 
organization/agency, the leadership of the organization/agency, the non-leadership 
employees of the organization/agency, the official rules by which that agency should be 
operating (due to legal codes, governing agencies, public mandates, etc.), and pressures 
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for certain goal outcomes (on the organization, the individual, or both).  Next are 
presented, individually for decoupling and anomie, the processes required for 
development of each state and its progression towards the outcome of deviant behavior.  
Similarities and differences can be noted between the two. 
The process of decoupling within an organization would present as the following: 
An organization has occupationally prescribed success goals.  The leadership of the 
organization promotes these success goals on all levels of the organization.  Certain of 
the goals may also be independently promoted by the peer culture of the organization 
(informally) for reasons other than occupational success (peer acknowledgment, personal 
aggrandizement, monetary achievement).  There are clear guidelines for how these goals 
should be achieved based on legal codes, governing agencies, and public mandates, and 
these guidelines are officially promoted by the leadership of the organization.  The non-
leadership employees of the organization are aware of and generally subscribe to these 
success goals and the officially sanctioned means of reaching those goals.  The leadership 
of the organization realizes that the success goals may be more effectively reached 
through non-legitimate means.  Employees within the organization are also aware of the 
enhanced ability to reach the desired success goals through non-legitimate means.  The 
leadership of the organization promotes the use of the alternate non-legitimate means to 
achieve the success goals by not applying official guidelines to the actual work of lower-
level employees (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  They may do this purposefully to circumvent 
official restrictions, or negliently through lax enforcement.  The resulting outcome is that 
lower level employees are encouraged to, or at least not prevented from, reaching success 
goals through non-legitimate means, because the goals are more important to the 
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organization than the legitimate means to reach those goals.  (Depending on the goals, 
alternate non-legitimate means may be undertaken by persons in leadership roles within 
the organization as well as non-leadership employees). 
The process of anomie within an organization would present as the following: An 
organization would exist in which there are universally prescribed success goals.  The 
leadership of the organization is aware of these success goals, and promotes them.  
Certain of the goals may also be independently promoted by the peer culture of the 
organization (informally).  There are clear guidelines for how these goals should be 
achieved based on legal codes, governing agencies, and public mandates, and these 
guidelines are officially promoted by the leadership of the organization.  The non-
leadership employees of the organization are aware of and generally subscribe to these 
success goals and the officially sanctioned means of reaching those goals.  Some 
employees determine that the prescribed success goals cannot be reached, or cannot be 
reached easily, though the legitimate means publicly promoted by the organization.  This 
situation is not alleviated by the actions of the organization (offering practical solutions 
for achieving goals through legitimate means).  The resulting outcome is that many 
employees may attempt to reach success goals through non-legitimate means, because the 
goals are more important within the culture of the organization than the legitimate means 
to reach those goals.  (Depending on the goals, alternate non-legitimate means may be 
undertaken by persons in leadership roles within the organization as well as non-
leadership employees). 
These examples for decoupled and anomic organizations present distinct parallels 
between the two concepts, with some differences.  While both anomie and decoupling 
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result in non-legitimate means to reach success goals, an anomic condition may relate 
more strongly to culturally emphasized goals, while decoupling relates more clearly to 
occupational goals.  As such, while the lack of action on the part of an organization (lax 
accountability mechanisms, lack of emphasis on practical and legitimate means to reach 
goals) can result in both anomie and decoupling, decoupling is often the result of 
purposeful actions or willful ignorance on the part of the leadership of an organization.  
Thus, anomic conditions result more from informal culture and inaction by an 
organization, while decoupling results more from purposeful or negligent action on the 
part of an organization, honed and specified in outcome by the informal culture of the 
organization.  Due to these differences, as previously noted, decoupling more clearly may 
result in noble cause (occupationally centered) corruption, while anomie may result in all 
forms of corruption (due to greater emphasis on cultural pressures versus occupational 
pressures).  While these differences result in different methods for measuring the two 
conditions, the similarities in factors, processes, and outcomes suggest the potential for a 
strong relationship between the two constructs. 
The cross-sectional design of the current study does not allow for the testing of 
the causal relationship between decoupling and anomie.   However, the two constructs 
are expected to be highly correlated and both predictive of corruption at the 
organizational level of analysis (between departments). At the individual level of 
analysis, decoupling and anomie, as correlated concepts, are both expected to act as 
environmental predictors of individual corruption.  Decoupled police departments are 
hypothesized to be high in anomie, and these departments are expected to have high rates 
of likelihood for both normative and noble cause corruption as operationalized by the 
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Klockars items (higher rates of officers accepting deviant norms), such that officers in 
decoupled and anomic departments are expected to report higher acceptance of deviant 
norms on the Klockars items.    
Individual Predictor: Moral Disengagement 
While decoupling practices and anomie on the organizational level may explain 
differences in perceptions of and attitudes toward corruption between police departments, 
they are unable to predict the differences between individuals on the acceptance of 
deviant norms within departments.  This is the role that the individual-level theory of 
moral disengagement plays in the proposed model. 
Some police corruption studies have examined individual-level characteristics, 
such as personality, as predictors of individual-level police corruption.  For instance, 
Arrigo and Claussen (2003) proposed that antisocial personality traits and 
conscientiousness may be significant predictors of corruption, and Girodo’s (1991) 
results indicated that neuroticism predicts who may choose corrupt behaviors.  Past 
studies have also found, however, that a combination of individual and environmental 
predictors makes for a more complete causal model.  Girodo (1991) believed that the 
personality traits that make a person susceptible to corruption may only lead to deviant 
behavior given the right “instigating environment” (p. 361), and Pogarsky and Piquero 
(2004) found that corrupt behavior could be best explained though an interaction of 
environmental factors and the individual predictor of personality.  In fact, they found a 
mediating effect of personality on the environment.   
Building on these findings, the proposed multilevel model uses the 
personality/cognitive trait of moral disengagement as the predictor of corruption within 
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individuals.  Moral disengagement is also expected to interact with the environmental 
predictors of anomie and decoupling, mediating their effects on individual-level 
acceptance of deviant norms (likelihood for corruption).   
The moral disengagement trait was chosen as the individual predictor because 
past studies support its direct impact on unethical decision-making (Detert, Trevino, and 
Sweitzer, 2008).  Moral disengagement, as a valid predictor of unethical decision-
making, could be expected to be an equally strong predictor of acceptance of deviant 
norms due to the definitional and operationalized similarities between the two outcomes.  
Unethical decision-making requires a choice on the part of an individual to accept a less 
than moral action given specific circumstances, while acceptance of deviant norms 
reflects an attitude that deviant behavior is an acceptable option in certain circumstances.  
This similarity is demonstrated by Moore’s (2008) proposal that moral disengagement 
would ease a person’s initiation into an organization’s corrupt normative structure, while 
in the current model acceptance of deviant norms is considered representative of 
likelihood for an individual to accept a corrupt normative structure.   
Moral disengagement forms part of Bandura’s social cognitive theory, which 
seeks to explain human behavior through the self-regulation of thoughts and behavior in 
interaction with social influences (Bandura, 2002).  It is also an offshoot of Matza’s 
(1964) social control theory of moral drift, in which drift is defined as “episodic release 
from moral constraint” (p. 69).  In drift theory, moral norms may be violated through 
techniques of neutralization (Matza, 1964, p. 79), an internal justification or excusing of 
non-conforming behavior, based on mood, circumstance, or other factors, allowing for a 
drift toward deviance (p. 83).  Neutralization thus results in a weakening of social 
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controls on behavior.  The way a person drifts is proposed to be the result of “underlying 
influences” (p. 29), including environment, events, and individual personality 
characteristics. 
Pursuant to Bandura’s (1986) conceptualization of moral disengagement, moral 
constraints are conceived of as self-regulation–regulation resulting from internal moral 
standards and inhibitions; external moral conventions have been internalized to create 
constraint on behavior.  Detert et al. (2008) explained that within this theory, “people 
make unethical decisions when moral self-regulatory processes that normally inhibit 
unethical behavior are deactivated via use of several interrelated cognitive mechanisms 
collectively labeled moral disengagement” (p. 374).  The mechanisms of moral 
disengagement are the “points in the process of moral control at which moral self-censure 
can be disengaged from reprehensible conduct” (Bandura, 2002, p. 102).  The concept of 
moral disengagement thus subsumes Matza’s (1964) idea of neutralization as a cognitive 
mechanism detaching one from moral constraints, since moral disengagement 
mechanisms can all be considered forms of neutralization or justification.   
Bandura (1986) described eight moral disengagement mechanisms: 1) moral 
justification, 2) exoneration through social comparison, 3) use of sanitizing or 
euphemistic language, 4) diffusion of responsibility, 5) displacement of responsibility, 6) 
minimization of harmful consequences, 7) attribution of blame to victims, and 8) 
dehumanization of victims.  Through the use of these cognitive mechanisms, a person 
who otherwise would not commit unethical behavior may feel free to do so without 
“apparent guilt or self-censure” (p. 374), without feeling that they are giving up their 
moral standards (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), and without the 
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cognitive dissonance that otherwise would be present.  Moral disengagement can thus 
foster “detrimental conduct by reducing prosocialness and anticipatory self-censure and 
by promoting cognitive and affective reactions conducive to regression” (Bandura et al., 
1996, p. 364).   
Recent studies have found positive correlations between levels of moral 
disengagement and (1) unethical or transgressive behavior (Bandura, Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Detert et al., 2008), (2) the ability to engage in 
morally ambiguous acts such as execute prisoners (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 
2005), and (3) prisonization and bullying behavior (South & Wood, 2006).  Moore (2008) 
made a convincing theoretical argument that moral disengagement impacts the initiation, 
facilitation, and perpetuation of organizational corruption by “releasing” individuals to 
engage in morally ambiguous acts in the interests of the organization.  Detert et al. (2008) 
noted that “if organizations knew more about whether some individuals were more 
predisposed to moral disengagement than others, perhaps they could target resources 
toward improving these individuals’ decision-making processes” (p. 374).   
When compared to the Level 2 predictors, moral disengagement is expected to act 
on a level of individual predisposition towards deviance while anomie and decoupling are 
expected to influence individuals through the organization to which they belong.  Moral 
disengagement is not expected to interact directly with anomie and decoupling, such that 
the individual predisposition of moral disengagement is not expected to be influenced by 
organizational environment.  Rather, individual levels of moral disengagement may have 
more or less of an overall impact on the outcome of acceptance of deviant norms 
depending on the level of anomie and decoupling in the individual’s organization.  In 
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organizations with higher anomie and decoupling, it is expected that the effect of moral 
disengagement on the outcome will be reduced, as the environmental pressures that may 
encourage deviance become more influential than individual predispositions. 
In sum, moral disengagement is hypothesized to distinguish between police 
officers who are more or less likely to succumb to the deviant norms that may arise in 
anomic and decoupled occupational environments within police departments.  It is also 
hypothesized to interact with the environmental predictors in explaining the outcome 
such that its effect on deviance may be diminished depending on the strength of the 
environmental factors. 
Addressing Potential Tautological Concerns 
 Within the model created for this study, there was the potential for tautological 
problems.  Tautology could be perceived as a potential concern between departmental 
anomie and departmental level susceptibility to corruption (acceptance of deviant norms) 
and between moral disengagement and individual officer susceptibility to corruption 
(acceptance of deviant norms).  Addressing this potential concern requires a clear 
distinction between both predictors and the outcome variable at both levels, to be 
discussed here before a presentation of expected study relationships and hypotheses. 
 First, there is a definite conceptual distinction between departmental anomie and 
departmental acceptance of deviant norms.  Anomie can arise in a group (in this case a 
police department) when a lack of equal emphasis is placed on goals and the ethical 
means of reaching these goals.  It can be considered a state of normlessness and social 
disequilibrium in which the environment of the group fosters mistrust and alienation 
because the preferred goals and means do not align.  In a police department with an 
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anomic subculture, the ends become more important than the ethical means of reaching 
those ends, making deviant behavior in pursuit of goals more likely.   
Alternately, when there is an Acceptance of Deviant Norms, a majority of the 
individuals in a group (in this case a police department) dismiss the seriousness of 
deviant behavior and are less likely to believe that their group should discipline or will 
discipline such behavior.  They also do not believe that others in their group are likely to 
report on the deviant behavior.  This outcome indicates that the subculture has accepted 
the deviant behavior as a normative state of officer activity, increasing the likelihood that 
similar deviant behaviors do occur in the department (since they are not considered 
serious), and that they are not disciplined or reported.   
The distinction between the two concepts is that anomie, unlike acceptance of 
deviant norms, does not determine how individuals view corrupt behavior or how the 
agency is likely to deal with it.  It does, however, describe the agency environment that 
would be more likely to foster this type of acceptance.  Anomie is the dissociation of 
goals and ethical means while acceptance of deviant norms is the adoption of deviant 
alternatives to accomplish these goals.  Further, a measure of anomie would indicate 
whether the majority of officers in the agency think that the goals that they pursue are not 
possible to reach without breaking the ethical guidelines, while a measure of acceptance 
of deviant norms would indicate whether deviant behaviors have thus been accepted as 
reasonable and normative departmental activities (as a means, perhaps, of reaching the 
desired goals).  Anomie can thus be considered the moral “temperament” of the agency, 
while Acceptance of Deviant Norms can be considered the actual perceptions or the 
officers in the agency as related to their occupational activities.  There were some 
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tautological concerns related to the actual operationalization of anomie and acceptance of 
deviant norms for the current study, and they are addressed in the bivariate correlation 
results section. 
Second, there is a definite conceptual distinction between moral disengagement 
and individual officer acceptance of deviant norms.  Moral Disengagement is the 
individual cognitive tendency to use mechanisms to release oneself from moral 
constraints in behavior or decision-making.  It is a personal/cognitive trait and can be 
considered a tendency to view situations or moral quandaries with an emphasis on 
negating internal moral constraints.  This personal tendency is determined by answers to 
questions about deviant behavior that include possible justifications, rationalizations, or 
neutralizations to see if the respondent will use one of these methods to accept the need 
for the deviant behavior.   
Acceptance of Deviant Norms on the individual level is not a cognitive tendency, 
but is rather a concrete individual perception of occupational deviant behaviors, their 
seriousness, their necessary and likely punishment, and the belief that other officers will 
report on them.  Individual acceptance of deviant norms is derived from personal 
assessments of scenarios and of the response of fellow officers (which can be considered 
reflective of personal views on reporting infractions).  Results represent respondent 
perceptions to specific forms of deviant police officer behavior. 
The distinction between the two concepts is that while moral disengagement may 
ease a person’s initiation into a deviant normative structure, the instrument for measuring 
it does not (unlike the instrument for acceptance of deviant norms) seek to determine the 
respondent’s stance on specific forms of deviant occupational behavior.  It rather 
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determines if the person is more likely to have the cognitive tendency to “explain away” 
deviant behavior.  Alternately, the acceptance of deviant norms instrument does ask for 
actual perceptions of specific deviant behaviors that may arise in an agency.   
Based on these operational definitions, a person with higher moral disengagement 
would be determined to have a greater chance of using cognitive mechanisms to justify 
the personal use of deviant behavior.  The use of these mechanisms may make the 
respondent more likely to be accepting of deviant norms as defined by the specific 
occupational scenarios in the outcome measure of acceptance of deviant norms, but the 
use of these cognitive mechanisms could not predict with certainty the specific 
acceptance of deviant occupational norms.  This determination could only be made 
through the responses to the items for each scenario on the acceptance of deviant norms 
instrument.  So, in sum, Moral Disengagement is the use of cognitive mechanisms that 
may make one more likely to accept deviant norms, while Acceptance of Deviant Norms 
is the actual statement of the acceptance of deviant norms as determined through 
responses regarding the seriousness and responses required for specific deviant 
occupational behaviors. 
Thus, to conclude the section on tautology, while the concepts contained in the 
predictors and outcome variables were similar enough in nature to support their predicted 
relationships in the model, they were not similar enough to pose tautological problems. 
Summary of Study Concepts and Expected Relationships 
To review, the current study uses Klockars as a guide for an organizational 
approach, conceptualizing likelihood for susceptibility to police corruption as the 
acceptance of deviant norms.  This encompasses: “how seriously officers regard 
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misconduct, how amenable they are to supporting punishment, and how willing they are 
to tolerate misconduct in silence” (Klockars et al., 2000, p. 3).   
Anomie and decoupling on the organizational level and moral disengagement on 
the individual level of analysis were expected to interact to explain total variance in 
acceptance of deviant norms.  Police departments with higher decoupling and anomie 
within the organizational level of analysis were expected to have higher levels of 
acceptance of deviant norms.  On the individual level of analysis, it was hypothesized 
that officers with higher moral disengagement will exhibit higher likelihood for 
corruption (acceptance of deviant norms) than others in the same department.  Finally, 
anomie and decoupling in a department were expected to moderate the effect of moral 
disengagement on acceptance of deviant norms.  Anomie and decoupling as 
environmental predictors were expected to decrease the impact of moral disengagement 
on corruption likelihood on the individual level of analysis.  Thus, the higher the 
departmental anomie and decoupling, the weaker the effects of moral disengagement on 
acceptance should become, eventually decreasing to insignificance.  Prior research has 
supported the moderating effects of personality features on environmental factors 
(Girodo, 1991; Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004). This hypothesis predicts similar moderation 
in the opposite direction, from the upper to the lower levels of analysis, rather than from 
the lower to the upper levels of analysis. 
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Hypotheses 
The following testable hypotheses were drawn from both the organizational-level 
explanation of corruption (acceptance of deviant norms) as a result of decoupling and 
anomie, and the individual-level explanation of corruption as a result of moral 
disengagement:  
1) Levels of anomie (aggregated from individual evaluations) and rates of 
decoupling will be strongly and positively correlated within departments.   
2) Departments with high aggregated individual evaluations of anomie and high 
rates of decoupling will have higher aggregated rates of officers accepting deviant 
norms (e.g., evaluating corrupt behaviors as less serious, supporting less 
punishment for corrupt behaviors, being less likely to say they would report the 
corrupt behaviors of fellow officers).   
3) Individual officers with high moral disengagement will be more likely to accept 
deviant norms. 
4) Rates of departmental anomie (aggregated from individual evaluations) and 
decoupling will moderate the effect of moral disengagement on individual officer 
likelihood to accept deviant norms.  In a department with higher anomie and 
decoupling, moral disengagement will have a weaker effect on the likelihood to 
accept deviant norms. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Methods 
The previous studies of police corruption detailed earlier had various problems 
with methodology; these included limited sample sizes, single department samples, and 
biased means of measuring police corruption likelihood.  The current study tried to 
address these deficiencies.  A large number of respondents from multiple departments 
were surveyed.  Corruption likelihood was measured using the indirect response 
instrument created by Klockars et al.  Also, the predictive abilities of anomie, decoupling, 
and moral disengagement were supported in the literature and were chosen for strength in 
clarity and validity. 
The sections below describe how subjects were selected, the survey methods, and 
the instruments used to measure the constructs.  
Sampling 
The instruments used in the current study were distributed to eight police 
departments as part of data collection for the National Police Research Platform, funded 
by the National Institute of Justice.  The Platform distributed surveys on a number of 
different topics to the population of sworn and unsworn employees of 24 law 
enforcement agencies, including the eight receiving the instruments proposed for this 
study.  Most departments completed two to four surveys on topics that included Culture, 
Technology, and Training.  The instruments used in this study were included in the 
survey entitled Accountability, Integrity, and Discipline.   
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The 24 departments participating in the Platform were purposefully selected.  
Selection criteria included national reputation and visibility (for the largest agencies), 
size, and geography.  The Platform team attempted to include agencies of different sizes.  
Geographically, many sites were clustered around the universities leading the 
Platform─the University of Illinois at Chicago, Northeastern University in Boston, and 
the University of South Florida in Tampa.   
The eight departments who administered the Accountability, Integrity and 
Discipline survey, of which the proposed instruments are a part, and provided data for the 
current study are of varying size and demographics.  These eight departments included 
the city police departments for Catasauqua, PA; Skokie, IL; Framingham, MA; 
Cambridge, MA; Arlington, TX; Chicago, IL; and Los Angeles, CA.  Also included was 
the police department for the tribal nation at Ft. McDowell, AZ.  Table 1 presents the 
most recently available demographics for each of these eight departments and their 
jurisdictions based on census data and UCR crime estimates. This includes size of 
jurisdiction, number of sworn personnel, crime rates, ethnic composition of jurisdiction, 
household income, and poverty rates.  There are two large and more diverse agencies, 
four medium sized agencies, and two small agencies represented. 
In all but two of the agencies, the entire population of sworn personnel was asked 
to complete the Accountability, Integrity and Discipline survey.  Because of the large 
number of personnel in the two agencies of Chicago and Los Angeles, the sworn 
personnel in these agencies were randomly assigned to several groups (five in Los 
Angeles and nine in Chicago) and each group was assigned to a different survey.   One 
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group from each department was assigned to take the Accountability, Integrity and 
Discipline survey.   
Due to concerns about this being a convenience sample of departments, the 
sample agencies were compared on demographic characteristics to others of their same 
size and geographical region to make sure that values fall within a normal range.  Within 
each agency, such concerns were addressed by comparing respondents to total agency 
data on available demographic information to see if those who chose to participate were 
representative of their departments.  Lastly, when evaluating differences in the 
departmental and jurisdictional characteristics included in this small sample, it was 
determined that the tribal nation of Ft. McDowell may present an outlier on some of the 
variables of interest.  Evaluation determined that it was on the low end for the outcome 
variables; this was not, however, determined to be a risk to the validity of the data or its 
generalizability.  Rather, keeping at least eight departments at the cluster level was very 
important, as well as having at least two small departments represented. 
Collectively, these agencies employ a total of close to 25,000 sworn personnel, 
but with the random sampling in the large agencies, only approximately 7,000 sworn 
personnel were approached for participation in the survey.  (This study did not use survey 
data from the non-sworn personnel in the agencies.)   
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There are a couple of weaknesses related to the sample of subjects.  The first 
weakness was the use of a convenience sample.  The second weakness was that the 
sample included only eight departments.  Regarding the first concern, due to the nature of 
the current investigation, which hypothesizes determinants of between and within 
department variations, it was not necessary to conduct a random sampling of 
departments.  The hypotheses did not require a fully representative sample of 
departments from the United States as they were not positing anything about the 
characteristics of police in the United States as a whole. However, the model would have 
been strengthened by having an adequate variability on the outcome variable (Acceptance 
of Deviant Norms) between the departments selected.  This would have been 
accomplished by surveying the personnel of a stratified random sample of agencies. A 
representative sample of US police departments would have increased the chances of 
finding significant between-department variation on acceptance of deviant norms and on 
anomie and decoupling.   
While the agencies in the proposed study did not represent a stratified, random 
sample that would promote the likelihood that differences in demographics and Level 2 
variables were evenly distributed over the sample, there still were demographic 
differences distributed in the sample.  As such it was hoped that even with the limited 
number of departments, there would be significant differences on the Level 2 variables of 
interest. 
The second concern, about the number of departments in the sample, is relevant to 
the multilevel structural equation model used for the analysis.  It is preferable to have a 
sample size of at least 25 to 50 Level 2 clusters (police departments) to avoid biased 
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estimates (Maas & Hox, 2005) and to provide adequate statistical power (Snijders, 2005).  
Given that eight is too few for a strong multilevel structural equation analysis in absolute 
terms (related to bias and statistical power) and too few for this model specifically (based 
on larger number of parameters than clusters expected), Level 2 interdepartmental 
analyses were interpreted with caution and warning (see Limitations section for further 
discussion). 
A final concern was whether the respondents were representative of the total 
population of their departments, a concern related to external validity.  This was assessed 
by comparing the demographics of respondents and non-respondents within departments.  
Respondents were compared to all sworn personnel in their department on the 
demographics that were available on the survey and for the department as a whole.  These 
included race, gender, and job role.  The results are presented in Table 2 and the 
discussion of the implications of this data can be found in the discussion section.  
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Table 2 
Comparison of Agency Personnel and Respondents. Percent of Total Sworn in Sample, 
Percent Female, Percent White, Percent Black, Percent Hispanic, Percent Patrol 
Department  % of SW        % FEM        % WH           %BL          % HSP          % PAT  
Ft. McDowell   
 Agency     9.5        36.8   5.2        10.5    63.2 
 Respondents     52.6  10.0        30.0   0.0        10.0    60.0 
Catasauqua 
 Agency     0.0        94.1   5.9          0.0    94.1 
 Respondents     61.1    0.0      100.0   0.0          0.0  100.0 
Framingham 
 Agency   10.4        80.0   4.3        14.8    74.8 
 Respondents       4.2  40.0      100.0   0.0          0.0    40.0 
Skokie 
 Agency   11.0        81.0   3.0        13.0    81.0 
Respondents     48.2    5.7        81.3   0.0        10.4    67.3 
Cambridge 
 Agency     9.0        72.4 14.7          9.8    76.6 
 Respondents     27.9    5.3        72.2   9.7          9.7    56.8 
Arlington 
 Agency   18.6        68.8 14.9        11.3    82.2 
 Respondents     32.2  19.9        68.2 10.9        10.9    48.0 
Chicago 
 Agency   24.5        52.9 25.7        18.6    79.4 
 Respondents       1.5  27.8        69.3 13.8        11.1    44.6 
Los Angeles 
 Agency   19.0        36.4 11.8        42.2    67.0  
 Respondents       3.8  18.7        40.6 10.4        30.4    35.1  
 
Data Collection 
Pursuant to this component of the multi-component Platform study, the 
populations of both sworn and non-sworn personnel were surveyed electronically in the 
participating agencies.  Chiefs (or other high-level command staff persons) in the 
participating agencies sent out requests for participation to all sworn and non-sworn 
personnel in their employ (see Appendix A).  Participants were requested to participate, 
advised of their rights as subjects, and directed to the online survey once they had given 
their consent to participate (see Appendix B). 
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One to three weeks after the initial note was sent from the chief/sheriff, a first 
reminder note was sent, again requesting participation (see Appendix C).  A second 
reminder note one to two weeks after the first reminder served as the final 
communication to the personnel within most of the participating agencies.  Samples of 
these forms and communications are contained in Appendices A through C.  The survey 
was completely anonymous, requiring no identifying information such as social security 
or badge numbers.  The strengths and limitations of this survey methodology are 
discussed below. 
Instruments 
 The instruments used in the proposed study were chosen in order to test possible 
predictors of likelihood for corruption within and between police agencies.  Police 
corruption was operationalized as acceptance of deviant norms using the Klockars et al. 
(1997, 2000) scenarios.  This instrument produced the dependent variable.  Anomie and 
decoupling instruments produced independent variables, predicting likelihood of 
corruption on the individual level as environmental predictors, and on the organizational 
level as organizational predictors.  The moral disengagement instrument produced data 
for an independent variable, predicting likelihood of corruption on the individual level as 
an individual predictor.  The following sections discuss instrument development and 
describe each instrument in the context of the multi-level model. 
Instrument Development 
During the process of survey creation, the instruments from this study were 
submitted to others working on the Platform Project, and they were considered along with 
many other items covering similar topics.  There was a lengthy revision process during 
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which all of the constructs contained within this study were reviewed by various 
academics and police professionals for content, structure, and comprehension.  Possible 
alterations or exclusions were suggested and some acted upon.   
The most significant juncture in the evaluation of the content of the current 
measures came at the final stage when the accountability survey had to be reduced to no 
more than forty items to promote higher response rates.  With this final reduction, the 
items for measuring this study’s constructs underwent additional rigorous review.  The 
instrument for each study construct was reduced to a limited number of items.  The final 
measures include three items for anomie, four items for decoupling, four items for moral 
disengagement, and three scenarios with four items each for acceptance of deviant norms.  
The limitations created by the item reductions are discussed below.  
Decoupling 
 The first organizational-level predictor is organizational decoupling, 
operationalized as officers acknowledging that a greater emphasis is placed on the 
achievement of departmental goals than on using legitimate means (set forth in official 
codes of conduct) to reach them.  A decoupling instrument was designed to measure a 
breach between official codes of conduct that a department publishes to the public, and 
the actual practices promoted by authority figures within the organization.   
In order to measure decoupling levels for purposes of comparing agencies, it was 
necessary to create survey questions that would represent departmental decoupling 
practices as evaluated by officers within the organization.  The survey instrument 
attempted to measure dissonance between official statements of principles regulating 
officer behavior, and the actual understanding of line-duty officers as to what is allowed 
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and necessary in order to accomplish the pragmatic goals of the organization. The 
instrument asked individual officers within each agency to answer questions about the 
relative values their agencies place on pragmatic goals and the ethical means to achieve 
those goals (e.g., “Hold criminals accountable for their actions” versus “Uphold suspect’s 
rights”).  In each case, the pragmatic goals could be achieved by behavior that is in direct 
violation of the ethical principle noted.   
Described another way, the decoupling instrument presented two important 
mandates in a department: the need for pragmatic results and the need for ethical/formal 
guidelines.  These two mandates are not opposites, but the pragmatic goal may be easier 
to achieve by sacrificing an ethical guideline that exists within the formal structure.  In 
agencies with lower decoupling, officers should have reported that the ethical goal or 
guideline was more important to the department than the pragmatic goal.  This would 
match the official response that department leadership would have to give to the public in 
accordance with formal guidelines of conduct and ethics. 
The decoupling instrument was evaluated for item content and structure by 
several police chiefs and policing researchers.  The reviewers provided input leading to 
minor revisions in wording or focus.  The final scale was composed of 4 items presenting 
two goal options, for instance (a) Increase the public’s sense of security by showing 
crime reduction (pragmatic goal) versus (b) Report crime accurately (ethical/regulatory 
guideline).  Subjects were asked to choose one of six response options along a continuum 
ranging between the two goals.  The respondent choice indicated “whether you believe 
your department tends to favor the goal on the left side, the right side, or a position in 
between.”   
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This continuous variable was turned into a dichotomous variable for easy 
comprehension in the data analysis.  The two options to the side of the pragmatic goal 
were recoded to represent a “decoupled” response, and the four other options on the 
continuum toward the side of the ethical guideline were recoded to represent a “not 
decoupled” response.  The decoupling instrument can be found in Appendix D. 
Aggregated Individual Anomie 
 The second organizational-level predictor is departmental anomie, operationalized 
as aggregated rates of individual anomie (anomia), representing normlessness within the 
organization.  Personal measurements of anomie attempt to tap into the individual point 
of view that “there is a high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required 
to achieve given goals” (Seeman, 1959, p. 788).  This expectancy can be considered 
normlessness (Menard, 1995).  Instruments of personal anomie include descriptions of 
important goals, and measure whether the respondent believes that it is necessary to keep 
the rules in order to attain these goals.  This operationalization of anomie is similar 
enough to that of the decoupling instrument that the two were expected to be highly 
correlated.   
 Menard (1995) created a 6-item scale of normlessness to measure individual-level 
anomie in adolescent participants, whose goals included keeping the trust of parents, the 
respect of friends, being popular, staying out of trouble, and succeeding at school.  
Unacceptable means of attaining these goals included breaking rules, lying to parents and 
teachers, “playing dirty,” and “beating up” on others (p. 143).  Respondents answered on 
a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  This scale, with 
the adolescent sample, achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .75 to .81.   
  67 
 This scale, having high reliability and strong correlation with deviant behavior, 
was deemed appropriate for measuring individual anomie in the current study, although it 
underwent revisions.  Adjusting this scale to be used with police officers required altering 
the goals and unacceptable means presented in the survey items, while maintaining the 
basic structure of the instrument.  The chosen main goals and unacceptable means of 
reaching those goals were adapted from police corruption literature on types of corrupt 
activities (Klockars et al., 2000; Roebuck & Barker, 1974).   
The three police-specific items that were included in the survey are: "It is 
sometimes necessary to break department rules in order to advance up the ranks,” “One 
must keep fellow officers’ misconduct a secret to be accepted by colleagues,” and “To 
get criminals off the street, it is sometimes necessary to change the details of what 
happened when writing a report.”  The main goals reflected in these items are career 
advancement, acceptance by colleagues, and success at one’s job.  The unacceptable 
means that may be perceived as necessary to reach these goals include breaking 
departmental rules, not reporting fellow officers’ misconduct, and lying in official 
reports.  The original measure was a 5-point Likert scale.  For inclusion in the Platform 
agency survey, the items were incorporated into a section with other items that had a 4-
point Likert scale.  The anomie instrument can be found in Appendix E. 
Moral Disengagement 
 Moral disengagement measures the ability of a person to use cognitive 
mechanisms to justify behavior so as to make unethical decisions without internal censure 
or guilt.  Moral disengagement serves as the individual-level predictor in the multilevel 
model and is operationalized using a version of the adjusted measure created by Detert et 
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al. (2008).  The authors adjusted the original adolescent-oriented instrument created by 
Bandura (Bandura et al., 1996; Pelton, Ground, Forehand, & Brody, 2004) to make it 
applicable to adult college students familiar with a business environment.  This adult 
version was composed of 24 items on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree).  Using 828 responses from business and education student 
participants, the authors ran an exploratory factor analysis, finding an eight-factor 
solution, in keeping with the eight subscales of the moral disengagement concept.  They 
retained the three best-fitting items that loaded on each of the eight expected factors at 
.40 or above, with cross-loadings no greater than .25.  A confirmatory factor analysis 
supported this structure, finding eight first-order factors and a single second-order factor, 
with strong fit indices, and an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .87.   
 The version of this scale adapted for the current study still used the adult 
perspective created by Detert et al. (2008), making slight changes to wording to make 
certain concepts more easily understood by police officer respondents.  The new 
instrument retained four items from three of the original eight subscales.  The original 
eight subscales were moral justification, euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison, 
displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distortion of consequences, 
attribution of blame, and dehumanization.  The 3 subscales retained include attribution of 
blame, displacement of responsibility, and diffusion of responsibility.   
This reduction in items and scales resulted from space constraints.  The excluded 
items were selected for deletion based on their relative lack of applicability to the police 
officer sample and their more obvious wording and content.  Obvious wording and 
content was a factor in item choices because research has found that police officers are 
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more likely to provide valid responses to surveys on corruption or ethical issues when the 
surveys are worded in a less direct format, are not as threatening, and are less likely to be 
perceived as potentially problematic if confidentiality were to be breached (Klockars et 
al., 2000).  The items excluded on that basis were considered too direct to elicit an 
accurate response. 
The moral disengagement instrument–consisting of four relevant items from three 
subscales–is representative of the type of cognitive mechanisms deemed by Bandura et 
al. (1996) to neutralize moral constraints, and thus they should still provide a viable, if 
abbreviated, gauge of moral disengagement in the sample population.  The retained items 
include, “You can’t blame a person who plays only a small part in the harm caused by a 
group” (diffusion of responsibility), “People cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their 
coworkers pressured them to do it” (displacement of responsibility), and “People are not 
at fault for misbehaving at work if their supervisors mistreat them” and “If someone 
leaves something lying around, it’s his/her own fault if it gets stolen” (attribution of 
blame).  All items were measured on a 4-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to 
“strongly disagree.”  The moral disengagement instrument can be found in Appendix F.   
Acceptance of Deviant Norms 
Acceptance of deviant norms is the instrument that attempts to measure likelihood 
for police officers to accept corrupt behavior in their departments and perhaps participate 
in it.  The current study used the perceptual scenarios from Klockars et al. (1997; 2000) 
as the outcome instrument for likelihood for corruption in police departments.   
The original Klockars scenarios covered “a range of activities, from those that 
merely give the appearance of conflict of interest, to incidents of bribery, and theft” 
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(Klockars et al., 2000, p. 4).  The wording of each scenario, pulled partially from case-
study literature and partially from the experience of the authors, sought to describe 
situations that are common and plausible forms of police misconduct, while being 
“uncomplicated by details that might introduce ambiguity into either the interpretation of 
the behavior or the motive of the officer depicted in the scenario” (p. 4).  Respondents 
were instructed to “assume that the officer depicted in each scenario had been a police 
officer for 5 years and had a satisfactory work record with no history of disciplinary 
problems” (p. 4).  Honesty of responses has been evaluated by asking two additional 
questions about whether the respondent thought that most police officers would give 
honest responses to the survey, and whether they themselves had given honest answers.  
Of the respondents, 84% believed that most officers would answer honestly, and 98% 
said that they themselves had done so.    
Based on the commonly accepted typology of police corruption put forth by 
Roebuck and Barker (1974), the eleven scenarios fall into seven different categories of 
misbehavior.  These include violation of internal departmental codes of conduct, covering 
the inappropriate and illegal actions of fellow officers (code of silence), corruption of 
authority through the acceptance of gratuities, kickbacks from citizens for referral of 
services, opportunistic theft, shakedowns that involve accepting bribes for not reporting 
the illegal behavior of citizens, and excessive use of force.   
Each of the original eleven scenarios has been evaluated by respondents through 
six questions “designed to assess the normative inclination of police to resist temptations 
to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation” (Klockars et al, 2000, p. 4), and 
one item asking if the behavior in the scenario is approved by the official policies of the 
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department.  Of the initial six questions, two have asked about perceived seriousness, two 
about how severely the behavior should be disciplined, and two about willingness to 
report such an incident.  In each pair, one question asked the officer about his or her own 
view and a second question asked that officer his or her perception of the view of fellow 
officers. 
For the current study, three scenarios were selected and each was followed by 
four questions.  The first scenario presented an incident of an officer accepting kickbacks 
from a local auto body shop; the second scenario presented an incident of an officer 
covering up the illegal behavior of a fellow officer; and the third scenario presented an 
incident of noble cause corruption in which an officer lies about evidence found on 
potential suspects in order to make an arrest.  Of the four questions retained for each 
scenario, two questions evaluated the opinions of the officer respondents themselves, and 
two questions evaluated what the officer thinks others in the department would think or 
do.  One addressed seriousness, two addressed discipline, and one addressed reporting 
behavior.   
They are:  
1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be? (seriousness, personal 
opinion) 
2. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered 
doing it, what, if any, discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow? 
(discipline, personal opinion) 
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3. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered 
doing it, what, if any, discipline do YOU think WOULD follow? 
(discipline, opinion on departmental action) 
4. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would 
report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior? (reporting, 
opinion on departmental action) 
With the three scenarios, for each respondent, there were 6 responses of personal 
opinion (seriousness, discipline) and 6 responses reflecting what the respondent thinks 
others in the department would be likely to do or think (discipline, reporting).  Item 4 is a 
question of the likelihood that fellow officers will report on the behavior, and hence 
relfects what the respondent thinks others in the department are likely to do.  This item 
has been found to be related to individual perceptions of seriousness and discipline for 
lower ranking officers, but sometimes not as well for higher ranking officers.  Since, in 
the current sample, this difference was not found, for the purposes of the analyses, Items 
1, 2, and 4, were chosen to represent a measure of individual acceptance of deviant norms 
for each scenario.  Separate outcome variables were created for each of the three 
scenarios using Items 1, 2, and 4.  These outcome variables were used as both individual 
acceptance of deviant norms and aggregated acceptance of deviant norms for each 
department as part of the total model.  Separate outcomes for each scenario were 
necessary because, even though there was variation in seriousness, there was not an easy, 
valid way to weight each scenario for seriousness.  The acceptance of deviant norms 
instrument can be found in Appendix G. 
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Control Variables 
 A set of items in the survey produced demographic and job-related variables, 
some which were used as control variables in the analysis.  Some of these individual level 
covariates were evaluated as controls for individual variation that was not explained by 
moral disengagement.  These included civil service rank, job role, gender, shift type, 
work schedule, supervisory status, racial background, and estimate of neighborhood 
crime rate in officer service area.  The full list of control variables submitted to 
respondents in the survey can be found in Appendix E.  The categorical and ordinal 
covariates on this list were used to create dummy variables for proper interpretation in the 
models.  These included Rank (dummy coded for Officer, Lieutenant and up, and Captain 
and up), Neighborhood Crime (Low Crime, Moderately High Crime and up, Very High 
Crime), Workday (Night Shifts, Mostly Day Shifts, Afternoon/Evening Shifts), Race 
(White, Black, Hispanic), Gender (Female), and Shift (Fixed Shift, Rotating Shift).   
Department-level control variables reflected jurisdiction population size, ethnic 
composition of jurisdiction, number of sworn officers, crime rates for property and 
violent crimes, household incomes, and poverty rates (see Table 1).  Some of these were 
used to account for variance on Level 2 of the multilevel analysis that was not accounted 
for by anomie or decoupling. 
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Data Analysis 
First, lower level analyses were conducted on all the data.  This included 
descriptive data on all variables, variance evaluation for summed scales across 
departments, principal components analysis to verify factor composition for use in 
confirmatory factor analysis, and bivariate correlations between summed scales.  The 
principal components analysis was used to evaluate acceptance of deviant norms 
scenarios, moral disengagement, anomie, and decoupling.  Items that did not load 
adequately onto a single component for each of these scales were not included in the 
measurement portion of the MSE model or in any post-hoc tests.  Principal components 
analysis and bivariate correlations were conducted for each of the outcome variables on 
each individual department’s data to validate the aggregation of departments. 
Second, the primary data analysis method used in the current study was the 
multilevel structural equation (MSE) model, conducted with Mplus version 6.0 (Muthen 
& Muthen, 2010).  The goal of the MSE model analysis was to test hypotheses by 
determining the level of variance that existed Within and Between departments and 
determine how well the Level 1 and Level 2 predictors of moral disengagement and 
anomie/decoupling respectively accounted for that variance when controlling for certain 
demographic covariates.  It also attempted to determine if anomie and/or decoupling 
impacted the magnitude of the slope between moral disengagement and acceptance of 
deviant norms on the individual level.   
The MSE model was chosen as a superior analytical technique for the 
hypothesized model for several reasons.  OLS regression is not possible with this model 
because a clustered sample design would create correlated error terms; the residual error 
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from subjects in the same clusters (departments) would likely be correlated—violating 
the assumption of independent observations.  The multilevel structural equation model 
provides residual error terms for both individual and cluster levels, accounting for 
correlated residuals within clusters.  This makes the MSE model superior to the base 
structural equation model (SEM) which does not account for cluster level covariance or 
residuals.  Also, inclusion of the measurement model allows the total model to 
simultaneously account for measurement error, allowing for more valid results than a 
base multilevel model [no latent variables, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) conducted 
separately within a SEM].   
Stated another way, the MSE model allowed for the simultaneous evaluation of a 
confirmatory factor structure for latent variables along with the measurement of a path 
model on both levels of the analysis.  It was able to evaluate the relationship between 
moral disengagement and acceptance of deviant norms at the individual (Within) level 
(Hypothesis 3), and then use the intercept of acceptance of deviant norms on the 
individual level as the outcome for the group/cluster (Between, departmental) level 
(Hypothesis 2).  The random slope between moral disengagement and acceptance of 
deviant norms was also able to be evaluated as a possible outcome.  Anomie and 
decoupling then could be regressed on both outcomes to determine the relationships 
(Hypothesis 4).   
Due to problems found in the model identification process for the MSE model, it 
was deemed appropriate to conduct base level multilevel modeling (MLM) as a post hoc 
test.  This allowed for the testing of hypotheses that could not be tested with the MLE 
model, and allowed for the possibility that confirmatory factor analysis (hence the use of 
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the SEM model) may not be appropriate for data in this early stage of project 
development.  Thus results for the base ML models are presented for each scenario. 
Brief Overview of the Multilevel Structural Equation Model 
Multilevel modeling (MLM) is an analytic method able to distinguish between 
outcome variability at different levels of aggregation (Luke, 2004), typically within and 
between clusters.  In the context of the current study, Level 1 is the Within-cluster 
component of the model containing the individual units of analysis and the individual and 
environmental predictors.  Level 2 is the Between-cluster component of the model 
containing the organizational units of analysis and the organizational predictors.   
The multilevel structural equation model was chosen for use with latent outcomes 
and predictors.  In the current study the MSE model was used to analyze differences on 
the outcome variable (acceptance of deviant norms) between departments (Level 2) due 
to anomie and decoupling, within departments (Level 1) due to moral disengagement, and 
to examine cross-level interactions of how anomie and decoupling interact with moral 
disengagement on acceptance of deviant norms on the individual level.  The MSE model 
could also determine which predictors—organizational (Level 2, Between) or individual 
(Level 1, Within)—best accounted for between-level variance in the outcome variable of 
acceptance of deviant norms.  The base level MLM tested the same relationships without 
the inclusion of the measurement portion of the model.  The description of the MSE 
analysis is applicable to the base MLM for all elements other than the measurement 
model (confirmatory factor analysis) component.  
There are two elements to the MSE analysis: a confirmatory factor analysis and a 
path analysis specified for two levels of indicators.  Both elements were implemented 
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within Mplus.  The measurement element, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), is 
necessary to determine whether the latent variables are structured as expected.  CFA is 
chosen when there is an existing hypothesis for the number of common factors.  This 
requires “an understanding of the nature of the variables under consideration, as well as . 
. .  expectations concerning which factor is likely to load on which variables” (Kim & 
Mueller, 1978, p. 55).   
The second model element is the path analysis.  In a structural equation model, 
the structural portion of analysis examines the potential causal dependencies between 
endogenous and exogenous variables through path modeling (Kline, 2005).  To properly 
identify the model, the number of data points should be more than the number of 
estimated parameters.  Because this is a multilevel model, differences were expected both 
Within clusters (Level 1) and Between clusters (Level 2), and the goal was to explain 
variance in the outcome variable based on predictors measured at both levels.  This 
model looked at cross-level propositions, so that Level 2 factors (anomie and decoupling) 
were expected to impact both the intercept and slope of moral disengagement on 
acceptance of deviant norms on Level 1.  Both of the Level 1 parameters, intercept and 
slope, were thus expected to be a function of variability on Level 2 predictors.  These 
hypothesized paths are specified in Figure 1.  
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There were fixed and random effects to be estimated for each of the levels.  Fixed 
effects are similar to typical regression estimates, whereas random effects determine how 
much variance is explained by the latent variables.  A significant result for random 
effects (significant amount of residual variance) would indicate that unexplained 
variability can be diminished with the inclusion of relevant predictors.  Random effects 
were estimated for the acceptance of deviant norms (ADN) latent variable outcome on 
both Levels.  
 The multilevel model building process starts with a null model (intercepts for the 
outcome variable ADN only), and then adds Level 1 predictors (moral disengagement, 
MD), Level 1 covariates (individual level demographic control variables), Level 2 
predictors (anomie, ANO, and decoupling, DEC) with intercepts as outcomes, Level 2 
covariates (department level demographic control variables), random slopes (s1 = ADN 
on MD), and random slopes as outcomes (s1 on ANO, DEC) to examine how the residual 
variance at each level changes with each new addition.  This process was undertaken for 
each outcome latent variable–one each for the three ADN scenarios.  This same process 
for each scenario, without the inclusion of the latent variables (using summed score 
variables instead), was used for the base ML modeling post hoc tests. 
The model fit for the MSE model was evaluated at each stage using the following 
indices:  1) the Loglikelihood HO (LLHO) value, which should be as low as possible and 
is used to create the Deviance Test test statistic for significant of model fit; 2) the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) that is related to residual variance, with a 
desired value under .05; 3) the comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 
that evaluate variance accounted for in the model, with desired values above .90; and 4) 
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the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) that evaluates residual variance, with 
a desired value under .05.  For each model the residual variance between and within were 
used to create the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) to determine how much 
variance is left to be explained at the Between level, where ICC = residual variance 
between/(residual variance between + residual variance within).  Also, Pseudo R2 values 
were calculated to determine how much of a change in residual variance Between and 
Within clusters could be attributed to a new addition to the model, where Pseudo R2 = 
(old residual variance – new residual variance)/old residual variance.  For the base MLM, 
these same model fit statistics are reported, except for those models containing the 
random slope, for which only the Loglikelihood HO values are reported (that is all that 
the statistical program generates). 
Hypothesis Testing with the MSE and ML Models 
Each of the four hypotheses was initially tested through the use of the MSE 
model, and then with the base MLM.  The steps taken to test the hypotheses were the 
same for each modeling method. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that high levels of anomie (aggregated from individual 
evaluations) and high rates of decoupling would be strongly and positively correlated 
within departments.  Within the MSE and ML models, this means that the two variables 
should fit together in the same model and be positively correlated. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that departments with high aggregated individual 
evaluations of anomie and high rates of decoupling would have higher aggregated rates 
of officers accepting deviant norms.  Within the MSE and ML models this means that the 
addition of both anomie and decoupling should account for a significant portion of the 
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Between cluster variance.  When the acceptance of deviant norms intercept is regressed 
on these latent variables on Level 2, the regression coefficients should be positive and 
significant.  The coefficients should remain significant after the addition of Level 2 
demographic covariates. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that individual officers with high moral disengagement 
would be more likely to accept deviant norms.  Within the MSE and ML models this 
means that the addition of moral disengagement to the null model should decrease the 
residual variance on the Within departments level of the model.  When acceptance of 
deviant norms is regressed on the moral disengagement latent variable, the regression 
coefficient should be positive and significant and remain significant after the addition of 
Level 1 demographic covariates.  
The fourth and final hypothesis predicted that rates of departmental anomie 
(aggregated from individual evaluations) and decoupling would moderate the effect of 
moral disengagement on individual officer likelihood to accept deviant norms.  Within 
the MLM, the model-building process was used to evaluate how the explained variance in 
the acceptance of deviant norms varied with the addition of each new predictor.  When 
the Level 2 predictors of anomie and decoupling were added to the model, it could be 
determined if they were accounting for a significant portion of the residual variance 
between departments (not accounted for by moral disengagement or Level 1 demographic 
covariates) and if their addition impacted the relationship between moral disengagement 
and acceptance of deviant norms on the within-cluster level.  The slope between moral 
disengagement and acceptance of deviant norms was then added to the model to see if it 
could be used as an outcome.  If this hypothesis were supported, with the effects of moral 
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disengagement being moderated by anomie and decoupling, then the slope variance 
should be significant, indicating that the relationship significantly varied between Level 2 
clusters.  Also, the slope should stay positive but decrease in magnitude when regressed 
onto anomie and/or decoupling.  This would imply that departments with higher anomie 
and/or decoupling would have weaker relationships between moral disengagement and 
the acceptance of deviant norms.  
Sublevel Analyses 
Sublevel analyses evaluated differences between categories of employees on the 
outcome variable within individual departments.  Possible differences between sublevels 
(i.e., different shifts, occupational roles, genders) within the two largest departments (Los 
Angeles, Chicago) were evaluated by comparing means for each level of the most 
interesting of these demographic variables.  The goal was to acknowledge potential 
differences in the behavior of the model for groups of employees defined by such factors 
as shift, level of crime in the assigned geographic area, work schedule, rank, occupational 
role, and supervisory role.  There were also certain potential interaction effects that could 
create interesting combined variables for sublevel evaluation, including shifts by 
neighborhood crime rates, and rank by length of service.  Relationships between the 
demographic variable and the outcome or predictor variable were analyzed with 
ANOVAs to see if any of the test variables could discriminate between sublevel groups. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Results 
 This section provides the results for all analyses that were conducted on the 
survey data.  This includes the lower level analyses, the multilevel analyses, and the 
sublevel analyses.  The lower level analyses results presented include the descriptives; 
the variability of summed scales across departments, including coverage of issues of 
potential departmental outliers; the bivariate correlations between summed scales; and the 
principal components analyses for all scales.  Results are then presented for the multilevel 
structural equation models and  post-host tests, presented separately for each acceptance 
of deviant norms scenarios.  Lastly, the sublevel analysis results are presented, including 
differences found between groups in the Los Angeles and Chicago departments, and in 
the total sample. 
Descriptives 
Table 3 presents the individual level demographics for this sample based on valid 
percentages.  The sample composition was 81.2% male, 58.6% White, 10.3% Black, and 
18.3% Hispanic.  Forty-four percent of respondents were patrol officers and 18.7% were 
detectives.  Of the respondents, 52.4% worked mainly day shifts, 25.2% worked 
afternoon or evening shifts, and 22.4% worked night shifts.  Just under 38 percent of the 
respondents (37.5%) responded that they were supervising others.  Two-thirds (66%) 
held the rank of officer, 25.4% were ranked as sergeants or higher, 7.9% were ranked as 
lieutenants or higher, and .7% were ranked as captains or higher.  Lastly, 41% reported 
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that they worked in neighborhoods with very high or moderately high crime rates, 34.4% 
in neighborhoods with average rates, and 12.6% in neighborhoods with moderately low 
or very low rates. 
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Table 3 
Demographics of Total Sample (N = 1083) 
Measure        N           Valid % 
Gender 
 Male       755  81.2 
 Female      175  18.8 
Race 
 Black         92  10.3 
 White       523  58.6 
 Latino       164  18.4 
Asian         36    4.0 
Other         77    8.6 
Job Role 
 Patrol       408  44.5 
 Detective      171  18.7 
 Gang/Tactical        45    4.9 
 Narcotics/Vice       35    3.8 
 Community Police       22    2.0 
 Central Administration      28     3.1 
 Command Staff       14    1.3 
 Traffic         44    7.4 
 Other       149  16.3 
Work Day 
 Mostly Days      477  52.4 
 Afternoon/Evening     229  25.2 
 Night Shifts      204  22.4 
Supervisory Status 
 Yes-Supervisor     347  37.5 
 No       579  62.5 
Rank 
 Police Officer      621  66.0 
 Sergeant      239  25.4 
 Lieutenant        74    6.8 
 Captain and above         7      .7 
Neighborhood Crime Rates 
 High       381     41 
 Average      320  34.4 
Low       118  12.6 
Not Assigned      112  10.3 
 
 Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for items within each of the 
scales.  Means for ADN items were scored so that higher scores represented greater 
seriousness, more serious punishment, and greater likelihood of reporting.  Overall means 
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were lowest for ADN2 (covering for a fellow officer), indicating that it was considered 
the least serious offense.  Means were highest for ADN3 (false reporting), indicating that 
this was considered the most serious offense.  Anomie items were scored so that higher 
scores indicated more agreement with the item.  Anomie Items 1 and 2 (ANO1, ANO2) 
had similar means, while Item 3 (ANO3) produced lower scores.  This indicated that 
lying on a report to catch a criminal was less representative of departmental norms in this 
sample than was breaking departmental rules for advancement or keeping secret the 
misconduct of fellow officers.  Decoupling was scored so that 0 represented “not 
decoupled” and 1 represented “decoupled.”  Items 1 and 3 (DDEC1, DDEC3) had higher 
means than did Items 2 and 4 (DDEC2, DDEC4).  This indicated that respondents tended 
to give more decoupled answers to DDEC1 and DDEC3 (tending toward choosing the 
pragmatic goal over the ethical guideline) than to DDEC2 and DDEC4.  Moral 
disengagement was scored so that lower scores indicated lower levels of moral 
disengagment.  The means for the items were fairly similar, except that the mean of MD1 
was a bit higher than the others.  This indicated that respondents tended to give a more 
morally disengaged response to “You can't blame a person who plays only a small part in 
the harm caused by a group” than to other items. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Latent Variable Items (N = 1083) 
       Measure       M   SD 
ADN1 (Kickbacks)      
 1      4.55    .81 
2      4.76  1.24 
4      3.21  1.15 
ADN2 (Covering)  
 1      3.35  1.26 
2      3.71  1.26 
4      2.72  1.17 
ADN3 (False Reporting)  
 1      4.84    .54 
 2      5.46    .92 
 4        3.75  1.14 
Anomie   
 1      1.82    .75 
 2      1.81    .75 
 3          1.37    .61 
Decoupling (Dich)      
1        .32    .47 
 2        .19    .39 
3        .48    .50 
4        .27    .45         
Moral Disengagement 
 1      1.69    .62 
2      1.50    .56 
3      1.58    .61 
4            1.55    .72 
 
Principal Components Analyses 
Principal components analyses (PCAs) were run on each of the four latent 
variables (decoupling, anomie, moral disengagement, and acceptance of deviant norms) 
for the total sample, and then the component structures found for the outcome scales of 
ADN1, ADN2, and ADN3 were confirmed within individual departments to justify 
aggregation of departments.  The PCAs described here were used to confirm and/or 
modify as needed the expected factor structures.  A Cronbach’s alpha was computed for 
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each component with an eigenvalue over 1.  Final scale composition depended on 
eigenvalues, percent explained variance by component, strength of item loadings, and 
alpha scores.   The results of the principal components analyses supported the expected 
structures for all four latent variables (based on the original measures and an 
understanding of the constructs).   
All ADN scales used Items 1, 2, and 4 as representative of individual perceptions 
of acceptance of deviant norms.  As indicated in Table 5, ADN1, the kickbacks scenario, 
loaded on a single component with an eigenvalue of 1.80, accounting for 59.96% of total 
variance with a Cronbach’s alpha of .64. Item loadings were between .65 and .83.  
ADN2, the covering for a fellow officer scenario, loaded on a single component with an 
eigenvalue of 2.18, accounting for 72.77% of total variance, and with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .81.  Loadings were between .80 and .89.  ADN3, the false reporting scenario, also 
loaded on a single component with an eigenvalue of 1.89, accounting for 62.85% of total 
variance, and with a Cronbach’s alpha of .65.  Loadings were between .73 and .83.    
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Table 5 
 
Item Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of Acceptance of Deviant Norms 
Scales. Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance, and Cronbach’s Alpha  
Scale           Item             Loading         Communality 
ADN1   1       .83    .69 
   2       .83    .69 
   4       .65    .42 
  Eigenvalue     1.80 
  % Variance   59.96 
  Cronbach’s α       .64 
 
ADN2   1       .89    .79 
   2       .86    .75 
   4       .80    .64 
  Eigenvalue     2.18 
  % Variance   72.77 
  Cronbach’s α       .81 
 
ADN3   1       .81    .65 
   2       .83    .69 
   4       .73    .54 
  Eigenvalue     1.89 
  % Variance   62.85 
  Cronbach’s α                  .65 
 
As shown in Table 6, the anomie scale had three items loading together on a 
single component with an eigenvalue of 1.70, accounting for 56.58% of total variance, 
and with a Cronbach’s alpha of .62.  Loadings were between .70 and .79.    
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Table 6 
 
Item Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of Anomie Scale. Communalities, 
Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance, and Cronbach’s Alpha  
Scale           Item             Loading         Communality 
ANO   1       .76    .58 
   2       .79    .62 
   3       .70    .49 
  Eigenvalue     1.70 
  % Variance   56.58 
  Cronbach’s α       .62 
 
As seen in Table 7, decoupling loaded initially onto two components.  Component 
1, composed of Items 2 and 4, had an eigenvalue of 1.44, accounting for 36.01% of total 
variance, and having loadings of .78 and .79.  Component 2, composed of Items 1 and 3, 
had an eigenvalue of 1.44, accounting for 30.29% of total variance and having loadings 
of .72 and .82.  As all four variables would not load onto a single factor as need for the 
multilevel models, separate PCAs were run to determine which two items created 
stronger components.  Items 2 and 4 resulted in the stronger model, with greater total 
variance accounted for, a higher Cronbach’s α value, and higher item loadings than Items 
1 and 3.  When this structure was tested within an SEM to see how DEC responded to 
ADN factors being regressed on it, Items 1 and 3 did not load significantly for any of the 
ADN scenarios.  So, for the purposes of the MSE models and the MLMs, DEC was 
measured by DDEC2 and DDEC4 only.  This component, for Items 2 and 4 of DEC only, 
had an eigenvalue of 1.34, accounted for 66.96% of total variance, a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.50 and item loadings of .82 for both items.  
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Table 7 
 
Item Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of Decoupling Scales, Original and 
Revised.  Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance, and Cronbach’s Alpha  
Scale                          Component     
           Item         1        2    Communality 
DEC Original  1       .29      .80   .71 
   2       .78                -.06   .62 
   3      -.33      .76   .68 
   4       .80      .05   .64 
  Eigenvalue     1.44    1.21 
  % Variance   36.01  30.29 
  Cronbach’s α       .50      .33 
 
DEC Revised  2       .82     .67 
   4       .82     .67 
  Eigenvalue     1.34  
  % Variance   66.96 
  Cronbach’s α       .50 
 
As shown in Table 8, moral disengagement as measured by all 4 items loaded 
onto a single component with an eigenvalue of 2.37, accounting for 59.28% of total 
variance, and with a Cronbach’s alpha of .75.  Items 1, 2, and 3 loaded between .79 and 
.86 while Item 4 loaded at .54.  Due to the comparative difference and the disparate 
content of the 4th item, a PCA was run with only Items 1, 2, and 3.  This yielded a single 
component with an eigenvalue of 2.18 that accounted for much greater variance (72.81%) 
than the original structure, and had a higher Cronbach’s alpha (.81), and loadings 
between .82 and .88.  This improved three-item structure was confirmed through a SEM 
regressing ADN factors onto MD and finding it to be the preferred factor structure for the 
scale.  Based on these results, for the MSE model and the MLM post hoc tests, MD was 
composed of Items 1, 2, and 3.  
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Table 8 
 
Item Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of Moral Disengagement Scales, 
Original and Revised. Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance, and 
Cronbach’s Alpha                               
Scale           Item    Loading        Communality 
MD Original  1       .79         .63   
   2       .86                   .74   
   3       .84        .71   
   4       .54         .29  
  
  Eigenvalue     2.37      
  % Variance   59.28   
  Cronbach’s α       .75   
 
MD Revised  1       .82      .67  
   2       .88      .78  
   3       .86      .74 
  Eigenvalue     2.18  
  % Variance   72.81 
  Cronbach’s α       .81 
 
 It was next necessary to confirm that the structures of the acceptance of deviant 
norms scales for each scenario remained consistent across all departments in the sample, 
verifying that comparisons between departments on the outcome variables composed of 
the chosen items was appropriate.  This was accomplished by running principal 
components analyses on the data for each department individually for ADN1, ADN2, and 
ADN3.  There was a concern about the validity of these individual department PCAs due 
to the small sample sizes of three of the departments (Ft. McDowell, Catasauqua, 
Framingham);  however, while there has been a general rule of 4:1 ratio of subjects to 
variables for factor analyses, this is not mandatory.  MacCallum, Widaman, Preacher, and 
Hong (2001) found that “when communalities are high, sample factor solutions 
correspond closely to population solutions even when N is small and factors are weakly 
determined” (p. 615).  This suggests that PCAs can be run for all departments in the 
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sample, and that the validity of the results for the agencies with small N values depends 
primarily on the communalities. (Communalities are evaluated similarly to factor 
loadings such that above .30 is acceptable and scores close to 1.00 are desired.) 
 As can be determined from Tables 9 through 16, overall the three outcome 
variables perform strongly within all of the departments.  The commonalities that fell 
under .30 are in bold.  Based on sample size and communalities, there are a few values 
that are of concern.  For Catasauqua, ADN1 item 4 had a poor communality score, and 
the N was only 12.  Also, for Ft. McDowell, there was not enough variance on the items 
for ADN3 to allow for a PCA analysis to be run.  In both cases, there is thus the 
possibility that the sample may not be close to population values.  Since, generally, the 
scales performed strongly in all eight departments, aggregation of departments was 
determined to be appropriate with this sample. 
Table 9 
 
Ft. McDowell Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms 
Scenarios. Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N=12)  
                            
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .73    .53 
   2       .83    .69 
   4       .82    .66 
  Eigenvalue     1.88           
  % Variance   62.72       
ADN2   1       .91    .82 
   2       .78    .61 
   4       .61    .37 
  Eigenvalue     1.80 
  % Variance   59.98        
ADN3   1    ****             **** 
   2    ****                                   **** 
   4    ****               **** 
  Eigenvalue    **** 
  % Variance    ****    
Note: Statistics could not be run for ADN3 since two of the items had zero variance. 
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Table 10 
 
Catasauqua Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N = 12)   
                           
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .83    .70 
   2       .91    .83 
   4       .39    .15 
  Eigenvalue     1.68      
  % Variance   55.91       
ADN2   1       .89    .78 
   2       .80    .64 
   4       .76    .57 
  Eigenvalue     2.00 
  % Variance   66.56        
ADN3   1       .88    .78 
   2       .93    .86 
   4       .85    .72 
  Eigenvalue     2.36 
  % Variance   78.49   
 
Table 11 
 
Framingham Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N = 5)   
                           
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .95    .91 
   2      -.65    .42 
   4       .85    .73 
  Eigenvalue     2.06      
  % Variance   68.69       
ADN2   1       .83    .68 
   2       .96    .92 
   4       .77    .59 
  Eigenvalue     2.19 
  % Variance   72.99        
ADN3   1       .77    .59 
   2       .79    .63 
   4       .79    .63 
  Eigenvalue     1.84 
  % Variance   61.36   
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Table 12 
 
Skokie Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N = 53-55)   
                           
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .73    .53 
   2       .82    .66 
   4       .79    .62 
  Eigenvalue     1.81      
  % Variance   60.34       
ADN2   1       .87    .76 
   2       .90    .81 
   4       .87    .76 
  Eigenvalue     2.33 
  % Variance   77.49        
ADN3   1       .75    .57 
   2       .74    .55 
   4       .64    .41 
  Eigenvalue     1.53 
  % Variance   50.87    
 
Table 13 
 
Cambridge Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N = 76-78)   
                           
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .85    .72 
   2       .87    .76 
   4       .69    .48 
  Eigenvalue     1.95      
  % Variance   65.02       
ADN2   1       .91    .82 
   2       .85    .72 
   4       .71    .51 
  Eigenvalue     2.05 
  % Variance   68.38        
ADN3   1       .78    .61 
   2       .83    .69 
   4       .69    .48 
  Eigenvalue     1.78 
  % Variance   59.26    
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Table 14 
 
Arlington Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N = 206-212)  
                            
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .82    .67 
   2       .87    .76 
   4       .60    .36 
  Eigenvalue     1.78      
  % Variance   59.45       
ADN2   1       .89    .78 
   2       .88    .77 
   4       .72    .51 
  Eigenvalue     2.07 
  % Variance   68.98        
ADN3   1       .85    .73 
   2       .85    .73 
   4       .67    .45 
  Eigenvalue     1.91 
  % Variance   63.60    
 
Table 15 
 
Chicago Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N =199-204)  
                            
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .85    .73 
   2       .86    .75 
   4       .51    .26 
  Eigenvalue     1.73      
  % Variance   57.71       
ADN2   1       .84    .71 
   2       .82    .68 
   4       .70    .49 
  Eigenvalue     1.87 
  % Variance   62.34        
ADN3   1       .83    .70 
   2       .82    .67 
   4       .65    .42 
  Eigenvalue     1.79 
  % Variance   59.71    
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Table 16 
 
Los Angeles Principal Components Analyses of Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios. 
Communalities, Eigenvalues, Percentages of Variance (Valid N = 379-386)  
                            
Scale           Item    Loading      Communality 
ADN1   1       .83    .69 
   2       .83    .69 
   4       .68    .46 
  Eigenvalue     1.84      
  % Variance   61.24       
ADN2   1       .89    .79 
   2       .84    .71 
   4       .80    .64 
  Eigenvalue     2.14 
  % Variance   71.31        
ADN3   1       .77    .60 
   2       .79    .62 
   4       .66    .44 
  Eigenvalue     1.66 
  % Variance   55.19    
 
Determining Variability of Summed Scales across Departments 
 The items that were retained for each scale were summed to create overall scale 
scores that could then be used to evaluate variability across departments, conduct 
correlations with other scales, and be used in the base multilevel models.   
 To evaluate how much variance exists across departments on the summed scales, 
a few difference analyses were conducted.  Descriptives and variances are first offered 
for each summed scale across the total sample.  Descriptives are then provided for 
individual scales in the 8 different departments to allow for comparisons in scores and 
estimates of variability.  The comparisons of mean scores across departments can serve to 
suggest possible outliers.  Following the descriptives are the results of ANOVAs for each 
of the scales across the departments to verify the significance of the variance and identify 
possible agency outliers.  Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, minimums, 
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maximums, valid N, and variances for each of the summed scales across all departments.  
 The summed scores for ADN1, ADN2, and ADN3 were calculated using Items 1, 
2, and 4.  DEC is composed of DDEC2 and DDEC4 only, ANO is composed of all three 
anomie items, and MD is composed of MD1, MD2, and MD3 only.  The summed scores 
thus reflect the item composition of the scales in the complex models with higher scores 
representing higher acceptance of deviant norms, higher anomie, higher decoupling, and 
higher moral disengagement.  As can be seen in Table 17, of the ADN scenarios, ADN2 
has the highest mean and the highest variance.  Decoupling and moral disengagement had 
the lowest variance of all the scales.  Subsequent ANOVAs were used to test significance 
of scale variance across departments.  
Table 17 
Means, Standard Deviations, Minimums, Maximums, Valid N, and Variances for Summed 
Latent Variables  
Scale     N      min             max          M         SD           Var. 
ADN1   964       3  16        6.47    2.47     6.08  
ADN2   949       3  16        9.22    3.41   11.62 
ADN3   941       3  16        4.94    2.06     4.26  
ANO   970       3  12        4.99    1.59     2.52 
DEC   937       0    2          .46      .69       .47 
MD   975       3  12        4.76    1.52     2.32 
 
 It is also possible to evaluate the amount of deviance that exists to be explained in 
the sample based on the means for the acceptance of deviant norms scenarios.  The means 
for ADN1, ADN2, and ADN3 were 6.47, 9.22, and 4.94 respectively.  These values are 
out of a total possible score of 16, with Item one scored from 1 – 5, Item 2 from 1 – 6, 
and Item 4 from 1 – 5.   This means, that if 100% acceptance of deviance is represented 
with a score of 16, this sample presented deviance acceptance of 40.43% for ADN1, 
57.63% for ADN2, and 30.88% for ADN3.  This represents how much potential 
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deviance, a seemingly moderate level as suggested by deviance acceptance, there was to 
be explained in the sample as a whole. 
 Table 18 presents the mean and standard deviation for each summed scale for 
each agency to demonstrate variation between departments on each of the scales.  One of 
the issues to be evaluated with these data is the possible presence of outliers.  The most 
concerning outlier in this sample is Ft. McDowell, which consistently had some of the 
lowest scores and standard deviations on all items.  Since this is a police department 
servicing an Indian reservation, its characteristics may be considerably dissimilar from 
the other departments.  Thus its outlier status was investigated with the use of ANOVAs.  
In all these tables, for the sake of anonymity, only Ft. McDowell is listed by name, and 
the other departments are given letter titles. 
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Table 18 
Means and Standard Deviations (Excluding pairwise) for Summed Latent Variables by 
Individual Agency  
Scale   Agency            M               SD                 
ADN1   Ft. McDowell           5.83  2.25        
   B      5.91  2.22 
   C      7.43  2.57 
   D      7.53  2.91 
   E      6.00  2.19    
   F      5.86  2.23    
    G      6.21  2.30 
   H      6.60  1.52       
        
ADN2   Ft. McDowell           5.83  2.08  
   B    11.33  3.43 
   C    11.06  3.12 
   D    11.47  3.06 
        E    10.27  3.58     
   F      7.83  2.99    
   G      8.34  3.05 
   H    10.20  2.17       
      
ADN3   Ft. McDowell           3.36    .51        
   B      5.62  1.84  
   C      6.57  2.30 
   D      5.74  2.20 
   E      6.00  3.19  
   F      4.48  1.74    
   G         4.07  1.32     
   H      7.20  2.59     
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Table 18 (cont.) 
Means and Standard Deviations (Excluding pairwise) for Summed Latent Variables by 
Individual Agency  
Scale   Agency            M               SD                 
ANO   Ft. McDowell           4.17  1.34  
   B      5.15  1.62  
   C      5.69  1.77 
   D      5.44  1.71  
        E      5.45  2.16   
   F      4.89  1.40    
   G      4.57  1.39   
   H      5.20  1.30      
 
DEC   Ft. McDowell             .45    .52        
   B        .63    .77  
   C        .40    .63   
   D        .38    .67  
   E        .64    .81   
   F        .41    .68    
   G             .50    .70   
   H        .80    .84     
 
MD   Ft. McDowell           4.42  1.62        
   B      4.80  1.82  
   C      4.79  1.51  
   D      5.39  1.61 
   E      5.27  1.19  
   F      4.64  1.43    
   G         4.68  1.50     
   H      5.40  1.34     
 
 The ANOVAs were run on all summed latent variables across departments to first 
determine if the mean scores on the scales varied significantly across agencies.  The 
ANOVA for ADN1 was significant at F (7, 955) = 10.15, p < .001, ADN2 at F (7, 940) = 
32.70, p < .001, and ADN3 at F (7, 932) = 44.33, p < .001.  ANO was significant at F (7, 
961) = 12.13, p < .001, and MD at F (7, 966) = 2.74, p = .008.  DEC was non-significant 
at F (7, 928) = 1.48, p = .172.  These results indicate sufficient variability of scores 
across departments for most variables.  However, moral disengagement and decoupling, 
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the two variables that (as can be seen in later results) performed problematically in the 
complex models, had the lowest variability across departments.  This may be due to 
problems in measurement (too few items or improper items for the scales) or in sampling 
(not enough diversity between agencies).  These concerns are explored in the discussion 
section.  The lack of significant variance for decoupling across the departments indicated 
that it would not function properly as a level 2 covariate in the complex models.  
Decoupling was still included in the complex models to further test the hypotheses, but 
problems were expected due to this preliminary result. 
 Lastly, Ft. McDowell was compared to other individual departments with the use 
of Dunnet’s C post hoc tests to determine if it was in fact substantially different from 
other departments and hence an outlier.  Due to small sample size in certain departments, 
differences of .50 in the mean values were considered substantial differences between 
those departments and were reported.  Table 19 presents all of the mean differences 
above .50, comparing Ft. McDowell to other departments on each latent variable.  
Significant differences are noted.  The interpretation of the substantial differences must 
account for sample size, such that the cutoff of .50 is most valid when comparing two 
departments with small sample sizes, and less valid when comparing Ft. McDowell, for 
instance, to a department with a large sample size, such as department H.  Taking this 
under consideration, while all mean differences above .50 are presented in Table 19, this 
cutoff is will only be used when comparing Ft. McDowell to the other departments with 
small sample sizes.  When compared to other departments, assessments will use 
significance estimates (difference scores used for assessments are in bold). 
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Table 19 
 
Dunnet’s C Post Hoc Test.  Substantial Mean Differences between Ft. McDowell and 
other Agencies on Latent Variables   
Scale   Agency  Agency    MD         
ADN1   Ft. McDowell   
      C   -1.60   
        D   -1.69  
    H     -.77     
           
ADN2   Ft. McDowell  
      B   -5.50*   
        C   -5.23   
      D   -5.64*   
      E   -4.44  
      F   -2.00   
      G   -2.51    
      H   -4.37       
      
ADN3   Ft. McDowell   
      B   -2.26*   
      C   -3.21*    
      D   -2.38*    
      E   -2.64  
      F   -1.12*    
      G     -.71*    
      H   -3.84      
            
ANO   Ft. McDowell      
      B     -.98     
      C   -1.53*  
      D   -1.27  
      E   -1.29 
      F     -.73      
      H   -1.03    
       
DEC   ****   ***** 
MD   Ft. McDowell    
      D     -.97   
      E     -.86     
      H     -.98          
*p < .05 
 Based on this method of evaluating substantial differences, Ft. McDowell was 
determined to be a significant outlier for ADN3, but not for any of the other variables.  
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This indicates that respondents in the Ft. McDowell agency were significantly more 
likely to have lower acceptance of deviant norms on the false reporting scenario as 
compared to other agencies.  Since this result was found for only one of the latent 
variables, it is appropriate to aggregate Ft. McDowell with other agencies.   
 Based on these analyses, there was determined to be sufficient variability across 
the sample for ADN1, ADN2, ADN3 and ANO, but insufficient variability for DEC and 
MD.  This may be relevant when interpreting complex model results.  Also, the 
department of Ft. McDowell was determined to be an outlier to the rest of the sample on 
the outcome variable of ADN3 only, so it was determined appropriate to retain it in the 
analysis.   
Bivariate Correlations 
 Table 8 presents first the bivariate correlations between the summed latent 
variable scores for ADN1, ADN2, ADN3 (using Items, 1, 2, and 4 only to represent 
individual perspectives as used in the MSE model), ANO, DEC (Items 2 and 4), and MD 
(Items 1, 2, and 3).  All were significantly correlated with each other with the exception 
of the decoupling measure, which failed to be significantly correlated with ADN1, 
ADN2, ANO, and MD, and had much lower correlations than other measures on ADN3.  
All other correlations were significant at p < .001.   
 The second part of the table presents correlations between the acceptance of 
deviant norms scenarios and the anomie items.  These correlations were examined to 
determine whether the anomie items had a different relationship with difference forms of 
corruption (ADN1 and ADN2 as normative corruption, and ADN3 as noble cause 
corruption).  As seen in the first half of the table, all three scenarios were significantly 
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correlated with the composite anomie score, with correlations going low to high from 
ADN1 to ADN3.  While there was a stronger correlation of anomie with the noble cause 
corruption scenario (ADN3), all the coefficients were moderately high and significant at 
p < .001.  As such, while there may be a stronger relationship between noble cause 
corruption and anomie, this was not considered significant enough to impact 
interpretations of model results. 
 These correlations were also examined to determine if the significant correlation 
between ADN3 (the false reporting scenario) and anomie was due to the similarity 
between the scenario and anomie item 3.  Both ADN3 and Anomie item 3 deal with the 
issue of false reporting.  This similarity of content could account for the higher 
correlation between the composite anomie score and ADN3 as compared to the other two 
scenarios.  To test this, ADN3 was correlated with anomie item 3 and with a composite 
score of anomie items 1 and 2 (see last column in Table 8).  The correlations were .41 
and .38 respectively, indicating that the correlation between the false reporting ADN item 
and the false reporting anomie item were only slightly higher than correlations to a 
composite anomie score that contained only the remaining anomie items.  As such, it is 
reasonable to conclude that ADN3 and anomie correlations are not due to   potentially 
tautological item similarities, and that it is unlikely therefore that the higher correlation 
between ADN3 (compared to ADN1 and ADN2) and anomie is the result of the content 
similarities.    
 The last column in Table 20 confirms this; it presents correlations for all three 
ADN scenarios with a composite anomie score of Items 1 and 2 only–removing the false 
reporting item.  Total correlations drop in magnitude, but they are all still significant, and 
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the same trends appear, with the highest correlation being between anomie with ADN3 
and the lowest between anomie and ADN1.  These analyses indicate that the results for 
the composite scales are not due to tautological conflicts, and that the higher correlation 
of anomie to noble cause corruption is indeed valid.  The significance of this will be 
presented in the discussion regarding future research. 
Table 20 
Intercorrelations for Summed Latent Variables, and for ADN Scenarios and 
Individual/Combined Anomie Items (N = 1083) 
Measure    1    2   3    4  5         6  
 
1.  ADN1    --         
2.  ADN2  .48**   -- 
3.  ADN3  .44**  .49**    -- 
4.  ANO  .29**  .36**  .45**      -- 
5.  DEC  .04            -.04  .07*            -.02   -- 
6.  MD   .25**  .24**  .26**  .48**  .01         -- 
   Anomie 1 Anomie 2 Anomie 3 Anomie 1 + 2 
 
1.  ADN1    .15**     .24**   .28**    .23** 
2.  ADN2    .23**     .29**   .29**    .31** 
3.  ADN3    .29**     .35**   .41**    .38** 
**p < .001   *p < .05 
Multilevel Structural Equation Models and Post-Hoc Tests 
Overview 
 MSE modeling was conducted separately on each latent variable outcome 
representing the three ADN scenarios: ADN1) kickbacks, ADN2) covering for a fellow 
officer, and ADN3) false reporting.  Numerous problems were encountered during the 
testing of these models due to large variances for some of the variables, or variances 
close to zero.  After resetting these variances and other adjustments, it was possible to 
partially test the hypotheses with MSE modeling.  The results presented here represent 
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the testing of the hypothesized structure, with some alterations for poor performance, low 
correlations, and lack of convergence.  Different control variables were used for each 
outcome variable.  They were used in their dummy-coded versions for proper model 
interpretation.  These were chosen based on strong bivariate correlations with the 
outcome variable, model convergence, and contribution to model fit.  This selection 
process allowed for the use of the control variables for each outcome variable that were 
likely to create the most accurate evaluation of variance accounted for by the predictors 
alone.   
 Below, for each ADN model, the main steps for reaching the final model are 
explained and presented in a tabular format.  Following descriptions of the MSE model 
tests for each scenario, the results of the post-hoc tests for each are detailed.  The Within 
clusters/departments residual variance (σ0) and the Between clusters/departments 
variance (μ0) will be used to evaluate the value of each addition, both directly, using the 
critical ratio (CR) test for significance, and indirectly through the creation of the ICC and 
the Pseudo R2.   
Due to problems with MSE model convergence and identification, base 
Multilevel Modeling (MLM) was utilized as the post hoc test for all ADN scenarios.  
Summed scores for each of the latent variables were used in the MLMs to test the 
hypothesized relationships.  In order to ensure proper model identification for all model 
iterations, a minimal number of demographic covariates were included.  In this manner, 
all hypotheses were able to be tested with the MLMs. 
 All models have been nested for proper interpretations of the LLHO fit statistic 
through model comparisons.  Models including decoupling have been compared to the 
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relevant less complex models within a separate nesting scheme including decoupling as a 
parameter (as substitution for, or in combination with, anomie, depending on the model). 
ADN Scenario 1: Kickbacks 
Multilevel structural equation model results.  As indicated in Table 21, the null 
model for ADN1 had significant Within (σ0 = .328, CR = 3.629, p < .001) and Between 
(μ0 = .023, CR = 2.19, p = .028) level variance values indicating a significant portion of 
variance in the outcome variable to be explained on both levels.  The ICC indicated that 
6.55% of total model variance is explained on the Between departments level.  The model 
had a Loglikelihood HO (LLHO) = -15691.98, RMSEA = .136, CFI = .10, TLI = .09, 
Within SRMR = .143, and a Between SRMR = .270.  These values indicated a 
moderately well fitting null model.  
Table 21 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1 MSEM: Null Model. Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (L1, L2), ICC, and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=870, 8 clusters) 
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e. 
ADN1-1        1.439    0.060        
ADN1-2       2.225                0.073     
ADN1-4       2.773    0.162     
     
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.023   0.010   2.19* 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   0.328   0.090   3.63* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.066 (6.55%)               
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -15691.98, RMSEA = .136, CFI = .10, TLI = .09, WSRMR = .143, 
and BSRMR = .270 
 
 Next, MD was added to the model on the Within level and ADN1 was regressed 
on MD.  As indicated in Table 22, the total model had a LLHO = -15691.84 indicating 
almost no change in fit although other fit indices showed a slight improvement (RMSEA 
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= .112, CFI = .41, TLI = .38, WSRMR = .126, BSRMR=.270).  In the measurement 
portion of the model, ADN1 loaded strongly on both Within and Between levels.  
Standardized loadings for MD were moderate, ranging from .38 to 1.00.  However, 
ADN1 regressed on MD was not significant (b = -.02, CR= -.463 p = .643).  Both the 
Within and Between variances remained significant, with none of the Within variance 
accounted for by the addition of MD (Pseudo R2 = 0).  The ICC stayed the same at 6.55% 
indicating little change in the total model variance to be explained at the Between level.    
Table 22 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MSEM: Moral Disengagement only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=870, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD    -0.023   0.049     -.46 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.023   0.011   2.15* 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   0.328   0.090   3.66* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.066 (6.55%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.000 (0.00%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 -0.217 (-21.74%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -15691.84, RMSEA = .112, CFI = .41, TLI = .38, WSRMR = .126, 
and BSRMR = .270 
 
 Level 1 (individual level) covariates, chosen based on strong bivariate 
correlations with ADN1, were then added to the model.  As indicated in Table 23, those 
retained showed positive contribution to model fit.  These were Officer (OFFICER), 
Lieutenant and above (LIEUTUP), Captain and above (CAPTUP), Supervisory status 
(SUPER), low neighborhood crime rates (LOWCR), and Dayshift (DAYSHIFT).  The 
total model had a LLHO = -13851.79, a significantly better model fit than with MD 
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alone, and other model fit indices improved as well.  The measurement model was 
unaffected by the addition, and the ADN1 on MD regression coefficient showed only 
slight improvement while remaining non-significant.  Thus moral disengagement did not 
contribute anything to the model, with or without   the control variables. 
When ADN1 was regressed onto the control variables, OFFICER was positive 
and significant, LIEUTUP was negative and non-significant, CAPTUP was negative and 
significant, DAYSHIFT was negative and significant, SUPER was negative and non-
significant, and LOWCR was negative and non-significant.  These results indicated that 
respondents with higher ranks, supervisors, and those who worked dayshifts and in 
neighborhoods with lower crime tended to have lower ADN1 scores.  The ICC value 
indicated an increased amount of variance to be explained at the Between level (8.52%), 
while the addition of the Level 1 covariates accounted for 14.94% of the Within level 
variance (see Table 23).   
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Table 23 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MSEM: Moral Disengagement, L1 covariates. 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=870, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD    -0.047   0.040     -1.64 
 on Officer               0.186   0.054               3.46* 
 on Lieutenant up             -0.093   0.048   -1.94* 
 on Captain up         -0.261   0.108              -2.40 
 on Supervisor   -0.060   0.040   -1.50 
 on Low Crime   -0.053   0.045   -1.18 
 on Dayshift   -0.091   0.032   -2.87* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.026   0.012   2.14* 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   0.279   0.087   3.21* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.085 (8.52%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.149 (14.94%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.071 (-7.14%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -13851.79, RMSEA = .084, CFI = .66, TLI = .62, WSRMR = .083, 
and BSRMR = .270 
 
 Decoupling was attempted as an addition to the model. As indicated in Table 24, 
its addition created a test statistic of only 1.22 indicating that the model fit improved but 
not significantly.  ADN1 regressed on DEC was b = -.58, CR = -.71, p = .480, meaning 
that decoupling did not function as a significant predictor.  Residual Between variance 
was decreased, with a Pseudo R2 = .962, indicating that the addition of decoupling to the 
model did account for 96.15% of the variance to be explained at the Between level, with 
an ICC of .36%.  
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Table 24 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MSEM: MD, L1 cov, Decoupling only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects related to Decoupling addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model 
Fit Indices (Valid N=870, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD              -0.047   0.040            -1.16 
 on DEC             -0.584        0.821               -0.71 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.001        0.061        0.02 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   0.279        0.087        3.21* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.003 (.36%)  
Within Pseudo  R2   0.000 (0%)    
Between Pseudo R2                  0.962 (96.15%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -13850.57, RMSEA = .083, CFI = .66, TLI = .63, WSRMR = .083, 
and BSRMR = .322 
 
Since it was not possible to add ANO to DEC to serve as mutual Level 2 
predictors (model would not identify), the model was tested with the addition of ANO 
instead of DEC to see how the two compared in terms of their contribution to the model.  
(Due to this identification problem it was not possible to evaluate the correlative 
relationship between anomie and decoupling for Hypothesis 1, and this had to be 
investigated with the MLM post hoc test.) 
 When adding ANO instead of DEC, the test statistic was 16.5, significantly better 
than the prior model and indicating that ANO was a better fit than DEC.  That ANO was 
a better fit to the model than DEC was indicated not only by the test statistic but also by 
the higher significance for regressing ADN1 on ANO (b = 1.75, CR = 4.02, p < .001).  
More importantly, after the addition of ANO, the ICC = 0, and the Between Pseudo R2 = 
1.00, indicating that the addition of ANO accounted for 100% of the residual Between 
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variance.  Based on these results DEC was not included in the final MSE model for 
ADN1.   
The final model thus included MD as a latent predictor with the covariates of 
OFFICER, LIEUTUP, CAPTUP, SUPER, LOWCR, and DAYSHIFT all on Level 1.  
ANO was the only predictor on Level 2.  No Level 2 covariates could be added to the 
model as there was no more Between variance to be explained.  The final ADN1 model 
statistics were LLHO = -13835.29, RMSEA = .083, CFI = .67, TLI = .63, WSRMR = 
.083, and BSRMR = .183, indicating that, although it served to test some of the 
hypotheses, the final model was still not a good fit to the data.  Final structural model 
statistics can be found in Table 25.   
Table 25 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MSEM Final Model: MD, L1 cov., Anomie. 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=870, 8 clusters)                    
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD              -0.046       0.041                  -1.12 
 on Officer              0.182        0.054                 3.39* 
 on Lieutenant up            -0.095        0.044                  -2.15* 
 on Captain up                  -0.252        0.122                -2.06* 
 on Supervisor             -0.061   0.042             -1.43 
 on Low Crime             -0.053   0.040             -1.32 
 on Dayshift             -0.092   0.032             -2.84 
 on ANO   1.175        0.292        4.02* 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.000        0.014                 -0.00 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   0.269        0.084        3.22* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.000 (0%)  
Within Pseudo R2              0.000 (0%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  1.000 (100%) 
*p < .05 
Fit of ADN1 Model: LLHO = -13835.29, RMSEA = .083, CFI = .67, TLI = .63, 
WSRMR = .083, and BSRMR = .183 
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 Due to the inability to evaluate anomie and decoupling together in the MSE 
models, Hypothesis 1 could not be tested (ANO and DEC correlated) and was tested in 
the MLM post hoc analyses.  For ADN1, Hypothesis 2 was supported for anomie, such 
that the addition of ANO accounted for all of the Between level variance, and ADN1 
regressed on ANO neared significance.  Hypothesis 2 was not, however, supported for 
DEC; the regression coefficient was not significant.  ADN1 regressed on MD was not 
significant and accounted for no within variance, thus   Hypothesis 3 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 could not be tested in the MSE model because the random slope of s1 = 
ADN1 on MD required too many integration points.  Based on these results and what was 
possible with the MSE model, all four hypotheses were tested further with a post hoc 
base MLM.  All ADN1 MSE models can be viewed together in Table 26. 
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 Multilevel model post-hoc tests.  The base level MLM used non-latent summed 
variables to evaluate 2-level path relationships.  These models had to be pared down, 
eliminating most demographic covariates in order to allow convergence with a random 
slope.  The major steps from the null model to the final model, with the purpose of 
hypothesis testing, are discussed below.   
 First, the null model was evaluated, including just the outcome variable of 
acceptance of deviant norms for Scenario 1 (ADN1).  As indicated in Table 27, the null 
model for ADN1 had significant Within (σ0 = 5.687, CR = 12.99, p < .001) and Between 
(μ0 = .439, CR = 3.38, p = .001) level variance values indicating a significant portion of 
variance in the outcome variable to be explained on both levels.  The ICC indicated that 
7.17% of total model variance could be explained on the Between departments level.  The 
model had a Loglikelihood HO value of -6029.03, with an RMSEA=.244, CFI=.00, 
TL1=.00, Within SRMR=.20, and Between SRMR=.25.  This indicated a poorly fitting 
null model.  
Table 27 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM: Null Model. Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (L1, L2), ICC, and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=903, 8 clusters)              
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e. 
ADN1 Mean    6.457        0.269 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.439        0.130        3.38* 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.687        0.438                12.99* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.072 (7.17%)               
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -6029.03, RMSEA = .244, CFI = .00, TLI = .00, WSRMR = .204, 
and BSRMR = .248 
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Next, MD was added to the model on the Within level and ADN1 was regressed 
on MD.  As indicated in Table 28, the total model had a LLHO = -4340.17 indicating a 
significantly better fit than the null model and other fit indices improved slightly 
(RMSEA = .247, CFI = .126, TLI = 1.00, WSRMR = .191, BSRMR=.248).  ADN1 
regressed on MD was also significant (b = .36, CR= 5.88, p < .001).  The Within variance 
remained significant, as did the Between variance.  Only 5.12% of the Within variance 
was accounted for by the addition of MD (Pseudo R2 = .051).  The ICC decreased to 
6.50% indicating a decrease in the total model variance to be explained at the Between 
level.  
Table 28 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM: Moral Disengagement only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=903, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD    0.358        0.061        5.88* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.375        0.106        3.54* 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.396        0.380                14.22* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.065 (6.50%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.051 (5.12%) 
Between Pseudo R2       0.146 (14.58%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -4340.17, RMSEA = .247, CFI = .13, TLI = -.02, WSRMR = .191, 
and BSRMR = .248 
 
Level 1 (individual level) covariates were tested in the model based on strong 
bivariate correlations with ADN1, and the best fitting one for the model, Officer 
(OFFICER), was retained.  As indicated in Table 29, the total model had a LLHO = -
3709.93, a significant better model fit than with MD alone.  Other model fit indices 
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remained about the same.  The ADN1 on MD regression coefficient did maintain 
significance with the addition of the covariate (b = .33, CR = 6.53, p < .001).  This 
indicated that MD contributed something to the model over and above the control 
variable, supporting Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient produced from ADN1 regressed onto 
OFFICER was positive and significant, indicating that respondents with a rank of officer 
tended to have higher ADN1 scores than those of higher ranks.  The ICC value indicated 
an increased amount of variance to be explained at the Between level (8.24%), while the 
addition of the Level 1 covariates accounted for 5.12% of the Within level variance.    
Table 29 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM: Moral Disengagement, L1 covariate. 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=903, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD    0.328        0.050        6.53* 
 on Officer              0.981        0.161                  6.09* 
  
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.465        0.285        1.63* 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.175        0.244                21.73* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.082 (8.24%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.041 (4.10%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 -0.240 (-24.00%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3709.93, RMSEA = .276, CFI = .23, TLI = -.15, WSRMR = .176, 
and BSRMR = .248 
 
 The next stage involved the addition of the Level 2 predictors to the model.  
When it was determined that it would not be possible to test the random slope of ADN1 
on MD as the outcome with both ANO and DEC in the model as predictors (model would 
not terminate properly), it was necessary to determine which of the two was a better fit 
for the total model.  ANO was evaluated as an addition to the model and used through the 
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model iterations to the final “random slope as outcome” model.  DEC was then evaluated 
in the same way.  Both contributed significantly to an explanation of ADN1 variance 
between departments and had similar results as predictors of the random slope.  As such, 
both versions of the model for ADN1 (anomie and decoupling) have been presented here.   
Since ANO and DEC did not function together in the full model, Hypothesis 1 for 
ADN1 (significant correlation between ANO and DEC) was tested on a model that 
included MD, Rank, ANO, and DEC with a command of ANO with DEC to evaluate the 
correlative relationship.  The resulting estimate was b = -.01, indicating a very low 
correlation, and the model would not terminate properly.  Thus Hypothesis 1 could be 
rejected.   
The following will present first the sequence of models that include anomie as the 
only Level 2 predictor.  Then the second sequence of models will be presented that 
instead use decoupling as the only Level 2 predictor.  Each sequence of models will test 
Hypotheses 2 and 4 for the respective Level 2 predictors (anomie or decoupling), 
determining the significance of the regression coefficient with ADN1, and with the slope 
between ADN1 and moral disengagement. 
As indicated in Table 30, when anomie was added to the model, the LLHO was -
3581.71 indicating that the model fit significantly improved.  Other test statistics 
supported this.  Also, ADN1 regressed on ANO was b = 1.56, CR = 2.81, p = .005, 
indicating that it functioned as a significant predictor, thus supporting Hypothesis 2 for 
anomie.  Residual Between variance decreased, with a Pseudo R2 = .684, indicating that 
the addition of anomie to the model accounted for 68.39% of the variance to be explained 
at the Between level, with an ICC of 2.76%.    
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Table 30 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM: MD, L1 cov, Anomie only. Fixed Effects 
and Random Effects related to Anomie addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices 
(Valid N=903, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD    0.329        0.050        6.55* 
 on ANO              1.599        0.556        2.81* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.147       0.144        1.02 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.177        0.245                21.17* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.028 (2.76%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.000 (-.04%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.684 (68.39%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3581.71, RMSEA = .152, CFI = .80, TLI = .21, WSRMR = .041, 
and BSRMR = .006 
 
 The addition of the random slope of ADN1 on MD to the model containing MD, 
Officer, and ANO did not significantly change the Between or Within variance, and the 
ICC remained similar at 2.71%.  The intention of adding the random slope to the model 
was to determine how much the relationship between ADN1 and MD varied across 
clusters.  The mean for the random slope of s1 (ADN1 on MD) was .34, with CR= 5.74, p 
< .001.  This indicated that the average effect for moral disengagement on ADN1 was 
positive and significant.  However, the variance estimate for the slope was not significant 
(Est. = .00, CR = .39, p = .697), indicating that the effect of moral disengagement on 
ADN1 did not vary significantly across departments.  As such, there was not enough 
variance to try to explain with the use of a predictor.  However, since Hypothesis 4 
required the regression of s1 on ANO, this was still attempted.   
The results of this final model–which includes the random slope of ADN1 on MD 
as the outcome, regressed onto ANO–are presented in Table 31 as the final MLM model 
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for ADN1.  The LLHO was -3579.87.  The resulting ICC was 2.68% with a non-
significant Level 2 residual variance.  The Within Pseudo R2 as compared to the model 
containing no random slope was .004, and the Between Pseudo R2 was .034.  This 
indicated that the inclusion of the random slope as outcome to the model accounted for 
.41% of the Within variance and 3.4% of the Between variance.  As expected, the 
regression of s1 on ANO was not significant (b = .25, CR = .03, p = .978) indicating that 
ANO did not have a significant effect on the relationship between MD and ADN1 across 
departments, leading to a rejection of Hypothesis 4. 
Table 31 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM Final Model (Anomie):MD, L1 cov, 
Anomie, Random Slope as Outcome (s1=ADN1 on MD). Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=903, 8 clusters)              
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on Officer              0.975        6.154                  0.16 
 on ANO              1.549                13.512        0.12 
s1 on ANO   0.248                 9.079        0.03 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.142        4.589        0.03 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.156        4.182        1.23 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.026 (2.68%)  
Within Pseudo R2        0.004 (.41%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.034 (3.40%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3579.87 
 
When decoupling was added to the model, its addition created a test statistic of 
4.48, indicating that the model fit significantly improved.  Other test statistics supported 
this.  However, as seen in Table 32, ADN1 regressed on DEC was b = 11.31, CR = -1.66, 
p = .096, indicating that decoupling did not function as a significant predictor, thus 
leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 2 for decoupling.  Residual Between variance was 
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decreased, with a Pseudo R2 = .694, indicating that the addition of decoupling to the 
model accounted for 69.43% of the variance to be explained at the Between level, with an 
ICC of 2.74%.  This suggested that while decoupling was not a significant predictor, it 
added slightly more to the total model than anomie, and accounted for a large amount of 
variance between departments. 
Table 32 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM: MD, L1 cov, Decoupling only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects related to Decoupling addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model 
Fit Indices (Valid N=905, 8 clusters) 
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on MD    0.330        0.050        6.64* 
 on DEC           -11.313                  6.798                -1.66 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.144        0.295        0.49 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.108        0.241                21.20* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.027 (2.74%) 
Within Pseudo R2        0.000 (.04%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.694 (69.43%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -2969.27, RMSEA = .034, CFI = .99, TLI = .95, WSRMR = .014, 
and BSRMR = .000 
 
 The addition of the random slope of ADN1 on MD to the model containing MD, 
Rank, and DEC did not change the Within variance very much, although it increased the 
Between variance by 15%.  The ICC remained very low at 2.64%, and evidencing a slight 
drop.  The intention of adding the random slope to the model was to determine how much 
the relationship between ADN1 and MD varied across clusters.  The mean for the random 
slope of s1 (ADN1 on MD) was .337, with CR= 5.69, p < .001.  This indicated that the 
average effect for moral disengagement on ADN1 was positive and significant.  
However, the variance estimate for the slope was not significant (Est. = .00, CR = .47, p 
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= .641), indicating that the effect of moral disengagement on ADN1 did not vary 
significantly across departments.  As such, similar to the model containing anomie, there 
was not enough significant variance to try to explain with the use of a predictor.  
However, since Hypothesis 4 required the regression of s1 on DEC, this was still 
attempted.   
The results of the model including the random slope of ADN1 on MD as the 
outcome, regressed onto DEC, are presented in Table 33 as the final MLM model for 
ADN1.  The LLHO was -2968.00.  The resulting ICC was 3.94% with a non-significant 
Level 2 residual variance.  The Within Pseudo R2 as compared to the model containing no 
random slope was .004, and the Between Pseudo R2 was -.451.  This indicated that the 
inclusion of the random slope as outcome to the model accounted for .35% of the Within 
variance and -45.14% of the Between variance (creating more variance to be explained 
between clusters as opposed explaining variance).  As expected, the regression of s1 on 
DEC was not significant (b = 1.57, CR = -.03, p = .975) indicating that DEC did not have 
a significant effect on the relationship between MD and ADN1 across departments, 
leading to a rejection of Hypothesis 4.  The most relevant ADN1 base multilevel models 
can be viewed together in Table 34. 
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Table 33 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 1, MLM Final Model (Decoupling): MD, L1 cov, 
Decoupling, Random Slope as Outcome (s1=ADN1 on MD). Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=905, 8 clusters)             
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 on Officer              0.957        7.843                 0.12 
 on DEC             -8.737                 27.059                 -0.32 
s1 on DEC             -1.565                49.118                -0.03  
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN1 Level 2 Effect   0.209         4.133        0.05 
ADN1 Level 1 Effect   5.090         1.097        4.64*  
 
Interclass Correlation   0.039 (3.94%)  
Within Pseudo R2        0.004 (.35%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 -0.451 (-45.14%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -2968.00 
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 Summary.  Based on the results from the two modeling methods, for ADN1, 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported; decoupling and anomie not significantly correlated.  
Hypothesis 2 was only partially supported, indicating that anomie was a significant 
predictor of ADN1, but that decoupling, while contributing considerably to the base 
MLM, was not a significant predictor.  Hypothesis 3 was supported in the MLM with a 
significant and positive relationship between moral disengagement and ADN1 after the 
inclusion of a covariate, but this significance vanished in the more complex MSE model.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4 was not supported in the MLM, as there was not a significant 
proportion of variance in the slope of ADN1 on MD to be explained across departments, 
and with neither DEC nor ANOMIE having a significant effect on this relationship.  The 
best model for the data for Scenario 1, based on the MLM results, is presented in Figure 
2.  This includes the coefficients for the final multilevel relationships and the random 
slope. 
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ADN Scenario 2: Covering for a Fellow Officer 
Multilevel structural equation model results.  As indicated in Table 35, the null 
model for ADN2 had significant Within (σ0 = .996, CR = 27.37, p < .001) and Between 
(μ0 = .174, CR = 3.71, p < .001) level variance values indicating a significant portion of 
variance to be explained on both levels.  The ICC indicated that 14.87% of total model 
variance could be explained on the Between departments level, a great deal more than 
was found for ADN1.  The model had a Loglikelihood HO (LLHO) = -8495.29, RMSEA 
= .29, CFI = .00, TLI = -.15, Within SRMR = .128, and a Between SRMR = .301.  These 
values indicated a well-fitting null model.  
Table 35 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MSEM: Null Model. Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (L1, L2), ICC, and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=862, 8 clusters)                      
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e. 
ADN2-1        2.891    0.166        
ADN2-2       3.567                0.219     
ADN2-4       3.524    0.168     
     
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   0.174        0.047        3.71* 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   0.996        0.036                27.37* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.149 (14.87%)               
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -8495.29, RMSEA = .290, CFI = .00, TLI = -.15, WSRMR = .128, 
and BSRMR = .301 
 
Next, MD was added to the model on the Within level and ADN2 was regressed 
onto MD.  As indicated in Table 36, the total model had a LLHO = -8126.99, indicating a 
better fit, although other fit indices remained good, similar to the results for ADN1 
(RMSEA = .135, CFI = .77, TLI = .75, WRMSR = .091, BRSRMR = .301).  In the 
measurement portion of the model, ADN2 items loaded strongly on both Level 1 and 2, 
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with standardized loadings ranging from .59 to .85.  MD items also loaded strongly on 
the Within level, with standardized loadings from .38 to 1.00.  Similar to the model for 
ADN1 however, ADN2 regressed on MD was not significant (b = -.05, CR = -.42, p = 
.673).  There was no change in the Within variance with the addition of MD, which 
remained significant at p < .001.  The addition of MD slightly reduced the Within 
variance, with a Pseudo R2 = .001, although the total Within variance remained 
significant, with an ICC of 14.96%, indicating only a small drop.  
Table 36 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MSEM: Moral Disengagement only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=862, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD              -0.050        0.118                  -0.42 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   0.175        0.047        3.75* 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   0.995        0.037                26.81* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.150 (14.96%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.001 (.10%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 -0.006 (-.57%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -8126.99, RMSEA = .135, CFI = .77, TLI = .75, WSRMR = .091, 
and BSRMR = .301 
 
Next, Level 1 covariates were added to the model based on their strong bivariate 
correlations with ADN2.  Those retained showed a positive contribution to model fit.  
These were Nightshift (NIGHTSHIFT), Low Neighborhood Crime Rate (LOWCR), and 
Captain and above (CAPTUP).  As indicated in Table 37, the total model had a LLHO = -
14134.09, a significantly worse model fit than with MD alone, and the other model fit 
indices also worsened somewhat.  The total model remained reasonably acceptable 
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(RMSEA = -.072, CFI = .63, TLI = .60, WRSRMR = .104, BSRMR = .299).  The ADN1 
on MD regression coefficient also diminished and remained non significant.  This 
indicated that MD was not significantly contributing to an explanation of ADN2 
variance, with or without the addition of control variables.   
When ADN2 was regressed onto the control variables, NIGHTSHIFT was 
positive and significant, LOWCR was negative and significant, and CAPTUP was 
negative and significant.  These results indicated that although ADN2 was similar to 
ADN1, in that those ranked captain and up had significantly lower scores than those 
ranked below them, unlike ADN1, respondents in neighborhoods with higher crime rates 
and those working night shifts had higher ADN2 scores.  The ICC value indicated that 
some of the Between variance (1.71%) was explained by these covariates.  The addition 
of the Level 1 covariates accounted for 3.42% of the Within level variance.  Hence the 
demographic variables explained more of the Within variance for ADN2 than did MD. 
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Table 37 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MSEM: Moral Disengagement, L1 covariates. 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=862, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD              -0.056        0.109                  -0.52 
 on Nightshift              0.303        0.052                  5.83* 
 on Captain Up             -0.561        0.124                  -4.52* 
 on Low Crime                   -0.251        0.062                   -4.08* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   0.053        0.038        1.39* 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   0.959        0.033                 28.87* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.152 (15.18%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.034 (3.42%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.017 (1.71%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -14134.09, RMSEA = .072, CFI = .63, TLI = .60, WSRMR = .104, 
and BSRMR = .299 
 
When DEC was added to the model the model failed to identify, indicating that 
DEC was a poor fit to the model, despite a correction for high variances.  In contrast, as 
seen in Table 38, the addition of only ANO to the model improved the overall model fit 
(LLHO = -8154.44, RMSEA = .134, CFI = .80, TLI = .76, WSRMR = .088, BSRMR = 
.152) and accounted for a large portion of the Between level variance to be explained.  
ANO had high item loadings, close to 1.00, and ADN2 regressed on ANO was significant 
at b = 2.92, CR = 4.10, p < .001.  The Between variance was diminished, with an ICC of 
5.24% remaining.  The addition of ANO thus accounted for 69.19% of remaining 
Between variance (Pseudo R2 = .692).  Unlike the ADN1 model, however, the inclusion 
of ANO did not impact the relationship between ADN2 and MD, which remained at the 
same level of non-significance.  
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Table 38 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MSEM: MD, L1 cov, Anomie only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects related to Anomie addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit 
Indices (Valid N=862, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD              -0.056        0.109                  -0.52 
 on ANO              2.915        0.710        4.10* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   0.053        0.038        1.39 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   0.959        0.033                28.87* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.052 (5.24%)  
Within Pseudo R2        0.002 (.21%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.692 (69.19%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -8154.44, RMSEA = .134, CFI = .80, TLI = .76, WSRMR = .088, 
and BSRMR = .152 
 
Based on bivariate correlations and model identification requirements, only AA 
(percentage African Americans in jurisdiction) could be added to the model as a Level 2 
covariate.  As seen in Table 39, there was a significant improvement in the model with its 
addition.  The final LLHO = -8126.50, with a deviance test statistic at p < .001.  ADN2 
regressed onto ANO remained significant with the inclusion of the Level 2 covariate, 
while ADN2 significantly and negatively regressed onto AA.  This indicated that as 
percentage of African Americans in a jurisdiction increased, ADN2 scores for 
respondents decreased.  AA accounted for 64.72% of remaining Between variance 
(Pseudo R2 = .647), with a final ICC = 2.14%.   
The final model included MD, Nightshift, Captain and higher, and Low Crime on 
Level 1 and ANO and AA on Level 2.  Similar to the model for ADN1, while the final 
model allowed for the testing of certain hypotheses, the model statistics did not represent 
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a good fit (RMSEA = .135, CFI = .80, TLI = .76, WSRMR = .088, BSRMR = .184).  Full 
measurement and structural model statistics can be found in Table 39. 
 
Table 39 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MSEM Final Model: MD, L1 cov., Anomie, L2 
cov. Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices 
(Valid N=862, 7 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD              -0.055        0.110                -0.50 
 on Nightshift   0.303        0.051        5.98* 
 on Captain up                    -0.544        0.126                 -4.32* 
 on Low Crime             -0.254        0.062                  -4.11* 
 on ANO   4.105        1.051        3.90* 
 on AA              -0.377        0.171                 -2.20* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   0.021        0.020        1.05 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   0.962        0.034                28.07* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.021 (2.14%)  
Within Pseudo R2             -0.003 (-.03%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.647 (64.72%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -8126.50, RMSEA = .135, CFI = .80, TLI = .76, WSRMR = .088, 
BSRMR = .184 
 
Based on the MSE model results, Hypothesis 1 could not be tested, as DEC could 
not be added to the model (the inability to fit it to the model suggested problems with the 
latent variable).  Hypothesis 1 was thus tested in the MLM post hoc analysis.  Hypothesis 
2 was supported for anomie, such that the addition of ANO accounted for a large portion 
of the Between level variance, and ADN2 regressed onto ANO remained significant even 
with the addition of a Level 2 covariate.  Hypothesis 2 could not, however, be evaluated 
for decoupling.  In the final model, ADN2 regressed on MD was not positive or 
significant.  MD did not seem to contribute positively to the model or account for any 
Within level variance, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 3 as tested with the MSE 
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model.  Hypothesis 4 could not be tested with the MSE model because, similar to the 
ADN1 model, the addition of the slope s1 = ADN2 on MD required too many integration 
points.  Based on these results and what was possible with the MSE model, all four 
hypotheses were further tested with a post hoc base MLM.  All ADN2 MSE models can 
be viewed together in Table 40. 
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 Multilevel model post hoc tests.  The base level MLM used non-latent summed 
variables to evaluate 2-level path relationships.  This model was pared down, eliminating 
most demographic covariates in order to allow convergence with a random slope.  The 
major steps from the null model to the final model for ADN2, with the purpose of 
hypothesis testing, are discussed below.   
 First, the null model was evaluated, including only the outcome variable of 
acceptance of deviant norms for Scenario 2 (ADN2).  As indicated in Table 41, the null 
model for ADN2 had significant Within level variance value (σ0 = 9.290, CR = 36.34, p < 
.001), and a significant Between (μ0 = 2.984, CR = 2.52, p = .012) level variance value 
indicating that a considerable portion of variance in the outcome variable was explained 
on both levels.  The ICC indicated that 24.31% of total model variance could be 
explained on the Between departments level.  The model had a Loglikelihood HO value 
of -5923.66, with an RMSEA=.229, CFI=.00, TL1= .00, Within SRMR=.203, and 
Between SRMR=.240.  This indicated a poorly fitting null model. 
Table 41 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MLM: Null Model.  Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (L1, L2), ICC, and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=873, 8 clusters)                      
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e. 
ADN2 Mean    9.526        0.665 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   2.984        1.187        2.52* 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   9.290       0.256                36.34* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.243 (24.31%)               
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -5923.66, RMSEA = .229, CFI = .00, TLI = .00, WSRMR = .203 
and BSRMR = .240 
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Next, MD was added to the model on the Within level and ADN2 was regressed 
on MD.  As indicated in Table 42, the total model had a LLHO = -4290.68 indicating a 
significantly better fit though other fit indices remained poor (RMSEA = .232, CFI = 
.118, TLI = -.029, WSRMR = .189, BSRMR=.240).  ADN2 regressed on MD was 
significant (b = .46, CR= 7.32, p < .001).  The Within variance remained significant, and 
the Between variance remained significant at around the same value.  Only 5.08% of the 
Within variance was accounted for by the addition of MD (Pseudo R2 = .051), and 
11.46% of the Between variance (Pseudo R2 = .115).  The ICC also decreased to 23.05% 
indicating a slight decrease in the total model variance to be explained at the Between 
level. 
Table 42 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MLM: Moral Disengagement only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=873, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD    0.455        0.062        7.32* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   2.642        1.047        2.52 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   8.818        0.337                26.19* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.231 (23.05%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.051 (5.08%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 0.115 (11.46%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -4290.68, RMSEA = .232, CFI = .12, TLI = -.03, WSRMR = .189, 
and BSRMR = .240 
 
Level 1 (individual level) covariates were tested based on strong bivariate 
correlations with ADN2, and the covariate that best fit the model, Workday 
(WORKDAY), was retained.  As indicated in Table 43, the total model had a LLHO = -
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3817.37, a significantly better model fit than with MD alone.  Other model fit indices 
remained about the same.  The ADN2 on MD regression coefficient maintained 
significance with the addition of the covariate (b = .45, CR = 6.85, p < .001).  This 
indicated that MD contributed something to the model over and above the control 
variable, supporting Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient produced from ADN2 regressed onto 
NIGHTSHIFT was positive and significant, indicating that those working night shifts 
tended to have higher ADN2 scores.  The ICC value indicated a slightly increased 
amount of variance to be explained at the Between level (23.50%), while the addition of 
the Level 1 covariates accounted for 1.17% of the Within level variance.   
Table 43 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MLM: Moral Disengagement, L1 covariate. 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=873, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD    0.452        0.066        6.85* 
 on Nightshift              0.828        0.245        3.38* 
  
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   2.673        1.553        1.72 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   8.702        0.418                20.79* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.235 (23.50%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.013 (1.32%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.012 (1.17%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3817.37, RMSEA = .292, CFI = .16, TLI = -27, WSRMR = .185, 
and BSRMR = .240 
 
The next stage involved the addition of the Level 2 predictors to the model.  As 
with the ADN1 MLM, it was determined that it was not possible to test the random slope 
of ADN2 on MD as the outcome with both ANO and DEC in the model as predictors 
(model would not terminate properly).  It was thus again necessary to determine which of 
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the two predictors (anomie or decoupling) was a better fit for the total model.  ANO was 
evaluated as an addition to the model and used through the model iterations to the final 
“random slope as outcome” model.  DEC was then evaluated in the same way.  While 
anomie was a significant predictor of ADN2 between departments, decoupling was not.  
Comparatively, anomie also contributed more to the model (accounted for more Level 2 
variance).  Due to these differences, decoupling will be presented first only to show its 
initial contribution to the model.  Then the series of models leading to the “random slope 
as outcome” final model will be presented using only ANO as the level 2 predictor, since 
the results indicate that anomie is a better fit to the model than decoupling.  
Similar to the ADN1 model, since both variables of ANO and DEC did not 
function in the full model, Hypothesis 1 for ADN2 (significant correlation between ANO 
and DEC) was tested on a model that included MD, Rank, ANO, and DEC with a 
command of ANO with DEC to evaluate the correlative relationship.  The model would 
not identify, indicating that the relationship was not an appropriate fit to the model.  Thus 
Hypothesis 1 could be rejected for ADN2.   
The following will present first the model for decoupling (as added to the model 
with the Level 1 predictor and covariate) to test Hypothesis 2 for decoupling, determining 
the significance of its regression coefficient with ADN2.  Subsequently, the sequence of 
models that includes anomie as the only Level 2 predictor will be presented.  These will 
test Hypotheses 2 and 4 for anomie only, determining the significance of the regression 
coefficient with ADN2, and with the slope between ADN2 and moral disengagement. 
When decoupling was added to the model, its addition created a test statistic of 
1.17 indicating that the model fit improved but not significantly.  Other model fit 
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statistics supported a strong model.  As indicated in Table 44, ADN2 regressed on DEC 
was b = -11.97, CR = -.28, p = .782, indicating that it did not function as a significant 
predictor, thus leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 2 for decoupling.  Residual Between 
variance was decreased, with a Pseudo R2 = .077, indicating that the addition of 
decoupling to the model accounted for only 7.69% of the variance to be explained at the 
Between level, with an ICC of 21.92% remaining.  This suggested that decoupling was 
not a significant predictor, and did not account for much of the variance between 
departments, although remaining Between variance was non-significant. 
Table 44 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MLM: MD, L1 cov, Decoupling only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects related to Decoupling addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model 
Fit Indices (Valid N=877, 8 clusters) 
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD    0.464        0.066        7.05* 
 on DEC           -11.968                43.259                 -0.28 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   2.444        1.973        1.26 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   8.722        0.418                20.84* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.219 (21.92%) 
Within Pseudo R2        0.000 (0%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.077 (7.69%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3114.85, RMSEA = .012, CFI = 1.00, TLI = .99, WSRMR = .011, 
and BSRMR = .017 
 
As indicated in Table 45, when anomie was added to the model, its addition 
created a test statistic of -3685.71 indicating that the model fit significantly improved.  
Other test statistics supported this.  ADN1 regressed on ANO was b = 3.29, CR = 2.67, p 
= .008, indicating that it functioned as a significant predictor, thus supporting Hypothesis 
2 for anomie.  Residual Between variance was decreased, with a Between Pseudo R2 = 
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.593, indicating that the addition of anomie to the model accounted for 59.26% of the 
variance to be explained at the Between level, with a drop in the ICC to 11.13%.  This 
demonstrated that anomie was a much better addition to the model than decoupling, in 
terms of significance as a predictor and explanation of Level 2 variance.  
Table 45 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MLM: MD, L1 cov, Anomie only. Fixed Effects 
and Random Effects related to Anomie addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices 
(Valid N=873, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on MD    0.447        0.066        6.78* 
 on ANO              3.291        1.235        2.67* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   1.084        0.821        1.33 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   8.699        0.418                 20.80* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.111 (11.13%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.000 (.03%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.593 (59.26%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3685.71, RMSEA = .208, CFI = .61, TLI = -.57, WSRMR = .056, 
and BSRMR = .004 
 
The addition of the random slope of ADN2 on MD to the model containing MD, 
Rank, and ANO did not cause much change to the Between or Within variance, with the 
ICC remaining nearly the same at 11.28%.  The intention of adding the random slope to 
the model was to determine how much the relationship between ADN2 and MD varied 
across clusters.  The mean for the random slope of s1 (ADN2 on MD) was .44, with CR= 
2.97, p = .003.  This indicated that the average effect for moral disengagement on ADN2 
was positive and significant.  The variance estimate for the slope was not significant (Est. 
= .01, CR = .10, p = .918), indicating that the effect of moral disengagement on ADN2 
did not vary significantly across departments.  As such, there was not enough significant 
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variance to try to explain with the use of a predictor.  However, since Hypothesis 4 
required the regression of s1 on ANO, this was still attempted.   
The results of the model including the random slope of ADN2 on MD as the 
outcome, regressed onto ANO, are presented in Table 46 as the final MLM model for 
ADN2.  The LLHO was -3685.74.  The resulting ICC was 11.01% with a non-significant 
Level 2 residual variance.  The Within Pseudo R2 as compared to the model containing no 
random slope was .002, and the Between Pseudo R2 was .014.  This indicated that the 
inclusion of the random slope as outcome to the model accounted for only .16% of the 
Within variance and 1.38% of the Between variance.  As expected, the regression of s1 
on ANO was not significant (b = -.04, CR = .00, p = 1.00) indicating that ANO did not 
have a significant effect on the relationship between MD and ADN2 across departments, 
leading to a rejection of Hypothesis 4.  The relevant ADN2 base multilevel models can be 
viewed together in Table 47. 
Table 46 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 2, MLM Final Model: MD, L1 cov, Anomie, 
Random Slope as Outcome (s1=ADN2 on MD). Fixed Effects and Random Effects, ICC, 
Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=873, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 on Nightshift              0.830                 72.733        0.12 
 on ANO              3.323              260.951        0.01 
s1 on ANO             -0.040                91.671                 0.00 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN2 Level 2 Effect   1.074                 36.933        0.03 
ADN2 Level 1 Effect   8.685                 72.733       0.12* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.110 (11.01%)  
Within Pseudo R2        0.002 (.16%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.014 (1.38%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3685.74 
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 Summary.  The results from the two modeling methods for ADN2 were similar to 
those for ADN1.  Hypothesis 1 was not supported, and Hypothesis 2 was only partially 
supported, indicating the usefulness of anomie, but not decoupling, in the model.  In both 
the MSE and ML models, anomie served as a significant predictor while decoupling did 
not.  Hypothesis 3 was not fully supported.  In the more complex MSE model, MD did 
not have a significant relationship with ADN2, although within the MLM post hoc test 
the regression coefficient remained positive and significant even after the inclusion of a 
covariate.  These results suggested that while moral disengagement may have a 
significant impact on ADN2 scores in simpler models, this significance vanishes with the 
inclusion of a measurement model.  This may lead to the conclusion that there was not 
enough variation on MD within departments.  Finally, similar to the results for the ADN1 
model, Hypothesis 4 was not supported in the MLM; anomie did not serve as a 
significant predictor of the ADN2 on MD slope across departments.  The best model for 
the data for Scenario 2, based on the MLM results, is presented in Figure 3.  This 
includes the coefficients for the final multilevel relationships and the random slope. 
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ADN Scenario 3: False Reporting 
Multilevel structural equation model results.  As indicated in Table 48, the null 
model for ADN3 had significant Within level variance values (σ0 = .129, CR = 2.10, p = 
.036)  and significant Between  level variance values (μ0 = .012, CR = 3.04, p = .002) 
indicating sufficient variance to be explained on both levels (although the Within 
variance to be explained was considerably lower than for either ADN1 or ADN2).  The 
ICC indicated that only 8.51% of total model variance could be explained on the Between 
departments level (between that found for ADN1 and ADN2).  The model had a 
Loglikelihood HO (LLHO) = -13218.59, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .33, TLI = .29, Within 
SRMR = .145, and a Between SRMR = .001.  These values indicated a moderately well-
fitting null model. 
Table 48 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MSEM: Null Model. Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (L1, L2), ICC, and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=854, 8 clusters)              
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e. 
ADN3-1        1.195        0.042      
ADN3-2       1.621         0.092     
ADN3-4       2.454         0.222  
     
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.012        0.004       3.04* 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   0.129        0.062        2.10* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.085 (8.51%)               
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -13218.59, RMSEA = .065, CFI = .33, TLI = .29, WSRMR = .145, 
and BSRMR = .001 
 
Next, MD was added to the model on the Within level and ADN3 was regressed 
onto MD.  As indicated in Table 49, the total model had a LLHO = -6742.39, indicating a 
better fit, while other fit indices improved slightly (RMSEA = .07, CFI = .35, TLI = .24, 
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WRMSR = .045, BRSRMR = .001).  In the measurement portion of the model, ADN3 
items loaded strongly on both Level 1 and 2, with standardized loadings ranging from .43 
to 1.00.  MD items also loaded strongly on the Within level, with standardized loadings 
from .47 to 1.00.  However, similar to the results for ADN1 and ADN2, ADN3 regressed 
on MD was not significant (b = .03, CR = .69, p = .493).  There was no change in the 
Within or Between variance, with Pseudo R2 values at 0 and -.008.  Hence, MD did not 
help to explain variation in ADN3 either within or between departments.   
Table 49 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MSEM: Moral Disengagement only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=854, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on MD    0.028        0.040        0.69 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.012        0.004        3.02* 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   0.130        0.061        2.14* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.085 (8.45%)  
Within Pseudo R2             -0.008 (-.78%) 
Between Pseudo R2       0.000 (0%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -6742.39, RMSEA = .067, CFI = .35, TLI = .24, WSRMR = .045, 
and BSRMR = .001 
 
Next, Level 1 covariates were added to the model based on their strong bivariate 
correlations with ADN3.  Those retained showed a positive contribution to model fit.  
These were Female (FEMALE), White (WHITE), Nightshift (NIGHTSHIFT), and 
Officer (OFFICER).  As indicated in Table 50, the total model had a LLHO = -4676.34, a 
significant better model fit than with MD alone, although other model fit indices 
worsened.  The total model fit was rather poor (RMSEA = .068, CFI = .43, TLI = .23, 
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WRSRMR = .030, BSRMR = .001).  The measurement model was not much impacted by 
the addition, with loadings remaining between .47 and 1.00.  The ADN3 on MD 
regression coefficient remained similar and still non significant.  This indicated that MD 
did not significantly contribute to the explanation of ADN3 variance, with or without the 
addition of control variables.   
When ADN3 was regressed onto the control variables, FEMALE was positive and 
significant, WHITE was positive and not significant, NIGHTSHIFT was positive and not 
significant, and OFFICER was positive and significant.  These results indicated that 
respondents with lower ranks had significantly higher ADN3 scores, similar to the other 
two scenarios.   Also similar to the other two scenarios, those working night shifts had 
higher ADN3 scores, although this was not significant.  Interestingly, gender and race 
contributed to the model fit of ADN3 (race was not significant), though not to any of the 
other two scenarios.  Results indicated that females were significantly more likely to have 
higher ADN3 scores than males, and that Whites tended to have higher scores on ADN3.  
The addition of the Level 1 covariates accounted for 13.85% of the Within level variance.  
Hence the demographic variables explained more of the Within variance for ADN3 than 
did MD, similar to what was found for the other scenarios. 
For ADN3, the MSE model would not converge with the addition of either ANO 
or DEC.  This was indicative of poor model fit, and was likely due to insufficient 
variance in these predictors across the Level 2 clusters.  The final possible model, 
including MD and Level 1 covariates only, can be found in Table 50.  Owing to these 
convergence problems, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 could not be tested with the MSE model.  
MSE model results supported the possible rejection of Hypothesis 3 due to the lack of a 
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significant relationship between ADN3 and MD, and MD’s lack of contribution to the 
model.  Based on these results and what was possible with the MSE model, all four 
hypotheses were tested with the post hoc MLM.  All ADN3 MSE models can be viewed 
together in Table 51. 
Table 50 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MSEM Final Model: Moral Disengagement, 
L1 covariates. Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit 
Indices (Valid N=854, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on MD    0.019        0.035        0.56 
on Female   0.087        0.043        2.03* 
on White              0.030        0.036                  0.85 
on Nightshift              0.074        0.048                  1.55 
 on Officer   0.092        0.027        3.46* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.012        0.004        3.23* 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   0.112        0.051        2.20* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.097 (9.68%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.139 (13.85%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.000 (0.00%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -4676.34, RMSEA = .068, CFI = .43, TLI = .23, WSRMR = .030, 
BSRMR = .001 
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 Multilevel model post hoc tests.  The base level MLM used non-latent summed 
variables to evaluate 2-level path relationships.  This model was pared down, eliminating 
most demographic covariates in order to allow convergence with a random slope.  The 
major steps from the null model to the final model for ADN3, with the purpose of 
hypothesis testing, will be discussed below.   
 First, the null model was evaluated, including only the outcome variable of 
acceptance of deviant norms for Scenario 3 (ADN3).  As seen in Table 52, the null model 
for ADN3 had a significant Within level variance value (σ0 = 3.253, CR = 21.12, p < 
.001), and a near significant Between level variance value (μ0 = 1.092, CR = 2.69, p = 
.091) indicating a significant portion of variance in the outcome variable was explained 
on both levels.  The ICC indicated that 25.13% of total model variance could be 
explained on the Between departments level.  The model had a Loglikelihood HO value 
of -5769.44, with an RMSEA = .258, CFI= .00, TL1= .00, Within SRMR = .220, and 
Between SRMR=.316.  This indicated a poorly fitting null model. 
Table 52 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MLM: Null Model. Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (L1, L2), ICC, and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=901, 8 clusters)              
         
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e. 
ADN3 Mean    3.561        0.417 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   1.092        0.645        1.69* 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   3.253        0.154                 21.12* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.251 (25.13%)               
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -5769.44, RMSEA = .258, CFI = .00, TLI = .00, WSRMR = .220, 
and BSRMR = .316 
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Next, MD was added to the model on the Within level and ADN3 was regressed 
on MD.  As seen in Table 53, the total model had a LLHO = -4075.08 indicating a 
significantly better fit than the null model, and other fit indices remained about the same 
(RMSEA = .333, CFI = .00, TLI = -.48, WSRMR = .203, BSRMR=.316).  ADN3 
regressed on MD was significant (b = .32, CR= 10.71, p < .001).  However, both the 
Within and Between variances remained significant.  Only 7.04% of the Within variance 
was accounted for by the addition of MD (Pseudo R2 = .070), and 13.83% of the Between 
variance (Pseudo R2 = .138).  The ICC did decrease to 23.73%, indicating a decrease in 
the total model variance to be explained at the Between level. 
Table 53 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MLM: Moral Disengagement only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=901, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on MD    0.317        0.030                10.71* 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.941        0.341        2.76* 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   3.024        0.741        4.08* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.237 (23.73%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.070 (7.04%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 0.138 (13.83%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -4075.08, RMSEA = .333, CFI = .00, TLI = -.48, WSRMR = .203, 
and BSRMR = .316 
 
Level 1 (individual level) covariates were tested based on strong bivariate 
correlations with ADN3, and the covariate that best fit the model, Officer (OFFICER), 
was retained.  As indicated in Table 54, the total model had a LLHO = -3459.18, a 
significantly better model fit than with MD alone.  Other model fit indices remained the 
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same.  The ADN3 on MD regression coefficient maintained significance with the 
addition of the covariate (b = .31, CR = 8.01, p < .001).  This indicated that MD 
contributed something to the model over and above the control variable, supporting 
Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient produced from ADN3 regressed onto OFFICER was 
positive and significant, indicating that those respondents with the rank of officer tended 
to have higher ADN3 scores than those of higher ranks.  The ICC value indicated an 
increased amount of variance to be explained at the Between level (24.06%), while the 
addition of the Level 1 covariates did not account for much of the Within level variance 
(Pseudo R2 = .011).   
Table 54 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MLM: Moral Disengagement, L1 covariates. 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects (L1, L2), ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid 
N=901, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on MD    0.306        0.038        8.01* 
 on Officer              0.376        0.123                    3.07* 
  
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.948        0.556        1.71* 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   2.992        0.142                 21.13* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.241 (24.06%)  
Within Pseudo R2              0.011 (1.06%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 -0.007 (-.74%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3459.18, RMSEA = .307, CFI = .178, TLI = -0.233, WSRMR = 
.197, and BSRMR = .316 
 
The next stage involved the addition of the Level 2 predictors to the model.  As 
with the ADN1 and ADN2 MLMs, it was found that it would not be possible to test the 
random slope of ADN3 on MD as the outcome with both ANO and DEC in the model as 
predictors (model would not terminate properly).  It was thus again necessary to 
  154 
determine which of the two predictors (anomie or decoupling) was a better fit for the total 
model.  ANO was evaluated as an addition to the model and used through the model 
iterations to the final “random slope as outcome” model.  DEC was then evaluated in the 
same way.  While neither anomie nor decoupling were significant predictors of ADN3, 
anomie accounted for much more Level 2 variance than did decoupling, accounting for 
nearly all the Between variance to be explained.  Due to this finding, anomie was chosen 
as the preferable Level 2 predictor to use in the subsequent model sequence.   Decoupling 
will be presented first only to show its initial contribution to the model.  Then the series 
of models leading to the “random slope as outcome” final model will be presented using 
only ANO as the Level 2 predictor.  
Similar to the ADN1 and ADN2 models, since neither  ANO nor DEC   
functioned in the full model, Hypothesis 1 for ADN3 (significant correlation between 
ANO and DEC) was tested on a model that included MD, Rank, ANO, and DEC with a 
command of ANO with DEC to evaluate the correlative relationship.  Similar to the result 
for the ADN2 model, a model containing this correlation term would not identify, 
indicating that the relationship was not an appropriate fit to the model.  Thus Hypothesis 
1 was rejected for ADN3.   
Below, presented first, is the model for decoupling (as added to the model with 
the Level 1 predictor and covariate) to test Hypothesis 2 for decoupling, determining the 
significance of the regression coefficient with ADN3.  Following this, the sequence of 
models that include anomie as the only Level 2 predictor will be presented.  These will 
test Hypotheses 2 and 4 for anomie only, determining the significance of the regression 
coefficient with ADN3, and with the slope between ADN3 and moral disengagement. 
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When decoupling was added to the model, its addition created a test statistic of 
3.06 indicating that the model fit improved but not significantly.  Other test statistics 
actually worsened.  As indicated in Table 55, ADN3 regressed on DEC was b = -14.50, 
CR = -.60, p = .550, indicating that it did not function as a significant predictor and 
leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 2 for decoupling.  Residual Between variance was 
decreased, with a Pseudo R2 = .278, indicating that the addition of decoupling to the 
model still accounted for 27.82% of the variance to be explained at the Between level, 
with an ICC of 18.71% remaining.  This suggested that while decoupling accounted for 
some of the Between level variance, it was not a significant predictor of ADN3. 
Table 55 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MLM: MD, L1 cov, Decoupling only. Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects related to Decoupling addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model 
Fit Indices (Valid N=903, 8 clusters)  
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on MD    0.305        0.038                   8.01* 
 on DEC           -14.503                24.236                  -0.60 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.685        0.853        0.80 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   2.976        0.141                 21.15* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.187 (18.71%) 
Within Pseudo R2        0.000 (.04%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.278 (27.82%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -2717.45, RMSEA = .099, CFI = .89, TLI = .57, WSRMR = .032, 
and BSRMR = .073 
 
When anomie was added to the model, its addition created a test statistic of 
132.64 indicating that the model fit significantly improved.  Other test statistics supported 
this.  As indicated in Table 56, ADN1 regressed on ANO was b = 2.51, CR = 1.18, p = 
.240, indicating that, similar to decoupling, it did not function as a significant predictor, 
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leading to the possibility of rejecting Hypothesis 2 for anomie.  However, with the 
addition of anomie, the Residual Between variance was almost entirely eliminated, with a 
Between Pseudo R2 = .998.  This indicated that the addition of anomie to the model 
accounted for 99.79% of the variance to be explained at the Between level, with a drop in 
the ICC to .07%.  These results illustrated that anomie was a much better addition to the 
model than decoupling, at least in terms of explanation of Level 2 variance.  
Table 56 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MLM: MD, L1 cov, Anomie only. Fixed Effects 
and Random Effects related to Anomie addition, ICC, Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices 
(Valid N=901, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on MD    0.298        0.102        2.93 
 on ANO              2.506                  2.133        1.18 
 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.002                 0.182        0.01 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   2.993        0.069                43.48* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.001 (.07%)  
Within Pseudo R2   0.000 (-.03%) 
Between Pseudo R2                  0.998 (99.79%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3326.54, RMSEA = .295, CFI = .52, TLI = -.91, WSRMR = .078, 
and BSRMR = .000 
 
As indicated in Table 57, the addition of the random slope of ADN3 on MD to the 
model containing MD, Rank, and ANO did not cause any change to the Within variance, 
although it did increase the Between variance (Pseudo R2 = -.500).  The ICC stayed the 
same at .001.  This indicated that the addition of the random slope actually decreased the 
ability of the model to explain variance between departments.   
The intention of adding the random slope to the model was to determine how 
much the relationship between ADN3 and MD varied across clusters.  The mean for the 
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random slope of s1 (ADN3 on MD) was .31, with CR= 3.09, p = .002.  This indicated 
that the average effect for moral disengagement on ADN3 was positive and significant.  
However, the variance estimate for the slope was not significant (Est. = .00, CR = .01, p 
= .995), indicating that the effect of moral disengagement on ADN3 did not vary 
significantly across departments.  As such, there was not enough variance to try to 
explain with the use of a predictor.  However, since Hypothesis 4 required the regression 
of s1 on ANO, this was still attempted.   
The results of the model including the random slope of ADN3 on MD as the 
outcome, regressed onto ANO, are presented in Table 57 as the final MLM model for 
ADN3.  The LLHO was -3326.31.  The resulting ICC was .10% with a non-significant 
Level 2 residual variance.  The Within Pseudo R2 as compared to the model containing no 
random slope was .00, and the Between Pseudo R2 was -.50.  This indicated that the 
inclusion of the random slope as outcome to the model accounted for none of either the 
Within or Between variance.  Since there was no Between variance left to be explained, 
the addition of the random slope as outcome seemed to create more variance between 
departments to be explained than had previously existed.  Thus, it was not a good fit to 
the model.  And again, as expected, the regression of s1 on ANO was not significant (b = 
.06, CR = .06, p = .952) indicating that ANO did not have a significant effect on the 
relationship between MD and ADN3 across departments, leading to a rejection of 
Hypothesis 4 for ADN3.  The relevant ADN3 base multilevel models can be viewed 
together in Table 58. 
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Table 57 
 
Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenario 3, MLM Final Model: MD, L1 cov, Anomie, 
Random Slope as Outcome (s1=ADN3 on MD). Fixed Effects and Random Effects, ICC, 
Pseudo R2 and Model Fit Indices (Valid N=901, 8 clusters)                       
Fixed Effect         Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 on Officer              0.379                  0.604                  0.63 
 on ANO              2.486                  4.479        0.56 
s1 on ANO   0.062                  1.042        0.06 
Random Effect        Est.     s.e.    Critical Ratio 
ADN3 Level 2 Effect   0.003                1.288        0.00 
ADN3 Level 1 Effect   2.991        0.052                 57.11* 
 
Interclass Correlation   0.001 (.10%)  
Within Pseudo R2        0.001 (.07%) 
Between Pseudo R2                 -0.500 (-50.00%) 
*p < .05 
Model Fit: LLHO = -3326.31 
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 Summary.  The results from the two modeling methods for ADN3 were similar to 
those for ADN1 and ADN2.  Hypothesis 1 was not supported (anomie and decoupling 
not correlated), and Hypothesis 2 was only partially supported, indicating the usefulness 
of anomie but not decoupling in the model.  Hypothesis 3 was not fully supported.  In the 
more complex MSE model, MD did not have a significant relationship with ADN3, 
although in the MLM post hoc test the regression coefficient retained significance even 
after the inclusion of a covariate.  These results indicated that moral disengagement may 
have a significant relationship with ADN3 with in a model that does not have a 
measurement component.  MD seems to have had similar problems in all three MSE 
models, lacking enough variance within departments to make a successful contribution.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4 was not supported in the MLM, similar to the results for the ADN1 
and ADN2 models; there was no significant relationship between Level 2 predictors and 
the slope for ADN3 on MD. 
Summary of Multilevel Structural Equation Model and Multilevel Post-Hoc Test Results 
 The results of the MSE modeling and the MLM post hoc tests were consistent for 
all three acceptance of deviant norms scenarios.  Decoupling did not perform as 
hypothesized.  Decoupling was not significantly correlated with anomie (Hypothesis 1) or 
a consistently significant predictor of acceptance of deviant norms (Hypothesis 2).  
Decoupling did have the best results in the ADN1 MLM, where it showed strong 
predictive ability and contribution to the model, but this positive showing was the 
exception.   
Anomie was a strong construct, and consistently performed as expected, acting as 
a significant and positive predictor of acceptance of deviant norms (Hypothesis 2) even 
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after the inclusion of certain Level 2 covariates in the MSE modeling.  In the MLMs, it 
also either served as a significant predictor of ADN or accounted for a large proportion of 
Level 2 variance.  Also in the MLMs, moral disengagement had a positive and significant 
relationship with acceptance of deviant norms, even after the inclusion of Level 1 
covariates (Hypothesis 3).  This relationship did not, however, function as expected in the 
full MSE model, indicating the possibility that there was not enough variability in the 
moral disengagement scale when the measurement model was included to account for 
enough Within variance.  It is likely that the moral disengagement scale was too limited 
in size and scope to account for differences within departments as evaluated by the more 
complex model.  Lastly, Hypothesis 4 could be tested in the MLMs but not the MSE 
models.  Based on the MLM results, this hypothesis was rejected.  The slope of 
acceptance of deviant norms on moral disengagement did not vary significantly between 
departments for any of the scenarios, and was not significantly impacted by either 
decoupling or anomie.  The best model for the data for Scenario 3, based on the MLM 
results, is presented in Figure 4.  This includes the coefficients for the final multilevel 
relationships and the random slope. 
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Sublevel Analysis Results 
Overview  
 Within department analyses were run on the data from the departments of Los 
Angeles and Chicago to determine if there were significant differences between 
demographic groups within the departments on the outcome variables.  The groups, or 
“sublevels,” evaluated were defined by the type of shift respondents worked (e.g., 
rotating, fixed)  (SHIFT), the crime rate in the neighborhoods respondents worked  
(NBCRIME), what shift respondents primarily worked (e.g., nights, evenings/afternoons, 
or days) (WORKDAY), respondents’ rank (RANK), their occupational role (e.g., patrol, 
detective) (JOBROLE), and whether they were supervisors (SUPER).  These were 
selected because they were found to be most relevant in the complex models.  Reported 
here will be the significant results for Los Angeles and Chicago on each of the outcome 
variables (ADN1, ADN2, ADN3) for each of these demographic and job-related 
variables based on ANOVAs and post hoc Dunnet’s C tests.  Interaction effects were 
assessed for SHIFT combined with NBCRIME but none were significant.  Significant 
results for SUPER and RANK as distinguishing sublevels in the total sample were also 
explored. 
Los Angeles 
 In the Los Angeles sample, there were significant differences by SHIFT on ADN1 
(F (2, 363) = 5.85, p = .003) [this OK??] and ADN3 (F (2, 363) = 6.34, p = .002) such 
that respondents on rotating shifts had significantly higher ADN1 and ADN3 scores than 
did those on fixed or other shifts.  This effect was not significant for ADN2.      
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 NBCRIME, reflecting the crime rate in the neighborhood in which respondents 
worked, was recoded into low, medium, and high crime rates for this test.  There were 
only significant differences between officers with different neighborhood crime rates for 
ADN2 (F (3, 361) = 3.67, p = .013).  Respondents patrolling neighborhoods that they 
considered to be low in crime scored significantly lower on ADN2 than did those with 
high or average rates. 
 Similarly, for WORKDAY, there were only significant differences between 
groups on ADN2   (F (2, 358) = 3.59, p = .029.  The post hoc analyses indicated that 
officers working nights had significantly higher scores on ADN2 than did those working 
mostly days. 
 Rank was recoded into the categories of police officer, sergeant to lieutenant, and 
captain and higher for the purposes of this analysis based on distribution in the sample.  
There were significant differences between ranks on both ADN1 and ADN3.  For ADN1 
there was a significantly higher score on ADN1 for each level lower in rank compared to 
that above (F (2, 368) = 9.43, p < .001),, such that the lower the rank, the higher the 
score.  For ADN3, officers had significantly higher scores than sergeants through 
lieutenants, indicating again that individuals of lower ranks tended to score higher in 
acceptance of deviant norms than those in the ranks above them  (F (2, 368) = 3.79, p = 
.023). 
 There were no significant differences by JOBROLE for any of the scenarios.  
Significant differences again emerged in the final sublevel of supervisory status.  Both 
ADN1 (F (1, 364) = 13.67, p < .001) and ADN3 (F (1, 364) = 4.63, p = .032) were 
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significantly different based on SUPER categories, such that those without a supervisory 
role had significantly higher scores on acceptance of deviant norms. 
 Interestingly, and consistently, scores on ADN2 were much higher than for ADN1 
or ADN2, indicating much greater acceptance of a scenario in which an officer is 
covering for another officer’s misconduct.  On the variables that had significant results 
for ADN1 and ADN3 but not ADN2 (SHIFT, RANK, SUPER), there were no differences 
because scores on this scenario were uniformly high for all categories, and much higher 
than for the other two scenarios.   
 Overall, those with the highest scores on acceptance of deviant norms in the Los 
Angeles sample included respondents on rotating shifts, those in neighborhoods with high 
or average crime rates, those working night shifts, those of lower rank, and those in non-
supervisory positions. 
Chicago 
 In the Chicago sample, there were considerably fewer significant distinctions 
between subgroups than in the Los Angeles sample.  There were no significant 
differences for any of the three scenarios on shift type (SHIFT), neighborhood crime 
(NBCRIME), work schedule (WORKDAY), or job role (JOBROLE).   
RANK in this sample was recoded into officer, sergeant, and lieutenant through 
captain and higher.  There were significant differences by RANK on ADN1 only (F (3, 
2000) = 3.15, p = .026), such that officers had significantly higher scores than sergeants, 
indicating that lower ranking respondents tended to have a higher acceptance of deviant 
norms.   
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 There were also significant differences by supervisory role for ADN1 (F (1, 191) 
= 6.69, p = .010), such that those with no supervisory status had higher scores   than those 
with supervisory status on ADN1.   
 While there were few significant results in this sample, those that were found 
mirrored those found in the Los Angeles sample, indicating that respondents of lower 
rank and lower supervisory responsibilities tended to be more accepting of deviant 
norms.  
Supervisory Status in Total Sample 
 Since significant differences on acceptance of deviant norms were found between 
officers based on supervisory roles for both Chicago and Los Angeles, this variable was 
explored for significance in the total sample.  It was deemed appropriate to aggregate 
departments to evaluate differences on acceptance of deviant norms scenarios by 
supervisory role because, unlike for levels of rank, most departments in the sample had a 
similar ratio of supervisors to non-supervisors (1:2 or 1:1).   
 ANOVAs were  run for the total sample.  Supervisors were found to have lower 
ADN scores than non-supervisors on all scenarios.  This difference, however, was only 
significant for ADN1, the kickbacks scenario (F (1, 913) = 25.48, p < .001).  For ADN2, 
the covering for fellow officer scenario, results were not significant with F (1, 910) = 
2.24, p = .140.  Similarly, for ADN3, the false reporting scenario, results were non-
significant with F (1, 911) = 1.97, p = .161.  Means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 59.  The results provide some support for the impact of supervisory status, and 
hence, standing in the department, on an officer’s willingness to accept deviant norms in 
the department.  The implications of this are explored further in the discussion section. 
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Table 59 
Means and Standard Deviations for ADN1, ADN2, and ADN3 by Supervisory Status 
Scale   Supervisory Status   M   SD   N        
ADN1    Yes   5.94*  2.32  345 
     No   6.77*  2.50  570 
ADN2    Yes   9.01  3.34  341 
     No   9.36  3.45  571 
ADN3    Yes   4.83  4.83  345 
     No   5.03  2.08  568 
*p < .001 
Rank in Total Sample 
 Since significant differences on acceptance of deviant norms were found between 
officers based on rank for both Chicago and Los Angeles, this variable was also explored 
within the total sample.  When combining rank categories to create a dichotomous 
variable of “officers” and “sergeants and higher” most departments had ratios of either 
1:1 or 2:1. Only one of the small departments, Catasauqua, had no respondents ranked 
higher than officer.  Since Catasauqua had been similar on general levels of acceptance of 
deviant norms as compared to others in the sample, and due to the similar distribution of 
officer and higher ranking officers in the other departments, it was still deemed 
appropriate to include it in the total aggregation of departments when evaluating 
differences by rank. 
 ANOVAs were run for the total sample.  Respondents with ranks of sergeant or 
higher were found to have lower ADN scores than those of officer rank on all scenarios.  
This difference was significant for ADN1, the kickbacks scenario (F (1, 926) = 29.79, p < 
.001), and ADN3, the false reporting scenario (F (1, 923) = 4.60, p = .032).  For ADN2, 
the covering for fellow officer scenario, results were not significant with F (1, 923) = .69, 
p = .407.  Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 60.  The results provide 
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support for the impact of rank on an officer’s willingness to accept deviant norms in the 
department throughout the entire sample.  The implications of this are explored further in 
the discussion section. 
Table 60 
Means and Standard Deviations for ADN1, ADN2, and ADN3 by Rank 
Scale             Rank      M   SD   N        
ADN1            Officer   6.78*  2.50  609 
   Sgt or higher   5.87*  2.27  319 
ADN2            Officer   9.30  3.47  610 
   Sgt or higher   9.10  3.32  315 
ADN3            Officer   5.06*  2.11  606 
   Sgt or higher   4.76*  2.00  319 
*p < .001 
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Chapter Five 
 
Discussion 
Overview 
This discussion section will provide an overview of the results of the current 
study, a reflection on the study approach and limitations, and a discussion of the 
relevance and implications of the contained research.   
First, it reviews the hypotheses and discusses the results directly linked to 
hypothesized relationships.  It notes support or lack of support for hypotheses, how these 
results relate to previous research, and makes an initial assessment of the reasons for the 
found outcomes (in their similarity to or variance from expected outcomes) and the 
possible relevance of these results.    
Second, it presents a summary and discussion of results unrelated to the study 
hypotheses.  These results include the principal components analyses, descriptives for 
latent variables, scale variance across departments, potential outliers, demographic 
covariates and their functionality in the complex models, and sublevel analyses. 
Third, it evaluates the study approach and design, evaluating strengths and 
weaknesses.  This includes an overview of the study approach based on central research 
questions and a justification for the methodology that was chosen to evaluate the 
theoretical concepts.  The methodology itself is examined in detail for limitations related 
to sampling, survey design, survey dissemination, and survey content.  Also, the 
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statistical analyses are discussed in terms of justification for the chosen approach, 
alternate approaches, and potential weaknesses. 
Fourth, the relevance and implications of the study results are discussed.  There 
are two main sections to this portion of the discussion, including coverage of the: (a) 
potential practical/policy implications of results for policing (hypotheses, demographics, 
scale results, sublevel evaluations, department variation) in terms of training, screening, 
recruiting, prevention, and/or response (related to deviance/corruption); and (b) 
implications for future research. 
Discussion of Results Related to Hypothesized Relationships 
Review of Hypotheses 
 Four hypotheses were set forth.  First, anomie and decoupling were hypothesized 
to be strongly and positively correlated.  Second, both anomie and decoupling were 
hypothesized to be significant and positive predictors of acceptance of deviant norms 
between departments.  Third, moral disengagement was hypothesized to be a significant 
and positive predictor of acceptance of deviant norms within departments.  Fourth, both 
anomie and decoupling were hypothesized to moderate the relationship between moral 
disengagement and acceptance of deviant norms such that the higher the anomie and 
decoupling in a department, the lower the expected impact of moral disengagement on 
acceptance of deviant norms.  
 The hypotheses were tested with bivariate correlations and within the complex 
models.  The results will be covered for each hypothesis, presenting outcomes 
sequentially and separately on each of the three acceptance of deviant norms scenarios.  
The discussion will address why each hypothesis was or was not supported, how the 
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results might be attributable to or impacted by methodology or scaling concerns (to be 
addressed also in later sections), how the results compare with expected results based on 
the literature, and initial assessments of the possible significance or relevance of the 
findings.  
Hypothesis 1: Anomie and Decoupling Correlated 
 Results.  The summed scales for decoupling and anomie did not have a significant 
bivariate correlation, providing the first indication of a problem with this hypothesized 
relationship.  In fact, decoupling was not correlated with any of the other scales in the 
model except for ADN3 (the false reporting scenario), suggesting that it may not be a 
proper fit to the model.  Based on this finding alone, it was determined that Hypothesis 1 
could be rejected; this result was nonetheless confirmed in the complex models. 
 For ADN1–the acceptance of deviant norms scenario related to accepting 
kickbacks–anomie and decoupling would not function in the full multilevel structural 
equation model (MSEM); in the base level multilevel model (MLM), they were not 
significantly correlated (b = -.01) and the model still would not terminate properly.  For 
ADN2, the acceptance of deviant norms scenario related to covering for a fellow officer, 
anomie and decoupling would not identify together in a model for either the MSEM or 
the MLM, indicating that this correlative relationship was not a proper fit to the model.  
Finally, for ADN3, the acceptance of deviant norms scenario related to false reporting, 
the results were similar to those for ADN2.  Anomie and decoupling would not identify 
together in either the MSEM or the MLM, indicating again a lack of a proper fit to the 
model.  Overall, based on these results, Hypothesis 1 can be rejected.  The constructs 
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used in the current study to measure anomie and decoupling were not compatible as 
correlated scales and would not function properly in any of the complex models together.   
 Comparisons to literature.  Decoupling and anomie have not been previously 
tested together in the literature.  However, they were expected to be correlated due to the 
similarities in their operational definitions.  Anomie, understood as an unequal emphasis 
on ethical guidelines and goals was thought to be created by an environment 
characterized by organizational decoupling, in which an organization has structurally 
sheared formal statements reflecting ethical principles or goals from actual employee 
activities, including pragmatic job requirements (Monahan & Quinn, 2006).  In fact, the 
concepts of anomie and decoupling were similar enough to pose the potential for 
tautological concerns.   
A prime example of this similarity is that one of the key tests of anomic 
conditions is the required existence of a “universally prescribed success goal” (Menard, 
1995, p. 137), for which legitimate means of accomplishment do not exist or are near 
unattainable.  The anomie scale was designed to represent this dissociation.  Similarly, 
the operationalization of decoupling placed universally accepted goals of a police 
department in opposition to formal law enforcement ethical guidelines.  Due to this and 
other similarities, the operationalizations of anomie and decoupling were purposely 
designed to run parallel to represent their complementary theoretical concepts.   
It is possible that there may be flaws in the theory integration.  In this case, the 
concepts of anomie and decoupling would not be as complementary as would seem 
apparent from the literature.  Perhaps in a decoupled department, while ethics and goals 
are separated on the lower ranks, the guidelines in practice are clear enough to the 
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employees at those ranks that anomie does not result.  This possibility would run counter 
to the existing literature.  In fact, with such striking similarities between the two 
concepts, combined with literary support for their likely relationship, it is considerably 
more likely that the lack of support for this hypothesis is due to methodological flaws. 
 Results related to methodology concerns.  Methodological concerns, in this case, 
would relate to the structure and composition of the scales for anomie and decoupling.  
As will be discussed further when examining the results of the principal components 
analyses and methodological limitations, both scales had a limited in the number of 
representative items.  While the limited number of items created a compact and uniform 
scale for anomie, with specific topics paralleling those in the decoupling measure, the 
scope of the items was severely restricted.  More in-depth coverage of the anomic 
condition through additional items may have created a more valid measurement of the 
construct, and may have also resulted in more valid results when correlated with the 
decoupling scale.   
That said, it is likely that the lack correlation between the two scales was due in 
large part to flaws in the decoupling construct.  This supposition is based on the overall 
poor performance of the decoupling scale in the complex models and as a predictor of 
acceptance of deviant norms (to be discussed next in relation to Hypothesis 2).  There are 
many possible reasons for the poor performance of the decoupling scale, and these 
reasons may have also contributed to a lack of correlation with anomie.  For instance, the 
ethical guidelines placed opposite the chosen pragmatic goals were in conflict, but were 
not opposites.  Perhaps, as a result, the scale acted more as an assessment of which 
ethical guidelines carried more weight rather than as a representation of the actual 
  174 
decoupling of formal and informal norms.  This possibility and others are explored 
further in the discussion of the decoupling component results. 
Another possible methodological cause of the lack of correlation may have been 
the way the two scales were constructed.  Specifically, the anomie items presented a 
statement that implied that illegitimate means would be necessary to reach a prescribed 
goal.  The illegitimate means were specified, as was the goal.  The decoupling construct 
presented two goal options, pragmatic and ethical.  The implication was that illegitimate 
means that violated the stated ethical goal could be used to reach the pragmatic goal, and 
as such, valuing the pragmatic goal above the ethical goal would indicate a willingness to 
pursue illegitimate means; those means, however, were not stated, only implied.  As such, 
the anomie items function as ethical means vs. pragmatic goals, such that by agreeing 
with the statements one is rejecting the ethical means in pursuit of the pragmatic goals.  
The decoupling items are instead ethical goal vs. pragmatic goal, making it considerably 
less clear whether the pragmatic goal is being chosen over the ethical means.  This 
difference between the two scales may thus be responsible for the lack of cohesion 
between the two constructs.  Again, possible changes to the decoupling scale, some 
which might relate to this problem, are explored in the future research section. 
Initial assessment of relevance.  The immediate and practical significance of the 
lack of correlation between anomie and decoupling is that the two measures could not be 
used in models together.  With the exception of one of the MLMs, the models failed to 
converge or identify when both scales were included.  In some cases this was due to 
anomie accounting for such a large proportion of the remaining variance on acceptance of 
deviant norms between departments that there was no place in the model for another 
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Level 2 predictor.  In other cases decoupling alone seemed to be ill-fitted to the model.  
This may have been due to low variance in the decoupling scale across the departments, 
which again relates to item structure and scoring, to be discussed further in the section on 
variance.   
In sum, the two concepts as currently operationalized do not work as parallel 
predictors of susceptibility to corruption.  It is possible that in future research, decoupling 
will have to be measured differently, perhaps directly as an organizational variable.  This 
possibility is explored further in the discussion of scale composition.  However, the 
strength of the theoretical correlation between the two constructs still supports the value 
of both in combination for the prediction of departmental susceptibility to corruption, 
regardless of the model results with these specific scales. 
Hypothesis 2: Decoupling and Anomie as Predictors of ADN 
 Decoupling and anomie are discussed here as separate components because they 
were not significantly correlated and were not used together in the complex models. 
Decoupling.  Decoupling was tested as a possible predictor of the acceptance of 
deviant norms (as measured using the scenarios) within both the MSEM and the MLM.  
In the MSEMs, decoupling was not a significant predictor of ADN1 (b = -.58, CR = -.71, 
p = .476), while accounting for 96.15% of the variance to be explained in ADN1 between 
departments.  It could not be added to the MSEM for ADN2 or ADN3 (models failed to 
identify) indicating that decoupling was a poor fit to both models.   
In the MLMs, decoupling was not a significant predictor of ADN1 (b = -11.31, 
CR = -1.66, p = .096), though it accounted for 69.43% of the variance in ADN1 to be 
explained between departments.  It was also not a significant predictor of ADN2 (b = -
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11.97, CR = -.28, p = .782) or ADN3 (b = -14.50, CR = -.60, p = .550) in the MLMs, and 
accounted for only 7.69% and 27.82% of the variance to be explained between 
departments for ADN2 and ADN3 respectively.   
Overall, while accounting for a large portion of the variance to be explained in 
acceptance of deviant norms for the kickbacks and false reporting scenarios, decoupling 
never functioned as a significant predictor of any of the outcome scores.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported for decoupling.  This outcome was heralded by the lack 
of significant variance in decoupling scores between departments, indicating that it would 
not function as a significant predictor of differences between departments.  There are, 
however, several possible reasons for these results. 
Existing decoupling research has never measured decoupling with the use of 
survey items such as those used here, aggregating them up to the organizational level for 
interpretation.  As such, the scales created for the current study was truly a pilot attempt 
at using individual perceptions (versus departmental indicators) to make decoupling 
evaluations.  The fact that decoupling did, even with the methodological concerns and 
low variance, account for a substantial portion of variance in acceptance of deviant norms 
across departments suggests some value in the construct, just potentially poor execution 
in measurement.   
This attribution of problems with the decoupling scale to item measurement or 
composition is confirmed by the better performance of the scale in the MLMs as 
compared to the MSEMs.  Problems in the MSEMs are likely due to their inclusion of 
confirmatory factor analysis which means they accounted for the measurement model.  
These models are more sensitive to problems with low variance, and, as mentioned, 
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decoupling had the lowest between-department variance of all the scales.  Additionally, 
as a pilot version, the decoupling scale may not have been suited to confirmatory factor 
evaluation.     
If lack of adequate variance for the scale within this model was a main reason for 
the poor performance of decoupling, it is possible that the results do not rule out the 
potential value of the decoupling concept.  When evaluating the continued value of the 
decoupling concept for use in a law enforcement context, it is important to review what is 
already supported in the literature.  Policing research does support the existence of 
informal norms created by the police culture within departments.  These informal norms 
promote behaviors that conflict with departmental policies and official ethical guidelines 
while remaining reasonably unsanctioned (Punch, 2000).  Further, the literature suggests 
that the structure of the police organization itself, including working groups, bureaucracy, 
and goal incentives, may foster a culture of acceptable corruption which should be 
countered with official departmental policies that mandate discipline and eradication 
(Marche, 2009; Punch, 2000).   
This scenario of conflicting informal and formal norms, combined with a lack of 
enforcement of official policy, parallels what can be considered purposeful or negligent 
decoupling—the “decrease [of] internal coordination and control in order to maintain 
legitimacy” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 340).  Decoupling–an imbalance between formal 
and informal norms–can be considered a precedent for acceptance of deviant norms based 
directly on the policing literature.  In sum, this conceptual support from the policing 
literature suggests that the poor performance of the decoupling scale, as discussed 
previously, perhaps should not reflect so much on the theoretical model as on the 
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operationalization of the decoupling construct.  These possibilities are explored further 
below. 
Anomie.  Overall, anomie was a better fit to the models than decoupling.  In the 
MSEMs, the coefficient for ADN1 regressed on anomie was positive and significant (b = 
1.75, CR = 4.02, p < .001) and accounted for 100% of the residual variance to be 
explained in ADN1 between departments, indicating that it was an incredibly strong 
predictor of officer acceptance of kickbacks as a deviant norm.  Anomie was also a 
positive and significant predictor of ADN2 in the MSEM (b = 2.92, CR = 4.10, p < .001), 
accounting for 69.19% of the variance in ADN2 to be explained between departments.  
Conversely, and similar to decoupling, in the MSEM for ADN3 the model would not 
converge with the addition of anomie, indicating poor model fit. 
Anomie was a significant predictor of both ADN1 (b = 1.56, CR = 2.81, p = .005) 
and ADN2 (b = 3.29, CR = 2.67, p = .008) in the respective MLMs, accounting for 
68.39% of variance to be explained in ADN1 and 59.26% of variance to be explained in 
ADN2 between departments.  While it was not a significant predictor of ADN3 in the 
MLM (b = 2.51, CR = 1.18, p = .240), its addition accounted for 99.79% of the variance 
to be explained in ADN3—nearly all of the difference in scores for false reporting 
between departments. 
Overall, anomie was a strong predictor in most of the models, accounting for a 
very large amount of the variance in acceptance of deviant norms between departments.  
Also, its influence was in the expected direction (positive) indicating that the higher the 
anomie in a department, the higher the acceptance of deviant norms.    Hypothesis 2 was 
therefore supported for anomie. 
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The results for anomie were consistent with the literature, in which anomic 
conditions in an environment or organization have been confirmed as precedents for 
greater acceptance of and adoption of deviant behaviors (Aultman, 1976; Hickman et al., 
2001).  While the anomie scale was limited, including only three items directly related to 
police occupational concerns, it functioned not only as a significant predictor of 
acceptance of deviant norms, but also accounted for a very large portion of variance in 
acceptance of deviant norms between departments.  This suggests that anomie may be a 
very robust explanation, functionally as well as theoretically, for why the officers in 
certain departments have a greater acceptance of certain deviant or corrupt behaviors than 
those in other departments.     
There was some concern related to the similarity of the topics addressed in both 
the anomie scale and the ADN scenarios.3
                                                 
3 Anomie scale includes the items “It is sometimes necessary to break department rules in order to advance 
up the ranks,” “One must keep fellow officers’ misconduct a  secret to accepted by colleagues,” and “To 
get criminals off the street, it is sometimes necessary to change the details of what happened when writing a 
report.”  The last two items can relate to acceptance of deviant norms scenarios Covering for Fellow 
Officer and False Reporting, respectively. 
  Both addressed the issues of covering for a 
fellow officer and falsifying reports (an example of noble cause corruption).  Also, the 
perceptions of these behaviors addressed in the anomie items seem similar to what is 
asked by the ADN items on seriousness and discipline.  However, there are aspects to the 
consideration of the deviant behaviors that are being addressed separately by anomie and 
acceptance of deviant norms.  For instance, while reasons for accepting the deviant 
behaviors may be implied in ADN items on seriousness and discipline, the anomie items 
specifically ask if these behaviors are necessary for the accomplishment of accepted 
departmental goals.  Bivariate correlation results suggested that this concern did not 
manifest.  
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As previously suggested, one solution to eliminate any undue tautological 
concerns would be to increase the number of anomie items, covering a broader range of 
conditions, some relating to less serious deviant behaviors.  Another option would be to 
attempt (as may be relevant for decoupling as well) to measure anomie directly through 
organizational evaluations rather than individual officer evaluations.  This option will be 
explored further in the section on future research. 
In conclusion, the support for anomie as a significant predictor is consistent with 
the literature, falling in line with the classic model of anomie and deviance set forth by 
Aultman (1976) that predicts how the organizational environment may necessitate corrupt 
behavior to achieve material or occupational goals (p. 327).  Anomie’s predictive 
strength, as compared to the individual level predictor of moral disengagement (discussed 
next), is consistent with past research findings that organizational environments are 
stronger predictors of deviance than the individual characteristics officers may exhibit 
upon entering the policing profession (Barker, 1977; Marche, 2009).  As such, the 
anomie construct shows great promise for future research on police corruption as derived 
from the organizational structure. 
Hypothesis 3: Moral Disengagement as Predictor of ADN 
 Results. The results for Hypothesis 3 will be covered separately for each ADN 
scenario, and broken down by type of model. 
 In the MSEM for ADN1 (kickbacks), moral disengagement (MD) was not a 
significant predictor when first added to the model (b = -.02, CR = -.46, p = .643) and 
remained non-significant after the addition of the Level 1 covariates.  Its initial addition 
to the model also did not account for any of the variance to be explained in ADN1 within 
  181 
departments.  In the MLM for ADN1, moral disengagement was a significant predictor of 
ADN1 when first added to the model (b = .36, CR = 5.88, p < .001) but accounted for 
only 5.12% of the within-department variance in ADN1.  After the addition of the Level 
1 covariate of Officer, MD was still a significant predictor of ADN1 (b = .33, CR = 6.53, 
p < .001). 
 In the MSEM for ADN2 (covering for fellow officer), moral disengagement was 
not a significant predictor of ADN2 when initially added to the model (b = -.05, CR = -
.42, p = .673) and it only accounted for .10% of the variance left to be explained in 
ADN2 within departments.  There was little change with the addition of the Level 1 
covariates.  However, in the MLM for ADN2, MD did function as a significant predictor 
of ADN2 when first added to the model (b = .46, CR = 7.32, p < .001), accounting for 
5.08% of the variance in ADN2 to be explained within departments.  It also remained 
significant with the addition of the Level 1 covariates (b = .45, CR = 6.85, p < .001). 
 In the MSEM for ADN3 (false reporting), similar to the other two scenarios, 
moral disengagement was not a significant predictor of ADN3 when first added to the 
model (b = .03, CR = .69, p = .493) or after the addition of covariates, and did not 
account for any of the variance in ADN3 to be explained within departments.  However, 
also similar to the other two scenarios, in the MLM for ADN3, MD did function as a 
significant predictor of ADN3 (b = .32, CR = 10.71, p < .001) when first added to the 
model and accounted for 7.04% of the variance to be explained in ADN3 within 
departments.  When a covariate was added, MD remained significant (b = .31, CR = 8.01, 
p < .001). 
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 The significance of moral disengagement as a predictor in the MLMs, even after 
controlling for Level 1 covariates, leads to cautious and partial support for Hypothesis 3 
across all three scenarios.  However, Hypothesis 3 was not consistently nor strongly 
supported in the MSEM, meaning that moral disengagement was no longer significant 
with the inclusion of the measurement model (the CFA portion of the structural equation 
model), and thus performed more poorly when allowing for measurement error. 
Problems with moral disengagement when accounting for the measurement model 
may be due to insufficient variance across departments and/or within departments (to be 
discussed next in more detail).  To explore why the MD scale did not function strongly in 
the MSEMs, it is necessary to take a closer look at the construct—the theory behind its 
usage, the choice of its construction and item composition, and the statistical problems 
with the scale. 
Comparisons to literature. The literature shows that personality measures predict 
susceptibility to corruption (Arrigo & Claussen, 2003).  The literature also supports the 
importance of considering both environmental and individual factors in explaining 
propensity for deviance.  For instance, Girodo’s (1991) work strongly supported the need 
for consideration of an interaction between personality and situational causes when 
considering who may be prone to corruption.  Even though moral disengagement had a 
poorer performance compared to anomie, this result still fits within research suggesting 
that environmental or organizational predictors may be comparatively stronger predictors 
of deviance than individual characteristics (Barker, 1977; Marche, 2009).   
Results related to methodological/construct concerns. The grounding in the 
literature, and the significance of moral disengagement as a predictor and as an 
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explanation for some of the variance in acceptance of deviant norms within departments 
in the MLMs, supports at least the continued exploration of how the moral 
disengagement construct may be better utilized in the future.  However, both poor 
performance in the context of the measurement model (in part due to lack of variance 
across the sample), and a low proportion of variance accounted for within and between 
departments, indicate a need for change in the scale item number or complexity.  This 
option will be examined further in the discussions of scale composition in the context of 
PCA results and limitations on scale length. 
The results may also indicate a need for supplementary or alternative measures of 
individual characteristics.  It is possible that other individual measures of susceptibility 
may perform better in the multilevel model than moral disengagement, regardless of any 
changes to the existing scale.  For instance, it is possible that some of the personality 
features utilized in previous studies of police deviance, such as neuroticism, disinhibition 
(Girodo, 1991), antisocial behavior, conscientiousness (Arrigo & Claussen, 2003), and 
impulsivity (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004) may account for more of the variance in 
acceptance of deviant norms to be explained within departments than does moral 
disengagement.  As can be seen in a review of the complex models, there was significant 
residual variance at the within level in all the models, and it remained significant even 
after the addition of moral disengagement and other Level 1 covariates.  This implies that 
much of the reason for differences on acceptance between officers in the same 
department was unaccounted for.  One other option—as would relate to exploring 
whether moral disengagement is a formative trait and would, as Moore (2008) proposed, 
ease initiation into an existing corrupt environment—is to measure moral disengagement 
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in recruits before occupational exposure to the police culture.  This early data could then 
be used in a model including predictive and outcome data taken subsequently after these 
same recruits had been ensconced in the occupational culture for a few years.  Some of 
these and other options for measuring individual level characteristics will be discussed in 
the section on future research. 
Hypothesis 4: Anomie/Decoupling Moderating ADN/MD Relationship 
 This hypothesis predicted that the influence of moral disengagement on 
acceptance of deviant norms within departments would be moderated by anomie and 
decoupling.  This was first assessed by looking at changes in the regression coefficients 
between MD and ADN with the addition of anomie and decoupling in both the MSEMs 
and MLMs.  Next the random slope for ADN regressed on MD was added to the MLMs 
for each scenario to determine if the slope did indeed vary across departments; that is, to 
see if there was anything variance in this relationship that could be attributed to anomie 
or decoupling.  Then anomie and/or decoupling (depending on the model) were regressed 
onto the slope to see if the regression coefficient would be negative and significant.  Such 
a result would indicate that the strength of the relationship between moral disengagement 
and acceptance of deviant norms within a department decreased as anomie and/or 
decoupling scores for that department increased.  Results are presented separately for 
decoupling and anomie, and then by scenario and model type. 
 Decoupling.  The addition of decoupling to the MSEM model for ADN1 did not 
create any change in the regression coefficient between moral disengagement and ADN1.  
Also, a random slope could not be computed in the MSEM for ADN1.  In the MLM for 
ADN1, while the addition of decoupling made no appreciable change in the regression 
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coefficient between MD and ADN1, the random slope as outcome could be directly 
tested.  When the slope was first added to the model, its variance estimate was not 
significant, indicating that it did not vary significantly across departments.  Also, the 
regression of the slope onto decoupling was not significant (b = -1.57, CR = -.03, p = 
.975) indicating a lack of moderation.   
 When decoupling was added to the MSEM for ADN2, the model would not 
identify, so the effect of decoupling on the relationship between MD and ADN2 could 
not be tested in this model.  In the MLM for ADN2, decoupling’s addition did not 
appreciably change the relationship between MD and ADN2.  Further, the variance of the 
random slope in this model was not significant.  Since decoupling was not a good fit to 
the model, it was not tested with the random slope.  However, given the other results, it is 
estimated that the coefficient would have been non-significant, similar to that found in 
the MLM for ADN1. 
 When decoupling was added to the MSEM for ADN3, the model would not 
converge, so the effect of decoupling on the relationship between moral disengagement 
and ADN3 could not be assessed in this model.  In the MLM for ADN3, the addition of 
decoupling to the model did not substantially alter the regression coefficient of ADN3 on 
MD.  Decoupling was considered weaker than anomie in the model, and as both could 
not be used in combination, decoupling was eliminated from further model iterations and 
was not tested as a predictor of the random slope.  However, similar to the results of the 
MLMs for the other two scenarios, the variance for the random slope of ADN1 on MD 
was not significant, and in fact approached zero.  This implied that there was no variance 
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for decoupling to explain, and hence the regression coefficient of decoupling onto the 
random slope would have been non-significant. 
 Overall, the results did not support Hypothesis 4 for decoupling.  The addition of 
decoupling did not create any appreciable difference in the regression coefficients 
between moral disengagement and ADN for any of the three scenarios, regardless of 
model.  Further, in all scenarios, the random slope did not have significant variance 
across departments and decoupling did not perform as a significant predictor of the 
existing variance. 
 Anomie.  In the MSEM for ADN1, anomie’s addition to the model did not 
substantially alter the relationship between moral disengagement and ADN1, and the 
random slope could not be added to the model.  In the MLM, anomie’s addition to the 
model did not cause an appreciable difference in the relationship between MD and 
ADN1.  While the inclusion of the random slope of ADN1 on MD as an outcome to the 
model accounted for 3.40% of the variance within departments, the variance estimate for 
the slope was not significant.  Also, the slope did not significantly regress onto anomie (b 
= .25, CR = .03, p < .978). 
 In the MSEM for ADN2, anomie’s addition to the model did not perceptibly 
impact the relationship between MD and ADN2, and the random slope could not be 
added to the model.  Anomie’s addition to the MLM for ADN2 caused the regression 
coefficient for ADN2 on MD to drop slightly.  However, the variance estimate of the 
random slope when added to the MLM was not significant, nor was the regression of the 
slope onto anomie (b = -.04, CR = -.00, p = 1.00). 
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 In the MSEM for ADN3, the model would not converge with the addition of 
anomie, so the hypothesis could not be tested in this model.  Anomie’s addition to the 
MLM caused hardly any change in the relationship between MD and ADN3.  The 
variance estimate of the random slope of ADN3 on MD when added to the model was not 
significant, and anomie was not a significant predictor of the slope (b = .06, CR = .06, p = 
.952). 
 Overall, the results do not support Hypothesis 4 for anomie—anomie did not 
sufficiently moderate the relationship between moral disengagement and acceptance of 
deviant norms in the models for any of the three ADN scenarios.  While there was some 
slight change in the relationship between MD and ADN1 with the addition of anomie in 
some of the models, this was very minor.  Also, the random slope did not have sufficient 
variance across departments, and anomie did not perform as a significant predictor of the 
slope of ADN regressed on MD for any scenario.   
Summary of results. In summary, Hypothesis 4 was not supported for the Level 2 
predictors of anomie and decoupling.  For both predictors, the slope of acceptance of 
deviant norms on moral disengagement did not vary significantly between departments, 
and none of the regressions that were attempted were significant. 
The lack of support for this hypothesis could implicate the theoretical model or 
the methods used to test it.  The literature provides strong support for the overall 
hypothesized model dynamic of environmental effects acting as moderators of individual 
effects.  Environmental predictors have been suggested as stronger overall influences on 
the susceptibility of individuals to corruption as compared to pre-existing individual 
traits. The value of using them together in a model has also been supported (Barker, 
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1977; Marche, 2009).  Notwithstanding this support in the literature, it is possible that the 
findings reflect on the theoretical model.    
Possible implications of results for the theoretical model. One possibility is that 
moral disengagement is such a strong trait that its relationship to acceptance of deviant 
norms is not altered perceptibly by environmental influences.  In this case, regardless of 
departmental characteristics, scores on any moral disengagement construct could vary to 
about the same degree, with a similar range, within all departments.  Or scores could vary 
between departments based on an external factor like hiring practices, but be unrelated to 
internal organizational characteristics such as anomie or decoupling.  These options could 
explain the lack of variance in the slope across departments and/or why neither anomie 
nor decoupling could significantly predict the slope. 
There is a second possibility.  While the literature supporting this hypothesis 
presumes that individual predictors of deviance, such as personality or cognitive traits, 
are pre-existing (stable and fixed), this has not been empirically established for moral 
disengagement.  If MD is not stable and fixed, this could explain the lack of support for 
Hypothesis 4.   
There are two possible scenarios: (1) the individual trait IS pre-existing and fixed, 
or (2) the individual trait is NOT pre-existing or fixed.  For the first scenario, when an 
individual trait IS pre-existing and fixed, as was presumed for the creation of the 
theoretical model, then the trait is not unduly influenced by organizational characteristics.  
In this scenario, an organizational predictor would impact the outcome variable, and the 
individual predictor would also impact the outcome variable, but the organizational 
predictor could increase/decrease the outcome variable with no impact on the individual 
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predictor.  The following is an example of this first scenario.  In this example, the 
organizational predictor starts at 1, the individual predictor starts at 1, and the outcome 
variable starts at 1.  When the organizational predictor increases to 2, the outcome 
variable increases to 2, while the individual predictor stays at 1.  With an increase in the 
organizational predictor, the slope between the individual predictor and the outcome 
variable thus decreases from 1:1 to 1:2.  Hence, in this scenario, the organizational 
predictor moderates the effect of the individual predictor on the outcome variable insofar 
as it decreases the value of the slope. 
The premise of the second scenario is counter to Hypothesis 4, and could explain 
why it was not supported.  For this second scenario, when the personality trait is NOT 
preexisting, then one can assume that it can change proportionately as the organizational 
characteristics change.  In this scenario, the organizational predictor would impact the 
outcome variable, the individual predictor would impact the outcome variable, and the 
organizational predictor would also impact the individual predictor.  The following is an 
example of this second scenario.  In this example, the organizational predictor starts at 1, 
the individual predictor starts at 1, and the outcome variable starts at 1.  When the 
organizational predictor increases to 2, the outcome variable increases to 2, and the 
individual predictor also increases to 2 (rather than remaining at 1, as in the first 
scenario).  In this case, with any increase in the organizational predictor, the slope 
between the individual predictor and the outcome variable would maintain the same ratio 
value (1:1 versus 2:2), and thus the organizational predictor would NOT be moderating 
the effect of the individual predictor on the outcome variable. 
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In sum, with this possibility, a department’s organizational characteristics may 
moderate the effect of certain individual traits on acceptance of deviant norms only if the 
individual trait is not directly influenced by the departmental characteristics.  Applying 
this possibility to the scales in the current model, it may be that anomie and decoupling 
did not moderate the effect of moral disengagement on acceptance of deviant norms 
because moral disengagement is not a preexisting cognitive trait and increases when 
anomie and decoupling increase.  For instance, if anomie directly impacted moral 
disengagement, this would imply a scenario in which a police department that 
emphasizes prescribed goals over the ethical means to achieve those goals would actually 
influence individual assessments of whether unethical behavior can be justified given 
certain parameters.  A situation in which strain is being produced by the inability to 
achieve goals through proper channels would encourage an individual to create 
justifications for unethical decision-making that they might have otherwise rejected.  If 
this were the case, the assumptions of the theoretical model would be at fault for the 
results and correction might require the substitution of moral disengagement with a more 
stable individual trait. 
A third and final possibility related to the theoretical model is that while 
environmental predictors of susceptibility to deviance may function more strongly than 
individual predictors, this may not result in a statistical moderation of the individual 
effects.  The multilevel model assumes that if the effect of anomie and decoupling is 
stronger than the effect of moral disengagement, the effect of the individual predictor will 
be proportionally less in departments with higher scores on these environmental 
predictors.  It hypothesizes that the one will be stronger enough comparatively to 
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subsume the other.  It may instead be that the effect of the individual trait remains the 
same despite the stronger effect of the environmental trait because the effect of anomie 
and decoupling is not comparatively stronger than the effect of moral disengagement to 
the degree required for moderation to occur.  
Possible implications of results for study methodology. The lack of support for 
Hypothesis 4 may be due to methodological problems and not weaknesses in the 
theoretical model.  For instance, while Hypothesis 4 was not supported with the use of 
the slope as outcome, the addition of anomie did somewhat diminish value of the 
regression coefficient of ADN on moral disengagement in some of the models.  It is also 
possible that the results are due to the previously discussed problems with the 
composition and operationalization of the various scales.   
Possible methodological causes of the lack of support for this hypothesis relate to 
results showing a lack of sufficient variance in the slope across departments.  First, the 
relationship between moral disengagement and acceptance of deviant norms may have 
been the same in every department in the study regardless of other departmental features 
due to problems with the moral disengagement scale itself (too few items, lack of 
complexity), requiring merely its adjustment.  In this case, using a more complex version 
of the individual level predictor (in lieu of a completely different individual level 
predictor) would account for more within-department variance.  This option might create 
a more construct that distinguishes more clearly between officers, and thus may vary in 
impact on acceptance of deviant norms more perceptibly between departments than any 
version of a moral disengagement scale.   
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Second, the main problem may lie in the limited number of departments, such that 
a larger number of departments might provide more between-department variance on 
acceptance of deviant norms.  (Note that the initial MSEM estimates showed that 
variance to be explained between departments ranged from only 6.55% to 14.87% of total 
model variance.  This is less than half of that to be explained within departments).  
Limitations related to sampling will be discussed further in the section on model 
approach, as well as in the discussion of future research.  
The immediate and practical relevance of the rejection of the fourth hypothesis is 
that, at least within the bounds of the current study, inter-level effects, showing true 
interaction between the individual factors and the environmental/organizational factors, 
either could not be assessed or were too small to be notable.  Path models that were 
explored prior to conducting the complex models suggested that the interaction could be 
valid, but adjustments to both the sampling and the scales seem necessary to flush out the 
true significance of such an interaction. 
Discussion of Results Unrelated to Hypotheses 
 This section covers results that are not linked directly to the hypotheses, but rather 
provide interesting insights into the constructs, scale composition, and variation within 
and between departments in the sample.  These results convey how the constructs 
functioned within the sample and provide a basis for some of the recommendations made 
in the section on future research.    
Explanation of Deviance in Sample 
 The amount of deviance to be explained in this sample was discussed in the 
results section on scale descriptives.  As was noted, the amount of deviance varied by 
  193 
ADN scenario, ranging from 31% to 51% of greatest possible amount of deviance 
acceptance.  The model results can then be interpreted to indicate the proportion of 
deviance (acceptance of deviant norms), out of the amount existing in the sample, that 
could be explained by the predictors of anomie, decoupling and moral disengagement.  
This can be determined by 1) looking at the strength of the coefficients between ADN 
and the predictors; and 2) looking at the Pseudo R2 values for each predictor as it was 
added to the models, determining how well each explained the outcome variable.  This 
data cannot identify a precise amount of ADN that was explained, but instead indicates 
the magnitude of ADN that can be explained by each predictor, The MLMs are best to 
use for this evaluation, since they were determined to be the best fit to the data for all 
variables. 
 First, moral disengagement had coefficients on the 3 scenarios ranging from .32 to 
.46, all significant.  Anomie had coefficients ranging from 1.60 to 3.29, all but one 
significant.  Decoupling had coefficients ranging from -14.50 to -11.31, none significant.  
The coefficients imply that anomie did the best job at explaining acceptance of deviant 
norms and decoupling did the poorest job.  The Pseudo R2 values support this 
interpretation of the coefficients.  Table 61 presents the Pseudo R2 values for each 
predictor by ADN scenario on both the within and between levels.  Moral disengagement, 
which is a predictor on the within level, accounts for the largest amount of within 
variance, though the least amount of between variance.  And, of the two predictors on the 
between level, anomie explains much more between variance than decoupling.   
 Overall, the results do support the value of the predictors in explaining a 
substantial amount of the acceptance of deviant norms in the sample, although 
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differences on ADN between departments are much more strongly explained than are 
differences on ADN within departments.  Also, the moderate to high amount of variance 
explained between all three predictors suggests possible improvements or additions to the 
model that might allow for the explanation of more total deviance acceptance.  Such 
possibilities for changes are discussed in the section on future research. 
Table 61 
 
Pseudo R2 values for Predictors by Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios.  Within and 
Between Levels. 
ADN Scenarios    Moral Disengagement   Anomie  Decoupling 
ADN1 
 Within     5.12%     -0.04%       0.04% 
 Between  14.58%    68.39%     69.43% 
ADN2 
 Within     5.08%      0.23%       0.00% 
 Between  11.46%    59.26%       7.69% 
ADN3 
 Within     7.04%     -0.03%       0.04% 
 Between  13.83%    99.79%     27.82%  
 
Scales: Results from Principal Components Analysis 
Acceptance of deviant norms.  The scales for all three acceptance of deviant 
norms scenarios gave a strong performance, with the scales consisting of items 1, 2, and 
4.  These items were determined to be representative of individual officer acceptance of 
deviant norms; they asked a respondent about the seriousness of the behavior in the 
scenario, what discipline should follow the behavior in the scenario, and whether most 
officers in their agency would report the behavior in the scenario.  Of the three scenarios, 
items for ADN2 accounted for the largest portion of variance to be explained (72.77%), 
suggesting that this was the strongest of the three ADN constructs.  The strength of this 
scenario–covering for a fellow officer–suggested that the items explained more of the 
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essence of the construct than the items of the other two ADN scales.  Interestingly, this 
scenario was also distinct in the uniformity of responses across departments, as will be 
discussed in the section on descriptives.   
These scales for acceptance of deviant norms were based on the scenarios created 
by Klockars et al. (2000).  For inclusion in the survey, they were pared down from six 
questions that covered both officer opinions (e.g. “How serious do YOU consider this 
behavior to be?”) and officer perceptions of departmental behavior (e.g. “How serious do 
MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?”) to four 
questions, and of those only three were used to create the components used in the 
complex models.  These three items represented the individual opinion of the respondent, 
and then were aggregated to represent departmental acceptance of deviant norms.  While 
both the topics of the scenarios and the items representing them were limited, their strong 
component structures and modeling outcomes suggested support for the current scale 
composition.   
Regardless of the apparent strength of the current scales, knowing that what 
would be used in the complex models would be an assessment of individual inclinations 
alone, it may have been preferable to replace Item 4 (Do you think MOST POLICE 
OFFICERS in your agency would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this 
behavior?) with a third original item representing personal inclination to report: “Do you 
think YOU would report a fellow officer who engaged in this behavior?” (Klockars et al., 
2000, p. 5).  The current Item 4 was chosen in order to include two personal opinion and 
two department behavior items, but due to the complex models utilized, the departmental 
behavior items were not able to be used (same items had to represent acceptance of 
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deviant norms on both the individual and departmental levels).  While Item 4 was 
determined to be closely enough correlated to Items 1 and 2 to be representative (by 
proxy) of personal opinions, for future research the item representing personal inclination 
to report the deviant behavior would be a more straightforward alternative. 
Anomie.  Anomie was a strong measure, and the final scale included all three 
survey items.  This strong result was expected because it was based on the scale from 
Menard (1995) that also had high reliability, strong loadings, and had successfully 
explained “17%-23% of the variance in the frequency of minor delinquency” (p. 169).  
The large amount of explained variance in the anomie measure suggested that all three 
items, while representing differing topics related to illegitimate means, were 
representative of the same concept.  The only adjustments that might strengthen future 
research would be the addition of a few more items to lend validity to the use of 
confirmatory factor analysis, provided that they contributed as much to the single 
component as the current items. 
Decoupling.  The results of the decoupling principal components analysis 
indicated two components, one for items 1 and 3, and one for items 2 and 4.  The 
subscale for items 2 and 4 was stronger, and thus these two items comprised the 
measurement of decoupling in the complex models.  Interestingly, while these were the 
two items for which the departments manifested less decoupling, they created a much 
stronger scale, accounting for more explained variance.  The two retained items were 
“Hold criminals accountable vs. Uphold suspect’s rights” and “Reduce criminal activities 
vs. discourage and prevent racially biased policing.”  As previously mentioned, problems 
using all four items in a single scale (items would not load together on a single 
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component) suggests that there may be a more concise and cohesive way of measuring 
the decoupling construct.   
One way to strengthen the measurement of decoupling may be to choose new 
topics for the items.  Another may require constructing measurement differently, to find a 
way to keep the item scale continuous rather than the dichotomous.  It is also possible 
that decoupling could be measured directly on an organizational level.  There are a few 
different options for accomplishing this last possibility. 
One option for measuring decoupling on the organizational level is through a 
direct review of department policies and practices.  One of the primary articles explaining 
decoupling in the context of occupational deviance was written by Monahan and Quinn 
(2004).  They emphasized the role of informal structure and its connection to formal 
structure in an organization, stating that “neo-institutional theory suggests organizational 
mechanisms by which informal structure may be systematically linked to formal 
structure” (p. 364).  Neo-institutional theory would suggest that “the unofficial 
relationships and patterns of behavior that exist alongside formal policies and structures 
may be more than accidental or incidental: they may be the product of decoupling as a 
formal organizational strategy” (p. 364).   This implies that the leadership of an 
organization such as a policing agency may be knowingly turning a blind eye to deviant 
or corrupt activities in the lower ranks for the sake of cultural unity, expediency, or 
occupational morale.  This type of situation might be detected in a police agency through 
the inspection of internal policies of conduct review, policy implementation, supervisory 
practices, and officer accountability procedures.   
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A second option for measuring decoupling on the organizational level would 
involve sending surveys to a sample of individuals at different ranks of an agency to ask 
about norms instituted in the department and the adherence to those norms.  Comparison 
between ranks on the same questions could expose potential decoupling, determining 
whether there is a shearing of formal norms instituted on higher management levels from 
the informal norms accepted and followed without opposition on the lower ranks.  This 
could create a score of decoupling for each agency.   
To investigate the potential of this alternative with the current decoupling scale, 
ANOVAs were run to see if there were significant differences on decoupled perceptions 
(ranking pragmatic goal over ethical guidelines) by ranks (officers vs. sergeants and 
higher) and supervisory status across departments.   
The findings supported this proposed difference.  Police officers (M = .50, SD = 
.70, N = 606) represented their departments as significantly more decoupled than did 
those ranked at sergeant or higher (M = .39, SD = .64, N = 318, F (1, 922) = 5.72, p = 
.017).  Also, non-supervisors (M = .52, SD = .71, N = 568) represented their departments 
as significantly more decoupled than did supervisors (M = .38, SD = .63, N = 344, F (1, 
910) = 915, p = .003).  This suggests that the relative importance of ethical guidelines vis 
a vis pragmatic goals varied within each department, and may be best investigated by 
targeting differences in perspectives by rank, perhaps in conjunction with a direct 
inspection of internal department policies.  These proposals will be integrated into the 
discussion of future research. 
Moral disengagement.  The version of the moral disengagement scale that was 
composed of only Items 1, 2, and 3 created the strongest single component model, 
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accounting for 72.81% of total variance.  This was more than the 52.28% accounted for 
by the component that included all four items.  This three-item component had strong 
item loadings and included only items that shared a similar context; the item that was 
eliminated related to theft of personal property, while the three retained items had a work 
environment context and dealt with the attribution of blame or diffusion of responsibility 
to others. 
The strong performance of the moral disengagement scale in the PCA was 
consistent with prior results for the complete scale (of 24 items and 8 subscales) in the 
study originating the scale (Detert et al., 2008).  Since the items retained were closely 
related to a police occupational environment, the only possibility for improvement of the 
scale would be to add additional items of similar emphasis (diffusion of responsibility 
and attribution of blame) with a slightly broader subject matter, or one more specific to 
police officers.  As previously suggested, it would also be interesting to test this scale, or 
a more complete version of it, on police recruits and verify over time the stability of this 
personality trait after exposure to the police occupational culture.  This possibility is 
explored further in the section on future research. 
Variance in Scales across Departments and Potential Outliers 
 Variance.  Due to concerns in the models, which could be explained by lack of 
sufficient variance in the scales across departments or within departments, variance for 
each scale across departments was evaluated.  ANOVAs were run to determine if there 
were significant differences on the variables across the departments, and means and 
standard deviations were run for each summed scale within each department.   
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 The evaluation of the summed scales across departments determined that the 
scales with the lowest variance were decoupling and moral disengagement.  These were 
also the scales that had the most difficulty fitting within the multilevel structural equation 
model.  This would tend to suggest that the problems with fitting these variables into the 
MSEMs, including nonidentification and nonconvergence for decoupling, and lack of 
significance for moral disengagement, may be due at least in part to the lack of variance.  
The third lowest scale for variance was anomie, which performed well in the complex 
models on the whole, but would not converge in the MSEM for ADN3.  So variance for 
anomie may still have been low enough to cause problems in the MSEMs.  The 
difference in variance estimates between the scales is also evident from looking at the 
means and standard deviations across departments. 
 When ANOVAs were run on the summed scales across departments, the results 
confirmed the variance estimates.  The ANOVAs for ADN1, ADN2, ADN3, and anomie 
were all highly significant.  The ANOVA for moral disengagement was also significant, 
but at a lower level, and decoupling did not vary significantly across departments.   
 In sum, low variance on decoupling and moral disengagement signified that there 
was not enough difference on the scales across the entire sample, and the ANOVAs 
confirmed lower variance for these two scales between individual departments.  These 
findings support the likelihood that low variance was a factor in the problems 
experienced with model identification.  As has been previously discussed in relation to 
these two scales, these problems may be reduced by making changes to the construct 
operationalizations (e.g., changing item inclusion on the scales, using a different method 
for measuring the constructs, bringing in alternative scales), or increasing the number and 
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variety of departments in the sample.  Given the information that already exists on these 
two scales, and the continued support for the constructs in the literature, it may be 
advisable to attempt a combination of both approaches in future research—both an 
adjustment to the scales and increase in the number and variety of departments.  Other 
issues related to the number of departments and how they were selected are addressed 
further in the section on study approaches. 
 Outliers.  Looking more closely at the means and standard deviations for summed 
scales for each department, it became apparent that Ft. McDowell was a potential outlier.  
It consistently had the lowest or near to the lowest scores on the variables, indicating that 
its officers were reporting less acceptance of deviant norms, less anomie, less decoupling, 
and less moral disengagement than officers in the other departments.  Also, the standard 
deviation tended to be lower for Ft. McDowell, indicating more homogeneity in the 
responses given by the officers in that department.  To confirm these results, post hoc 
tests were run on the ANOVAs for scales between departments to see if Ft. McDowell 
was substantially lower on the scales than all the other departments, which would make it 
a statistically important outlier.  These tests showed that officers in the Ft. McDowell 
department responded with substantially less acceptance of the false reporting scenario 
(ADN3) than all other departments, but that for all other scales it did not perform as a 
statistically relevant outlier. 
 The existence of this outlier, even on one outcome variable, emphasized the need 
for a more carefully stratified sampling effort in future research.  Ft. McDowell retained 
in the group of departments used for the complex analyses because of the   need for more 
departments, particularly small ones for the analyses.  Given a larger sample of 
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departments with more small departments represented, such an outlier would be removed.  
It is likely that the results of low standard deviations were due to the more homogeneous 
nature of the police officers policing an American Indian Reservation.  They are all of the 
same ethnic background, from similar walks of life, and are thus likely to share similar 
ethical guidelines.  Moreover, it is possible that the reservation has lower rates and/or less 
diverse forms of crime, and a completely different environment for enforcement as 
compared to a similarly sized small town.  These differences in occupational culture and 
pressures might account for the lower overall means found for anomie, decoupling, moral 
disengagement, and acceptance of deviant norms.    
Descriptives for Latent Variables 
 Acceptance of deviant norms.  When comparing the acceptance of deviant norms 
scenarios, the items for ADN2, the covering for fellow officer scenario, had the lowest 
means, indicating that officers in the sample considered this to be the least serious of the 
offenses and the least deserving of reporting or discipline.  The item means were the 
highest for ADN3, the false reporting scenario, indicating that officers considered it to be 
the most serious offense, deserving of the most punishment, and the most necessary to 
report. 
 The results for the scenario on covering for a fellow officer were distinctive. This 
form of misbehavior was the most likely to be accepted by officers in all departments.  
Even an arguably minor offense such as accepting kickbacks was deemed more serious 
than this.  This result is consistent with past research indicating that a considerable 
number of police officers are likely to turn a blind eye to the misconduct of fellow 
officers (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, Williams, & 
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Bryant, 2000).  Many officers have been found to be reluctant to report on even serious 
forms of corruption or deviance (Crank, 1998; Skolnick, 2000).  As will be seen in the 
discussion on sublevel findings, this tendency is consistent regardless of rank and 
supervisory status.  The implications of the higher ADN2 scores are that departments 
need more policies and/or training that serve to promote the reporting of deviance on the 
part of fellow officers.  Specific organizational differences between departments on this 
particular issue may be discovered and could prove useful for policymakers.  These 
possibilities will be covered in more detail in the discussion of sublevel findings, future 
research, and practical implications.  
 Anomie.  On the anomie scale, Item 3 scored lower than the other two items, 
indicating that changing the details of a police report was a more serious offense than 
keeping fellow officer misconduct secret or breaking departmental rules.  This is 
consistent with the results for the ADN scenarios in that a noble cause form of corruption 
(changing report details) is considered more serious and less likely to be excused than 
covering for the misconduct of a fellow officer. 
 Decoupling.  On the decoupling scale, as mentioned in the discussion of the 
principal component analyses, the ethical guidelines of most import (indicating least 
decoupling) were “upholding suspect’s rights” and “discouraging racially biased 
policing.”  The ethical guidelines of less import (indicating most decoupling) were 
“uncovering, reporting, and disciplining the unethical/illegal behavior of fellow officers” 
and “reporting crime statistics accurately.”  This latter finding is somewhat in line with 
the results on the ADN scenarios—that covering for a fellow officer was more acceptable 
(and reporting on a fellow officer less acceptable) than other forms of 
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deviance/corruption.  It is possible that to make decoupling a more homogenous measure, 
there should be less of a distinction in perceived seriousness between the represented 
ethical guidelines.  Alternately, the items may have loaded on different components due 
to the way that the scale was constructed, using distinct policing topics of ethics and 
goals.  Certain of the chosen topics may have inadvertently correlated more strongly with 
others, regardless of perceived seriousness.  As previously mentioned, alternatives to the 
current construction of the decoupling scale will be explored for future research. 
 Moral disengagement.  There was not much distinction on item loadings between 
moral disengagement items, although Item 1, “You can’t blame a person who plays only 
a small part in the harm caused by a group,” had a slightly higher mean.  This result 
suggested that this item may be the most representative of the core construct. 
Demographic Covariates in Complex Models and Sublevel Results for Covariates  
 Certain individual level (Level 1) and departmental level (Level 2) demographic 
variables were used as covariates in the complex models to control for their influences.  
The categorical and ordinal covariates were, as noted in the measurement section, revised 
into dummy variables for proper interpretation in the models.  Those tested included 
Rank (dummy coded as Officer, Lieutenant and up, and Captain and up), Neighborhood 
Crime (Low Crime, Moderately High Crime, Very High Crime), Workday (Night Shifts, 
Mostly Day Shifts, Afternoon/Evening Shifts), Race (White, Black, Hispanic), Gender 
(Female), and Shift (Fixed Shift, Rotating Shift).   
 Only those that substantially contributed to the models were retained and, of 
these, some were significant predictors of acceptance of deviant norms for each scenario.  
The same Level 1 covariates that were considered for inclusion in the complex models 
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were examined more closely within the two largest departments of Los Angeles and 
Chicago with the use of ANOVAs (examining original and non dummy coded variables).  
These results mirrored much of what had already been found in the MSEMs and MLMs.  
The most consistent of these results were then explored in the entire sample.  Both the 
significant predictor covariates from the complex models and the individual level 
covariates used for the sublevel evaluations are included together in this section.  They 
are presented here by each scenario and by model level or departmental context.  This 
format was chosen to clearly demonstrate how acceptance of deviant norms for each 
scenario varied by these demographic categories in both the complex models and the 
ANOVAs. 
 ADN1: Kickbacks scenario.  The individual level demographic variables 
significantly associated with ADN1, the kickbacks scenario, were respondent rank, 
respondent supervisory status, respondent workday, and respondent shift type.   
(a) Rank—In the MSEM for ADN1, the coefficient for Officer was positive and 
significant.  This indicated that respondents ranked as officers had higher ADN 
scores related to kickbacks, thus a greater acceptance of the deviant behavior, than 
respondents of higher ranks.  Also in the MSEM for ADN1, the coefficient for 
Captain and up was negative and significant, indicating that those respondents 
ranked Captain and higher had lower ADN scores related to kickbacks than 
respondents of  lower rank, and were thus less accepting of this deviant behavior.  
The result for Officer was confirmed in the MLM.  In the sublevel ANOVAs, 
there was significant variation on the ADN1 (kickbacks) scenario based on 
respondent rank in both the Los Angeles and Chicago police departments.  In Los 
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Angeles, respondents with lower ranks had uniformly higher acceptance of 
kickbacks than respondents ranked higher.  In Chicago, this distinction was made 
between the ranks of officer and sergeant, where the lower ranking officers had 
higher acceptance of kickbacks than the higher ranking sergeants.  These results 
were confirmed with an ANOVA in the total sample.  Thus, across all 
departments, lower ranking officers were more accepting of kickbacks (ADN1) 
than were respondents with the rank of sergeant or higher. 
(b) Supervisory status—In the sublevel ANOVAs, there was significant variation on 
the ADN1 (kickbacks) scenario based on respondent supervisory status in both 
the Los Angeles and Chicago police departments.  In both departments, 
respondents without supervisory status were more accepting of kickbacks than 
those with supervisory status. These results were explored and partially confirmed 
in the total sample.  While for all scenarios the tendency was for non-supervisors 
to have higher ADN scores than non-supervisors, this was significant only for the 
kickbacks scenario.  This indicated that across all departments, non-supervisors 
were more accepting of kickbacks (ADN1) than were supervisors; this effect was 
not significant for either covering for fellow officers (ADN2) or for false 
reporting (ADN3). 
(c) Workday—“Workday” references the time of the person’s shift.  In the MSEM for 
ADN1, Dayshift was negative and significant, such that those working mainly day 
shifts tended to score lower on the ADN1 kickbacks scenario than officers 
working either afternoon/evening or night shifts.  This indicated that officers 
working day shifts were the least accepting of the deviant behavior.   
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(d) Shift—“Shift” refers to the type of shift—either fixed or rotating.  While shift was 
not a significant predictor of ADN1 in the complex models, in the sublevel 
ANOVA for Los Angeles, there was significant variation on shift worked by 
respondents for ADN1 (kickbacks).  This indicated that officers working rotating 
shifts had significantly higher acceptance of kickbacks than officers working 
fixed or other shifts. 
ADN2: Covering for fellow officer scenario.  The individual level demographic 
variables significantly associated with ADN2 (the covering for a fellow officer scenario) 
were crime rates of the neighborhood worked by respondent, respondent workday, and 
respondent rank (only found in the complex model).  The department level variable of 
percentage of African Americans in a jurisdiction was also a significant predictor of 
ADN2. 
(a) Neighborhood crime rates—In the MSEM for ADN2, Low Crime rates in the 
neighborhoods where respondents worked was a negative and significant 
predictor of ADN2 within departments.4
                                                 
4 Neighborhood crime rates were coded in such as way that crime rates from low to high were scored from 
1 to 5, and non-assigned officers were scored as 0. 
  This indicated that officers working in 
neighborhoods with low crime rates had lower ADN scores related to covering for 
a fellow officer as compared to those working in higher crime areas.  In the 
sublevel ANOVAs, there was significant variation on the ADN2 scenario based 
on crime levels in neighborhoods worked by respondents in the Los Angeles 
Police Department.  Similar to the complex model, respondents who worked in 
neighborhoods with low crime rates were significantly less accepting of covering 
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for a fellow officer than were respondents working in average or high crime rate 
neighborhoods.   
(b) Workday—In the MSEM for ADN2, Nightshift was a positive and significant 
predictor of ADN2 within departments, such that those working night shifts 
tended to have higher ADN scores related to covering for a fellow officer as 
compared to those working day or afternoon/evening shifts.  The result for 
Nightshift was confirmed in the MLM model for ADN2.  In the sublevel 
ANOVAs, there was significant variation on the ADN2 scenario based on 
workdays of respondents in the Los Angeles Police Department.  Similar to the 
complex models, respondents who worked night shifts were significantly more 
accepting of covering for a fellow officer than were respondents working mostly 
day shifts.   
(c) Rank—In the MSEM for ADN2, Captain and up was negative and significant, 
indicating that those with ranks for Captain or higher had significantly lower 
scores on ADN as related to covering for a fellow officer than did respondents of 
lower ranks.  However, this result was not supported in either the MLM or the 
sublevel evaluations. 
(d) Percentage African Americans in jurisdiction—In the MSEM for ADN2, 
percentage of African Americans in the departmental jurisdiction was a 
significant and negative predictor of departmental ADN scores related to covering 
for a fellow officer.  This indicated that the higher the percentage of African 
Americans in the jurisdiction, the less that agency’s officers were accepting of 
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covering for a fellow officer.  No Level 2 covariates were used in the MLM so 
this result was not confirmed. 
 ADN3: False reporting scenario.  The individual level demographic variables 
significantly associated with ADN3 (the false reporting scenario) were respondent rank, 
respondent gender, respondent shift type, and respondent supervisory status. 
(a) Rank— In the MSEM for ADN3, Officer was a positive and significant predictor 
of ADN3 within departments, such that within departments, respondents with the 
rank of officer had higher scores on ADN related to false reporting than did 
officers of higher ranks.  These results for Officer were confirmed in the MLM.  
Also, in the sublevel ANOVA for Los Angeles, there was a significant difference 
between ranks on ADN3, such that lower ranking officers had significantly 
greater acceptance of false reporting than the higher ranking sergeants and 
lieutenants.  These results were confirmed in the total sample.  Thus, across all 
departments, lower ranking officers were more accepting of false reporting 
(ADN2) than were respondents with the rank of sergeant or higher. 
(b) Gender—In the MSEM for ADN3, Female was a positive and significant 
predictor of ADN3 within departments.  This indicated that females had higher 
ADN scores related to false reporting than did males, and hence were more 
accepting of the behavior.   
(c) Shift—While not a significant predictor in the complex models, in the sublevel 
ANOVAs for the Los Angeles Police Department, there was a significant 
variation on shift worked by respondents for ADN3.  Officers working rotating 
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shifts had significantly higher acceptance of kickbacks and false reporting than 
officers working fixed or other shifts.  
(d) Supervisory status—While there were no significant results in the MSEM for 
ADN3, in the sublevel analyses for Los Angeles, there was a significant variation 
by supervisory status on ADN3 (false reporting scenario), such that non-
supervisors were more accepting of false reporting than supervisors.   
Summary of findings.  In summary, the individual level covariates that 
significantly determined responses on any of the acceptance of deviant norms scenarios 
were rank, supervisory status, workday, shift, neighborhood crime rates, and gender.  The 
only department level covariate to significantly determine acceptance of deviant norms 
responses between departments was percentage of African Americans in the jurisdiction.  
See summary of significant results by covariate and scenario in Table 62.   
Table 62 
 
Summary of Significant Covariates by Acceptance of Deviant Norms Scenarios 
Covariates  ADN1   ADN2   ADN3 
Rank      sig       sig      sig 
Super. Status     sig      —      sig 
Workday     sig      sig      — 
Shift      sig      —      sig 
Neighb. Crime    —      sig      — 
Gender     —      —      sig 
Jurisd. % AA     —      sig      — 
 
There were differences in the primary predictors between scenarios.  Of note were 
the differences between the predictors for ADN1 and ADN3 as compared to those for 
ADN2.  As discussed previously for other findings such as mean values, the ADN2 
scenario for covering for a fellow officer stood apart in its wide acceptance within the 
sample, and stands out again here for the sublevels on which it varies.   
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Two aspects of these results merit discussion: (1) the relationships between 
specific individual and department characteristics and susceptibility to deviance, and (2) 
the unique character of covering for a fellow officer as compared to the other deviant 
behaviors exhibited in the scenarios (accepting kickbacks and false reporting).  To 
address both issues, discussions of the covariates will be separated into those that were 
predictors of ADN1 and ADN3 only (rank, supervisory status, gender, shift), and those 
that were predictors of ADN2 (workday, neighborhood crime, percentage African 
American).  These discussions will include comparisons to past research when such 
information is available, and evaluations of relevance.  (As a note, there is not much 
research in the literature that looks at individual demographic or situational correlates of 
police deviance or likelihood for deviance.  As such, much of the results cannot be 
compared to previous findings.) 
Evaluations of significant covariates of ADN1 and ADN3. The covariates of rank, 
supervisory status, gender, and shift type were significant predictors of a minor form of 
corruption (accepting kickbacks) and a more serious form of noble cause corruption 
(falsifying reports to make an arrest).  The results indicated that respondents agreed that 
false reporting was the most serious of the scenarios.  Both can be considered deviant 
occupational behaviors and abuses of authority. 
In this sample, respondents of lower rank and non-supervisory status were found 
to be more accepting of deviant norms.  This result finds support in the literature.  Higher 
rank has been linked to higher assessments of seriousness (McConkey, Huon, & Frank, 
1996) and supervisors have been found to be more likely to perceive low level corruption 
as serious as compared to line officers (Ivkovic, 2005).   
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Females and people working rotating shifts were also more likely to accept 
deviant norms than males and those working fixed shifts.  There is some past research 
linking poor psychological well being in police officers with rotating shifts (Phillips, 
Magan, Gerhardstein, & Cecil, 1991).  Also, women have been found to still be facing 
gender bias and discrimination in the law enforcement occupational environment (IACP, 
1998).  Thus, while there is not research directly linking gender or shift type to likelihood 
for corruption or deviance, there is support for how stressors are linked to deviance 
(Violanti & Marshall, 1983).  Police stress has been found to be caused by a variety of 
factors, not the least of which are shift work (Violanti & Aron, 1994) and other functional 
features, social isolation, and organizational structure (Carter, 1994).  One could argue 
that the strain of being a female police officer comes from organizational features and 
isolation within the subculture.  This may increase pressure for conformity, including 
accepting serious deviant norms such as the adjustment of crime reports in order to make 
an arrest or impress fellow officers.  Also, shift work as a stressor may lead to greater 
acceptance of deviance as a stress outlet.  At least, these are possible explanations of the 
results. 
Evaluations of significant covariates of ADN2. The individual level covariates of 
workday and neighborhood crime were significant predictors of acceptance of covering 
for a fellow officer (ADN2), as was the department level covariate of percentage of 
African Americans in the jurisdiction.  The scenario of covering for a fellow officer was 
more generally accepted by the respondents, and, except for one positive result for 
Captain and up, was found in the MSEM, the scenario was not impacted by rank or 
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supervisory status in the sublevel analyses as were the other two forms of deviance.  In 
fact, regardless of respondent role, acceptance was generally uniformly high.   
There has been considerable prior research examining likelihood for 
whistleblowing (the converse of covering for an officer), both in police departments and 
in other organizations.  The results in the current study suggest that certain subcultures or 
work groups within a police department may be more likely to perpetuate a “blue wall of 
silence” than others.  Specifically, this was true of officers who worked night shifts and 
patrolled medium or high crime rate neighborhoods as compared to low crime rate 
neighborhoods.  
 Individual correlates of increased whistleblowing in past research have included 
supervisory status (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Wenger, Korenman, Berk, & Liu, 1999) 
and longer tenure (Miceli & Near, 1992) with some mixed findings.  Greater hesitancy to 
report has been found in specific types of police work groups, such as street patrols or 
investigative work.  In these subcultures, occupational situations might involve more 
danger and require more immediate, complex, and controversial decision-making.  These 
characteristics of a subculture may make solidarity more important.  In these types of 
contexts, whistleblowing may threaten group trust and cohesiveness and may therefore be 
less tolerated (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).   
While rank and supervisory status were not consistent significant predictors of 
covering for a fellow officer in this sample–in contrast with prior research–the results for 
night shift work and high crime patrols do fit with work group findings.  Arguably, 
officers who work night shifts and in higher crime areas are more likely to be part of a 
work group culture that requires more police discretion and that may be less accepting of 
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external review.  Also, as found in the previously discussed literature on stress and 
deviance, it is possible that these work groups experience increased occupational stress 
due to environmental hazards.  They may then be more prone to deviant behavior and 
covering for such behavior within the work group. 
The last result for this scenario, the department level finding, indicated that 
officers in police departments whose jurisdictions had higher percentages of African 
Americans were less accepting of covering for a fellow officer.  No correlates to this 
finding were found in the literature.  Instead, based on the literature linking stress and 
deviance, one might expect that officers in such jurisdictions would be more prone to 
internal corruption.   Percentage of African Americans was most highly correlated to the 
jurisdiction’s property crime rate, which would indicate the potential that such 
jurisdictions were more socially disorganized and hence, arguably, more stressful to 
police than others.  Thus the result does not correspond to expectations.   
The only finding in the literature that may have some relevance to this result is 
that of increased whistleblowing in larger organizations.  This finding has been attributed 
to the fact that larger organizations tend to have more organized systems for encouraging 
and protecting whistleblowers, and greater likelihood of having mandatory reporting 
policies (Miceli & Near, 1992; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  Examining the department 
descriptive statistics, the four largest departments did have the highest percentage of 
African Americans (although this was not a perfect correlation).  However, noting that 
department population was not a significant predictor of ADN2, it is likely that a 
mediating and unobserved variable is the explanation for the significant relationship 
between percentage of African Americans and ADN2.  Jurisdictional variables, other 
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than those attempted in the current models, could be explored to examine the practical 
significance of this finding. 
Evaluation of Study Approach 
 This section focuses on evaluating the methodological approach that was taken to 
test the theoretical hypotheses.  First, it summarizes the approach by restating the reasons 
for the multilevel design, the chosen scales, the sampling and survey methodology, and 
the data analysis techniques.  As part of the summary, the strengths of each aspect of the 
approach are presented. Second, this section details the study limitations, referencing 
issues introduced in the discussion of the results, and commenting on how limitations 
may have impacted the results.  Third, it summarizes the major weaknesses and presents 
possible options for rectifying these problems in future research. This leads into the final 
portion of the discussion with summary conclusions, possible practical and policy 
implications of findings, and implications for future research. 
Study Approach and Strengths 
Previous studies attempting to identify predictors of police deviance demonstrated 
the difficult task of adapting any one criminological theory to the study of police 
corruption.  While some researchers attempted theory integration, the methodology 
including both organizational and individual units of analysis, with both organizational 
and individual/environmental predictors, is unique to the current study.   
The current study took a multilevel approach, looking at both departments and 
individual officers.  It sought to measure corruption at the level of the police department, 
acknowledging how organizational factors and demographic features may predict a 
culture more accepting of deviance.  It also looked at how cognitive traits and other 
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individual-level characteristics may make certain officers more susceptible to deviance 
than others in the same department, and how the environmental influence of a corrupt 
organizational structure might interact with individual susceptibility.  Being a blend of 
past research efforts, the current study was a pilot attempt to examine all these facets 
simultaneously. 
 To do so, it utilized the resources of the National Police Research Platform 
Project, constructing survey scales of both organizational and individual variables 
through personal perceptions and individual evaluations of departmental environment and 
departmental behavior.  Organizational variables were aggregated up from the individual 
survey responses to be interpreted as department-level constructs.  This allowed for a data 
collection process that was shorter and less complex than a direct evaluation of 
organizational features.  This study involved surveys of officers in multiple departments, 
departments from a range of locations, sizes, and demographic compositions.   
 The on-line survey methods that were used provided ease of communication and 
flexibility, and ensured respondent anonymity.  Collaborating with other researchers on a 
large project also allowed for constructive feedback and the nesting of measures for the 
current study within more complex surveys.   
 The scales constructed for the current study, while limited in scope and size, were 
precisely tuned to police respondents on topics of relevance, measuring broad concepts 
without alienating the respondents.  The decoupling measure was a unique attempt to 
evaluate departmental structural problems through the evaluations of individual 
employees.  While flaws in design and scaling emerged, the attempt produced insight into 
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the theoretical construct of decoupling, and provided new ideas for similarly unique 
measurement approaches.   
 The data analysis approach of using the complex models—the multilevel 
structural equation model (MSEM) and the base multilevel model (MLM)—allowed for  
integrated evaluations of the individual and organizational predictors, and allowed for 
separate evaluations of the contributions of each variable on the “between departments” 
and “within departments” levels.  While predictive relationships between variables could 
have been accomplished with other approaches, they would not have been as thorough, 
and would not have provided as much information on the total theoretical model.  For 
instance, neither path analysis nor structural equation modeling would have distinguished 
individual and cluster effects.  The MSEMs had the added benefit of allowing for an 
inclusion of the measurement models for each latent variable, while still evaluating 
effects on two levels.   
While problems emerged indicating that certain variables, and perhaps the 
sample, needed improvement for a proper fit to the MSEMs (prompting the MLM 
evaluations), the information gathered with the MSEMs was incredibly valuable for 
assessing what these improvements should be.  For instance, concerns over scale variance 
across departments were brought to light due to problems encountered in the MSEM 
process.  Further, problems with certain of the hypotheses were highlighted by the greater 
constraints posed by the MSEMs.  It thus seems evident that these models were the 
preferred analytical approach, and should be used in future research, provided that the 
necessary adjustments to scales and to sample composition can be made. 
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  Overall, despite the limitations to be next addressed, there were many strengths in 
the chosen study approach.  Problems that were encountered in the process offer valuable 
suggestions for improvements for future research.  Comparing the strengths in the 
theoretical, methodological, and analytical approaches to the limitations and problems 
actually highlights the value of further attempts to improve on the operationalization of 
the theoretical model.    
Study Limitations 
This study’s methodological approach had limitations in several areas including 
(1) sampling of agencies, and its impact on population representativeness and robustness 
of statistical analyses; (2) survey design, and its impact on construct validity and 
robustness of statistical analyses; (3) survey methodology, and its impact on response 
bias; and (4) survey content, and its impact on response bias and theoretical robustness.  
For these reasons, this study must be considered a pilot study with future research   
addressing these limitations. 
Sampling limitations. There were limitations related to the small number of 
agencies and the manner of their selection.  Respondents came from a convenience 
sample of departments, chosen for national visibility, convenience of location to 
participating researchers, and willingness to participate.  Only eight departments received 
the survey, and since not all police departments had an equal chance of being chosen, 
these eight departments, while varying in size, racial composition, and geographic 
location, were not representative of the population of interest, namely U.S. police 
departments.  This is a biased sample, given that “the distribution of characteristics in the 
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sample is systematically different from the target population” (Shaughnessy, 
Zechmeister, & Zechmeister, 2003).   
These sampling limitations caused a few specific problems.  First, the limited 
number of departments was likely at least partly responsible, along with lack of stratified 
random sampling, for the low amount of variance across departments for both acceptance 
of deviant norms (ADN) as an outcome, and for the slope of ADN on moral 
disengagement (as predicted for use in Hypothesis 4).  And, as was found for both the 
outcome variable and some of the predictors, these low variance estimates contributed to 
problems with the complex modeling.     
Second, also as relates to the complex models, there were too few agencies to 
allow for a proper identification of the multilevel structural equation models.  The 
MSEMs had the ability to analyze differences both between and within levels of the 
analysis, including between Level 2 clusters (in this case police departments) and across 
the Level 1 units (individual police officers).  Since there was a consideration of 
differences between Level 2 clusters, there should have been more Level 2 clusters than 
total model parameters in order to properly identify the model.  The complexity of the 
model meant that even in its most scaled down form it still had more than the eight 
parameters, more than the number of clusters.  The number of Level 2 clusters would 
thus need to be larger in future studies to provide greater confidence in the results.  Due 
to the limited cluster number, the between-department results in the current study have to 
be considered preliminary estimates.   
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In summary, a greater number of departments would have not only improved 
model identification and strengthened validity of results, but also had the potential to 
strengthen hypothesized relationships.   
One other set of concerns related to sampling has to do with establishing validity.  
Both the self-selection of the departments and the self-selection of the officers within 
each department posed threats to external and internal validity.  External validity refers to 
the generalizability of results, or the extent to which the findings of a study are relevant 
to subjects and settings beyond those in the study.  External validity concerns relate to the 
between-agency comparisons, since not all agencies are willing to participate in a study 
of corruption, accountability and other internal department matters.  The departments that 
are willing to participate may have traits and characteristics that distinguish them from 
other departments.  Participating agencies, for instance, may have more accountability or 
a stronger culture of integrity.      
External validity is also relevant to the within-agency comparisons, as there were 
limitations related to the self-selection of the responding officers in each department.     
Officers who chose to participate may not have been representative of the department as a 
whole on traits such as personality, years on the job, personal integrity, opinions of their 
occupation or agency, or other variables of interest.   
Self-selection, and the resulting lack of representativeness, may also impact 
internal validity.  Internal validity is the degree to which one can draw valid conclusions 
about the causal effects of one variable on another.  It depends on how well extraneous 
variables have been controlled.  With regard to internal validity in between-agency 
analyses, the agencies that participate may have characteristics that differ from non-
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participating departments.  In this case, there may be between-department variables that 
contribute to model relationships for which the model does not control.  Such variables 
may account for residual between-department variance that the model attributes to 
current predictor variables.  With regard to the internal validity of within-agency 
analyses, respondent self-selection may increase the likelihood that respondents and non-
respondents differ in un-controlled for personal characteristics that may impact 
relationships between variables in the model.  For instance, if officers who choose to 
respond are also more likely to be those officers within their department who are most 
influenced by internal politics, they may be more likely to give socially desirable 
answers.  They may be responding how they believe that their superiors would like them 
to respond.  If this were the case, without controlling for social desirability, identified 
associations between variables could be invalid.   
The demographics for respondents as compared to agency population exist for a 
few variables, namely gender, race, and patrol status, and these are presented in Table 2 
in the methodology section.  The table presents a few exceptions to population 
representativeness in the samples.  For instance, in Arlington, there was a larger 
percentage of non-patrol officers participating in the survey than the departmental 
percentage.  For all agencies to some degree Black officers were under represented as 
participants.  Similar results were found for Hispanics in Framingham, Chicago and Los 
Angeles.  Also, a much larger percentage of participants from Framingham were female 
as compared to the total department percentages.  No data was available to compare 
respondents on the other sublevels that were used in the analyses, namely supervisory 
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status, shift type, work schedule, and rank.  As such, it is unknown how representative the 
sublevel analyses were for the Los Angeles and Chicago police departments. 
Survey design limitations. There were limitations related to the survey design.  As 
previously mentioned, restrictions on survey length required scaling back all measures of 
constructs to a small number of items.  This had an impact on construct validity, the 
robustness and identification of the multilevel structural equation model (given the 
problems of having a small number of items when conducting factor analysis), scale 
variance, and possibly on hypothesized relationships as well.  When designing the 
instruments for anomie, moral disengagement, and acceptance of deviant norms, it was 
important to attempt to stick as close to the original structures as possible.  For each of 
these instruments, previous research had ascertained convergent validity and predictive 
ability.  This included past correlations with other constructs and the ability to predict 
what the scale was expected to predict.  However, changes to the original constructs and 
limitations regarding item number for each construct, raised concerns about face validity, 
construct validity, and factor loadings.  Further concerns about model identification and a 
valid representation of the theoretical model also arose in the course of the analyses. 
Since there was no way in the context of the current study to compare the reduced 
set of items for each construct to the full set, it was not possible to know if the new 
versions of the instruments were still measuring the same constructs as the originals.  The 
decoupling instrument, which did not exist prior to its original formation for this study, 
was relegated to the same restrictions–also being in a more abbreviated form than 
originally conceived.  What could be assessed about the limited instruments to be used 
here, including the decoupling measure, were three things: (a)  face validity, comparing 
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the items retained to what the original instrument was trying to represent (in the case of 
decoupling, comparing to the fuller version); (b) predictive validity and concurrent 
validity, the ability of each instrument to form the predicted relationships with the others 
based on what was known about each construct from the literature and how it behaved; 
and (c), whether the items in each instrument all loaded strongly on the same factors, 
implying a cohesion in terms of representing constructs.  
Assessing face validity, although arguably the weakest form of validity, was 
important in this case because of the major revisions to the instruments.  Did the few 
items still remaining represent conceptually the construct as a whole?  It was also 
important to determine predictive validity and concurrent validity, representing whether 
the abbreviated instruments still performed as expected based on their original forms in 
past research.  Related to this performance is the assessment of the extent to which items 
loaded together.  Comparison to the previous versions and original concepts is presented 
below for each construct. 
For anomie, the original construct was based on Merton’s definition of social 
anomie and the individual perception of anomie, called anomia.  For anomie to be 
perceived by the individual, there needs to be a “universally prescribed success goal,” 
acceptance of the institutionalized means of achieving those goals, and belief that these 
culturally approved means “will not be effective in attaining the culturally prescribed 
goal of success” (Menard, 1995, p. 137).  The individual then has a choice of modes of 
adaptation, either accepting or rejecting the goals and then acting accordingly.  The intent 
in developing the original instrument was to pose statements to which agreement or 
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disagreement would imply a level of “expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are 
required to achieve given goals” (Menard, 1995, p. 143).   
The version for police officers posed statements to which agreement or 
disagreement would imply a level of belief that departmentally unapproved behaviors 
were required to reach occupational or social goals within the realm of work in their 
police department.  While the items remaining only pose a few examples of this dynamic, 
they all were still consistent with this construct and loaded strongly on a single factor.  
However, the weaker results in the complex model that included measurement error 
indicated that a more complex scale, perhaps including more items of less specific 
situational context, may improve the validity of the scale.  Doing so might increase 
variance accounted for in the component analysis, and improve the strength of the 
variable as a predictor and as a correlate. 
For moral disengagement, the revisions had a more dramatic effect on the 
construct, since the original measure was 24 items and 8 subscales and was reduced to 4 
items covering 3 subscales.  Each of the subscales of moral disengagement was expected 
to measure different elements of the same concept.  They were each “cognitive 
mechanisms that deactivate moral self-regulatory processes,” explaining how individuals 
who would otherwise manifest generally high morals could engage in unethical decision-
making made “without guilt or self-censure” (Detert et al., 2008, p. 374).  Removing 
several of the subscales meant that there was less complexity left in the measure; not all 
of the possible cognitive mechanisms that could fit under the banner of moral 
disengagement were accounted for.   
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Each of the items retained, however, was easily understandable by the population 
of interest, and each represented an example of a cognitive mechanism that could be used 
to excuse unethical decision-making.  The three items all related to situations that officers 
could encounter in the workplace or on the job, and all were examples of justifying 
behavior so that unethical choices could be made without self censure.  While not as 
complex, they still represented the underlying construct and loaded significantly on a 
single factor.  However, similarly to anomie, limitations on the number of moral 
disengagement items restricted the breadth of the measure, decreasing variance in scale 
scores within and across departments, and perhaps impacting predictive ability in the 
complex model that included measurement error.  As such, it would be preferable in the 
future to include a broader and more comprehensive version of this scale. 
For acceptance of deviant norms, the retained scenarios represented a range of 
corrupt behaviors, and the questions posed about each scenario represented officer 
perspectives.  The three chosen scenarios represented common forms of corruption at the 
middle range of seriousness.  The intention of the Klockars items (Klockars et al., 1997; 
2000) was to obtain information about (a) how corruption was perceived by the 
individual officers in a department and (b) how those officers viewed the culture of their 
department as a whole.   
Although not all the categories of perceived seriousness, punishment, and 
reporting were retained for these two perspectives, those that remained were balanced 
between the two, and all three categories were still represented.  Factor analysis revealed 
a similarity between responses to the three scenarios, and individual scenario items 
loaded strongly on single components.  The only necessary change would be the 
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exclusive inclusion of the three items that address individual opinions and likely 
behaviors, due to the need for a cohesive individual evaluation of acceptance of deviant 
norms to be used on both model levels.  As previously discussed, this would mean 
substituting the individual opinion version of the reporting item (“Do you think YOU 
would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?”) for the departmental 
version (“Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a 
fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?”). 
The revised decoupling scale can only be compared to the original concept upon 
which the longer (pre-cut) measure was constructed, since the scale was created for the 
current study.  Decoupling occurs when organizations separate or “decouple” policy from 
practice, such that what is promoted within official rules or public statements of goals is 
not actually upheld in practice, and is sometimes purposefully undermined to increase 
expediency in achieving pragmatic goals.  Another way of stating this phenomenon is to 
say that, over the course of an organization’s development, “institutional rules are 
distinguished sharply from prevailing social behaviors” with differences building 
between the “formal structure of an organization and its actual day-to-day activities” 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341).    
Within the decoupling instrument, two potentially conflicting goals, pragmatic 
and ethical, were presented to the respondents.  Through their responses to the two 
options, the objective was to see whether officers believed that their department cared 
more about practical results than codes of conduct.  Options for validating this measure 
could have included qualitatively comparing departments on core values, intent and 
content of their mission statements, thoroughness and enforcement of ethics manuals and 
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professional standards, the content of other publicly disseminated statements of 
departmental codes of conduct, and the verbal directives made directly by their chief or 
other superiors to the line officers (Beekun & Glick, 2001; Westphal & Zajac, 2001).  
While qualitative comparisons would have value, this approach was deemed too 
unwieldy for incorporation into the current study.     
Although the decoupling instrument was reduced to only four items from the 
original seven that were conceived, each remaining item was relevant to issues of current 
political and practical concern for police departments.  These issues were evident in the 
ethical goals or “formal guidelines” options: the reporting and punishment of deviance 
within the police ranks, respect for suspect rights, the accurate reporting of crime data, 
and racially biased police behavior.  For each of these four issues, the decoupling of 
policy from practice could have serious repercussions within the police organization and 
for the public.  However, against expectations, these items did not load onto a single 
factor, and the scale was thus limited to two items.  Further, decoupling was not a 
significant correlate of anomie or a significant predictor of acceptance of deviant norms.  
While this scale had moderate face validity, it did not have construct or predictive 
validity.  The scale also had very low variance across departments, contributing to lack of 
model identification in certain of the complex models. 
In the case of each of the study scales, due to the low number of items, there was 
limited robustness in the statistical analysis.  The issue of lack of sufficient items to 
support a given construct in the principal components analysis was covered briefly above 
when discussing the item loadings.  Of concern is not just whether the items loaded 
together on a single component, or on the expected components, but whether the 
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combination of items explained a large enough proportion of the variance within the 
component analysis to be considered a valid representation of the construct.   
When running both principal components analysis and confirmatory factor 
analysis, explaining a large proportion of the variance was the main goal.  Exploratory 
principal components analysis allows for data reduction based on the magnitude of the 
eigenvalues, which is the amount of variance explained by each component.  Data 
reduction is useful to remove items that are not as strongly correlated with the others, 
since “as the intercorrelation among the variables increases, the proportion explained by 
the first few components will increase” (Kim & Mueller, 1978, p. 8).  It is preferable to 
start with a large number of items that can be reduced if necessary during the exploratory 
process so that the remaining items, out of the possible items to measure the construct, 
are the most strongly correlated and explain the largest variation in the sample.  For 
confirmatory factor analysis, data reduction is not the primary goal, but it may be 
considered if doing so can increase the eigenvalues of the main components.  So having a 
more robust measure to start with is still preferable. 
Additionally, a component with less than three items is generally considered weak 
and unstable (Costello & Osborne, 2005).  Thus, starting with a very small number of 
untested items is risky because no more than the most limited data reduction is possible.  
The scale cannot be further refined, and the only refining process has been undertaken 
without the benefit of analysis.  In the case of the current scales, the option for data 
reduction would have been helpful to determine if the preferred items were truly the best 
representatives of the constructs.  It was not possible to determine whether items that 
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were already eliminated were better suited for the measures in place of or in addition to 
the current items.   
Survey methodology limitations. A third area of limitations is a function of the 
survey methodology.  One problem associated with any form of survey methodology is 
self-selection bias; people who decide to complete the survey may be different from those 
who choose not to participate, differing on a trait that is unknown and/or cannot be 
controlled (Wright, 2005).  In the current case, police officers who chose to participate 
may differ from those who did not on a variable that may also impact their responses on 
the survey.  As presented earlier, it was possible to assess representativeness by analyzing 
non-responsiveness.  This assessment, however, had limitations.  It was limited to only 
the few variables for which data were available for both groups.  As a result, variation in 
decisions to respond to the survey may still have been due to variables for which there 
were no data either from the survey or for the total department population.   
 The other potential problem–subject misrepresentation–is particularly relevant to 
on-line surveying.  Online respondents can easily lie about demographic variables.  It is 
also not possible to guarantee that the person who is supposed to take the survey is 
actually the person filling it out, and one person could take the survey numerous times.  
When a survey is completed in person, the researcher can control for external influences 
and can verify the identity of survey-takers.  This is not possible in the online format, as 
is also the case with mail-in surveys or even surveys by phone (Wright, 2005).  Thus, 
while there were many advantages to the online surveying used in the current study, 
including low cost and accessibility, it was difficult to control the surveying environment 
or guard against misrepresentation.   
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Additional limitations. There were some additional limitations of the current 
research related to survey content.  The larger accountability survey, of which the items 
for the current study were a part, included a very detailed list of demographic questions 
that were included on all of the Platform organizational surveys.  These items included 
such identifiers as race, time on the job, gender, rank, shift, and occupational role.  Given 
the small size of some of the participating agencies, it may have been problematic that 
these items were so detailed.  In a small agency with fewer than fifty employees, for 
instance, detailed demographic questions may produce the perception that anonymity 
may be compromised. This perception could impact accurate responses to survey items of 
a “controversial” nature, produce socially desirable responses, and hence limit the 
validity of responses.  Reducing this level of detail in the demographic items would be a 
valid consideration for future research.   
Due to the interest in organizational-level measurement of department 
characteristics, the inclusion of measures of anomie or decoupling that were based on the 
organizational features of the department rather than on aggregated individual responses 
may have increased theoretical robustness.  Since this type of macro measurement is 
preferable for the multilevel model, several macro measurement approaches were 
considered when first conceptualizing this project; however, these methods were not 
deemed feasible for implementation.  Reasons for the lack of feasibility included space 
limitations on the survey, time limitations for the completion of the study as a whole, and 
the need for a standardized format for all agencies receiving the survey.   
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Summary 
This study approach had a number of weaknesses, including limitations in survey 
design, survey content, external measurement validation, and implementation.  A number 
of these limitations stemmed from constraints associated with conducting this research 
within the Platform Project.  However, using the Platform also had many advantages 
including a large sample size of officer respondents, easy access to police departments, 
ease of conducting the surveying process, and the possibility for further research within 
the same framework but with an extended population.  The advantages seem to outweigh 
the disadvantages presented by the methodology.  Many of the limitations discussed 
present opportunities for future adjustment and revisions that may be applied to a larger 
and more in-depth study design, and should be explored in the next phase of the Platform 
Project.  The information gained from the current approach, and the sound theoretical 
foundation of the approach, represent the key value of this study despite opportunities for 
improvement. 
Relevance and Implications of Results 
 This final section of the discussion reviews the main findings and then discusses 
them in terms of their implications for the policing profession. This discussion addresses 
interventions for both the prevention of and response to corruption.  Preventative 
interventions include recruiting, screening, training, changes to organizational structure, 
and increased support structures for whistleblowing.  Interventions to address existing 
deviance and corruption in a department include intensive investigation of and harsh 
penalties for transgressions and modifying a subculture that provides peer support for 
such behaviors. 
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Summary of Conclusions from Overview of Results 
 There were a few major findings in the current study that could have practical 
relevance for policy and for future research.  First are the results related to the 
hypotheses.  Hypothesis 1 was not supported, which meant that decoupling and anomie 
were not significant correlates and did not function well together in the complex models.  
This perhaps implies the need for longer or alternative scales.  Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported for decoupling, such that decoupling was not a significant predictor of 
acceptance of deviant norms and did not work well in the models, again perhaps implying 
a need for better scaling or operationalization.  Hypothesis 2 was, however, supported for 
anomie, such that anomie was a significant predictor of acceptance of deviant norms in 
most of the complex models and accounted for a great deal of variance in acceptance of 
deviant norms between departments.  While it was a strong predictor, there still may be a 
need for a more complex and longer scale. 
 Hypothesis 3 was partially supported, such that moral disengagement was a 
significant predictor of acceptance of deviant norms in the base multilevel models but not 
in the multilevel structural equation models.  This may imply the need for additional 
items or supplementary individual level predictors.  Lastly, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported, such that the random slope for acceptance of deviant norms on moral 
disengagement did not vary significantly across departments, and neither anomie nor 
decoupling were significant predictors of the slope.  This may imply the need for more 
departments involved in future research to provide more between-department variance on 
acceptance of deviant norms, or may support the need for adjustments to the moral 
disengagement scale. 
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 Second, based on results related to the scales (principal components analyses, 
descriptives), a few adjustments are necessary.  Although the usage of the decoupling 
scale has theoretical support, its operationalization had flaws, not allowing for loading on 
a single component nor accountability for a large enough proportion of variance to be 
explained.  Alternative scale composition, scoring, or type of operationalization may be 
necessary.  The anomie scale was strong but might benefit from greater item number for 
the purposes of confirmatory factor analysis and general performance in the complex 
models.  The moral disengagement scale was also strong but may benefit from more 
items or complementary measure of individual susceptibility.  Lastly, the acceptance of 
deviant norms scales were strong, but would be benefited from a substitution of Item 4 on 
departmental reporting with the item for individual likelihood of reporting to make the 
scales stronger and more consistent. 
 From an evaluation of departmental descriptives, Ft. McDowell was found to be a 
potential outlier, indicating the need for a larger and randomly stratified sample.  When 
looking at scale descriptives, the false reporting scenario stood out as garnering the most 
overall acceptance across the sample, suggesting that the topic of whistleblowing may 
require more directed attention in future research.   
 In the evaluation of the covariate and sublevel results, the false reporting scenario 
was again unique, having distinct predictors as compared to the other scenarios.  In 
relation to the behaviors of accepting kickbacks and making false reports, lower rank, 
non-supervisory status, being female, working night shifts, and working rotating shifts 
were individual characteristics that increased likely acceptance of the deviant norms.  In 
relation to covering for a fellow officer, those working night shifts and in neighborhoods 
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with higher crime rates were more likely to be accepting of this behavior.  Also, 
jurisdictional percentage of African Americans indicated less acceptance of covering for 
a fellow officer between departments.  This may be related to the size of department, 
such that larger departments had more safeguards in place for whistleblowers or stricter 
accountability measures.   
Possible Policy Implications of Results 
A primary policy implication of these results is that the “bad apple” approach to 
addressing likelihood for police deviance or corruption is not effective in and of itself.  
Much of the variance in acceptance of deviant norms between and within departments 
could be accounted for by departmental characteristics or the characteristics associated 
with occupational subgroups.  This implies that while departments may work on weeding 
out individuals who may be more susceptible to accepting deviant norms through 
screening, recruiting, and training, equal and perhaps greater effort should be given to 
changing organizational characteristics, including leadership operations and departmental 
communications.  That is, departments must address the organizational and 
environmental correlates of susceptibility to deviance.   
The findings of the current study have practical significance for several arenas of 
intervention, including training, recruiting and screening, leadership and 
communications, whistleblowing, and responses to existing deviance.  Each of these 
arenas for reform is discussed below with reference to the relevant study findings. 
Training. There are a couple of findings relevant to police training.  First, anomie 
was seen as a significant predictor of acceptance of deviant norms.  Anomie in a 
department is manifest in the anomia of its employees (Aultman, 1976; Merton, 1968).  
  235 
In other words, in an anomic department, there is an expectation that the goals that are 
accepted as being the most valuable cannot be reached through accepted or ethical means.  
Anomia can come through a disillusionment with the occupational culture, leading to a 
sense of futility and then to deviance (Hickman et al., 2001).   
The manifestation of anomie in police departments seems closely aligned with the 
outcomes associated with cynicism.  Both anomie and cynicism in the police 
occupational environment arguably have similar roots; they manifest when the 
importance of goals and the official guideline of how goals may be achieved are not in 
line with the reality faced by police officers in the field, and not aligned with each other 
in actual departmental practice and accountability.  Practical implications of this 
correlation for training can hence be found most clearly in the literature on cynicism 
prevention.   
 Cynicism can be defined as a belief in the worst in others and the worst in one’s 
environment, resulting often as “a reaction to and a defense against dashed hopes” 
(Graves, 1996, p. 18).  Cynicism is often found in officers who come out of the academy 
with idealism and a strong belief in ethical codes only to find that these ideals are not 
reflective of reality.  Cynicism has been found to lead to a wide range of police problem 
behaviors, including corruption (Hickman, 2008).  Similar to what was found for 
acceptance of deviant norms, suggesting a link, cynicism has been found more in larger 
departments and in the lower ranks (Graves, 1996).   
The means of training that can prevent cynicism are relevant to the prevention of 
anomia.  Officers can be taught the realities of the police occupation from the beginning, 
with no idealistic overtures.  In the vein of “inoculation,” they can be trained to 
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understand the roots of cynicism, anomia, burnout and stress and their link to 
misbehavior.  This training can be emphasized with the careful selection of mentors (e.g., 
Field Training Officers) for these officers entering the police organization.  These 
mentors, too, can make sure that the realities, stresses, and difficulties to which the new 
officer will be introduced are not distinct from what they have been trained to expect.  
Not only would officers trained in this manner be less likely to experience anomia, but 
having such training available could decrease actual anomie within a department by 
linking expectations and reality more closely together. 
Second, the potential impact of stress on acceptance of deviant norms, through the 
sublevel and covariate findings, is another study finding with implications for training.  
The finding that there are differences in acceptance of deviant norms across sublevels and 
work groups may relate closely to the finding in the literature that stress—such as that 
which might be produced through rotating shifts, night shifts, high neighborhood crime, 
or gender bias—may lead to deviant behaviors (see additional support in Violanti & 
Aron, 1994).  This finding relates to training in that recruits can be trained to cope with 
the stress that would be specific to certain work assignments, departmental politics, or 
peer pressures.  Training can also help officers identify warning signs of stress in 
themselves and others and let them know where to go for help. 
Recruiting and screening. There are a couple of findings relevant to recruiting and 
screening policies.  First, the finding that anomie is a significant predictor of acceptance 
of deviant norms, and the relationship between this finding and cynicism research (as 
discussed previously for training), has implications for recruiting and screening.  In 
relation to the topic of cynicism, and to prevent against the development of anomie once 
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within the training cycle, potential recruits can be given a realistic job preview that 
directly addresses the realities of the policing profession when going through the 
screening/recruiting process (Graves, 1996).   
Second, the individual-level finding that moral disengagement is a significant 
predictor of acceptance of deviant norms may support the agency administration of 
instruments that attempt to measure moral disengagement during applicant screening. 
The value of this type of screening–for personality or behavioral tendencies predictive of 
deviance–has been supported in the literature.  Arrigo and Claussen (2003), for instance, 
suggested the use of the Inwald Personality Inventory, the Revised NEO Personality 
Inventory, antisocial behavioral tendencies, and conscientiousness as possible screening 
indicators of susceptibility to corruption.  Also, Girodo (1991) suggested extraversion, 
neuroticism, and disinhibition, and Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) found support for 
impulsivity as a predictor.   
While there have been concerns as to the reliability of personality screening tools 
due to the potential for faking and coaching (Miller & Barret, 2008), there still may be 
merit in the exploration of the use of an applicable version of the Detert et al. (2008) 
moral disengagement scale.  In order to confirm the usefulness of such a screening tool, 
however, it might be appropriate to first conduct research to determine whether moral 
disengagement is a fixed trait that functions as a stable mental tendency. 
Leadership and communication. The findings of the current study also have 
relevance for departmental leadership and communication policies.  First, anomie was a 
strong predictor of acceptance of deviant norms, and decoupling showed promise as a 
possible predictor as well.  Anomie and decoupling both stem from departmental policies 
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and ethical ideals conflicting with the reality of the pragmatic goals and informal 
methods utilized and tolerated within an organization.   
The implication of this for prevention is that strong leadership is needed that 
promotes ethical means to achieve goals.  The leadership in a department would need to 
actively communicate the connection between ethical behavior and goals to personnel at 
all levels of the department (Punch, 2000).  For instance, clarifying that accurate 
reporting of incidents, crimes, and suspect demeanor is as important as booking a suspect 
for a crime.  The leadership would also have to clearly communicate expectations 
regarding alternative and deviant means to achieve goals.  It would, for instance, have to 
make clear that falsely reporting incidents or exaggerating charges is not an acceptable 
means of getting criminals off the streets.  
Discipline for such behavior would have to be expected and inevitable, and 
covering for this behavior in fellow officers would have to also lead consistently to 
disciplinary action.  Hence, communication, investigation, and discipline are all 
necessary in order for the leadership to promote adherence to ethical guidelines down 
through the ranks of the agency.  As Monahan and Quinn (2006) noted, “[The] central 
dynamic of organizational decoupling [is that] deviance is normalized as long as it is 
invisible, and disavowed when it comes to light” (p. 380).  Clear communication of 
expectations and disciplinary outcomes of deviant behavior would decrease opportunities 
for deviance to breed in a department. 
Second, the finding that there are differences in acceptance of deviant norms 
across sublevels and work groups (specifically those working rotating shifts, night shifts, 
in places with high neighborhood crime) also relates to leadership and communication.  
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These work groups may have the highest environmental susceptibility, based on the 
findings, for deviant behavior to thrive.  They require more careful attention and directed 
protocols as a means of prevention.  Similar to the implications for the total department, 
prevention of acceptance of deviant norms in specific work groups and lower in the ranks 
(problem areas as suggested by the current study), requires that leadership on all levels be 
consistent (including leadership for these subgroups).  Expectations of behavior and 
punishment for offenses must be clearly communicated by commanding officers, 
pragmatic options that reflect policy clearly available, contradictions preempted, and 
accountability and external review (from outside the specific unit or work group) constant 
and ongoing (Punch, 2000).  Leadership must also be prepared to take preventative 
measures within the work groups to stop deviance from becoming the norm, including 
regularly rotating officers on and off groups most susceptible to deviant norms. 
Whistle-blowing. There were a couple of findings related to whistle-blowing.  
First, there was a much greater acceptance of the deviant norm of covering for the 
deviance of a fellow officer than there was for other behaviors.  This suggests the need 
for departments to have policies that encourage such reporting and punish nonreporting.     
Departments could increase support for whistle-blowing within the peer culture, 
protecting officers who report, and clearly delineating acceptable boundaries of behavior 
on all levels of the department.  Clear and public policies related to deviant behavior, 
reporting this behavior, and how ethical guidelines can be maintained and enforced on all 
management levels and in all work groups could also increase willingness of officers to 
come forward and maintain integrity in the ranks. 
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Second, while covering for a fellow officer was highly acceptable across the 
entire sample, the greatest acceptance was found in work groups that were more stressed 
and isolated (see support from Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  These results suggest that 
preventative measures could be taken to relieve strain in and prevent the isolation of these 
work groups, which might increase likelihood of willingness to report fellow officer 
deviance.  The prior suggestion of rotating officers between the more stressful 
assignments would be one way to decrease both the stress and isolation of those roles and 
subsequently decrease tolerance of deviant behavior in susceptible work groups.  
Responses to existing deviance. The findings of the current research suggest a few 
arenas for improved departmental response to deviance or corruption.   First, leadership 
within the departments that were included in the current study should be made aware of 
the specific level to which officers in their departments view certain deviant behaviors as 
serious, deserving of discipline, and likely to be reported.  They could then make 
adjustments to policy and communication within the department to remedy deficiencies.  
Similar evaluations could be made of the results of the anomie and decoupling measures 
to see what expectations are held by officers in the department.  If the findings are not in 
line with what is desired or officially promoted by the administration, then steps should 
be taken to open lines of communication and correct the disconnect between official 
norms and officer perceptions.  In fact, it would be informative for all police departments 
to do a similar internal evaluation of officer perceptions of deviant behaviors, ethical 
guidelines, pragmatic goals, and expectations of departmental responses.   
Second, findings of greater acceptance of deviant norms in certain subgroups 
could assist departmental administrations in targeting groups for more careful 
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monitoring, directed restructuring, and more stringent approaches for eradicating 
corruption when found.  Departments should individually confirm the subgroups that 
seem more tolerant of informal deviant norms and make changes in their leadership, 
review process, and incentives for reporting.  Departments could also provide outlets and 
counseling for those officers who may be most impacted by stress due to membership in 
these subgroups to decrease reliance on deviant outlets. 
Third, those departments that were higher on acceptance of deviant norms relative 
to the other departments may interpret this as an indication that more stringent 
eradication of deviant norms is necessary department-wide.  Past literature has suggested 
that successful means of accomplishing this on the agency level may include more 
organized and hard line internal affairs units, integrity testing of officers, clear discipline 
outcomes for specific behaviors, and increased inspection on all levels of the department 
(Punch, 2000).   
Fourth, based on findings supporting the potential importance of anomie and 
decoupling to departmental acceptance of deviant norms, departments with higher rates 
of anomie and decoupling may see this is a sign that it is necessary to revise policies that 
are not adhered to, and by doing so create a clearer chain of information and expectations 
down through the ranks.  Part of this process would necessitate rooting out mentors who 
promote deviant norms, and providing incentives for ethical guidelines being promoted 
and followed.   
Summary. In summary, much of the import of the study results for policy come 
from the overall findings that both individual and organizational factors impact 
acceptance of deviant norms.  The general support for the model suggests that the study 
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scales could be used to inform department administrators of decoupled policies, anomic 
attitudes, undesirable attitudes toward deviant behaviors, and individual susceptibility for 
accepting deviant norms.  The information could lead to adjustments in leadership, 
communication, and screening.  Support for anomie as a predictor of acceptance of 
deviant norms suggests that preventing the development of cynicism and anomia, starting 
with recruitment and training, may be a means of decreasing susceptibility to deviant 
behaviors.  The findings of greater susceptibility in certain subgroups suggest the 
importance of targeting these groups for reorganization, education, investigation, and 
stress counseling.  Findings of greater acceptance for covering for fellow officers suggest 
the need for policies to promote whistleblowing.  Finally, departments that have higher 
acceptance of deviant norms than others may see this as an indication that more stringent 
measures should be taken to eradicate existing deviance. 
Implications for Future Research 
 The results of the current study suggest some recommendations for future 
research.  Future research should adopt the  multilevel structural equation model  to test 
this model, but with certain important changes made to both scales and sampling to 
guarantee adequate item number for the scales, significant variance across the sample, 
sufficient number of departments for model parameters, and adequate robustness in the 
confirmatory factor analysis.  Recommendations for future research address this concern 
in part, including adjustments to the scales in the context of the results of the complex 
models, sampling changes, measurement of external influences, an increased focus on 
whistleblowing, investigation of differences between normative corruption and noble 
cause corruption, and separate evaluations of department-level characteristics. 
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 Adjustment to scales in context of complex models. As previously discussed, to 
increase robustness, variance, and identification in the complex models, each of the 
scales require certain changes.   
 For instance, the decoupling measure would not load on a single variable, and the 
scaling procedure required dichotomizing the scoring.  These problems may have led to 
decreased variance of the scale across departments, poor performance in the complex 
model, and lack of correlation with anomie or significant prediction of acceptance of 
deviant norms.  Revisions may be possible through a change in the focus of the items, 
such as comparing ethical guidelines to pragmatic goals on topics that are not as 
divergent in levels of seriousness.  This might also address the differences in construction 
between the anomie and decoupling scales as noted in the discussion of hypothesis 
results.  Or perhaps instead of asking respondents to mark a place on a chart between 
both, individual goals and guidelines could be matched on seriousness and assessed 
separately, comparing responses across the two categories.   Another possibility would be 
to measure perspectives on policies and guidelines as a specific comparison between 
respondents who are lower and higher in the agency hierarchy, based directly on 
individual agency ethical guidelines.  Such a measure would have the added value of 
providing information to researchers and agency leaders on where decoupling was taking 
place (between which ranks) and on which topics.   
The anomie scale also manifested some problems.  While anomie was a strong 
predictor of acceptance of deviant norms, its low correlation with decoupling and limited 
robustness in the measurement models indicated that the scale may require additional 
items. 
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The use of the individual level measurement of anomia and decoupling and their 
aggregation up to the agency level was conducted with the expectation that the general 
perspective of officers toward official rules, socially desirable outcomes, ethical 
guidelines, and pragmatic goals would provide proxy measures of anomie and decoupling 
in the department as a whole.  However, based on problems encountered with the 
complex models, it is possible that for future research a more valid measurement of these 
constructs could utilize alternate or additional macro measurement approaches, directly 
measuring them on the organizational level.   
As mentioned previously in this discussion, the macro measures that could be 
considered for decoupling include a direct agency-level evaluation of organizational 
structures, discipline policies, and/or accountability measures.  Possible macro 
measurement approaches that could be considered for anomie include the comparison of 
official agency rules to individual officer understandings of the enforcement of these 
rules, and the comparison of actual discipline outcomes to expected discipline outcomes 
within departments.  Ideal measurement might employ the collection of agency data on 
official rules and actual implementation of rules over a finite time.  This measurement 
could be used in combination with officer perceptions of agency ability to reward 
officially sanctioned behavior and punish breaches of policy.    
Future research should also include a more comprehensive scale of moral 
disengagement, perhaps supported by a few other measures of individual-level 
susceptibility.  The existing moral disengagement scale could be expanded to include 
items that were representative of more of those from the original Detert et al. scale.  This 
would increase robustness of the scale, perhaps improve its performance in the complex 
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models even when accounting for measurement error, and account for more variance in 
acceptance of deviant norms within departments.  The addition of other possible scales, 
as previously discussed, may also help to account for a larger portion of the residual 
within-department variance.  Another possible use of the moral disengagement scale in 
future research would be to test to see if it is a formative individual trait.  This could be 
accomplished by presenting the scale to recruits in the same departments that participated 
in this study to see if there are differences across the sample as compared to the 
established officers.  Or, providing more strength to the test, a longitudinal study could 
follow recruits from the academy and over a couple of years to see if their moral 
disengagement altered through exposure to the occupational culture. 
The acceptance of deviant norms scales could be improved by the additional or 
alternative usage of the individual opinion item for the reporting of deviant behavior.  
This would allow all items to be individual evaluations of opinion or likely behavior.   
Sampling.  Based on problems with complex model identification, variance across 
departments, and outliers, future research that tests this or similar models must make use 
of more departments and select them through stratified random sampling.  If this 
sampling method is not possible, at least the number of clusters must increase to improve 
the validity of the complex modeling.  It is not possible to know for certain if the 
hypotheses would have been supported or not given the proper number of departments 
for the modeling method.  This change is vital for future attempts.   
Measurement of external influences. Future research would be enhanced by 
adding external measures of influences on department-level acceptance of deviant norms. 
This could allow for a more comprehensive perspective on how the organizational 
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features of each department function and what may influence departmental culture and 
policies.  For instance, measuring the features of the city or county in which each agency 
is situated may identify factors that might promote or reduce agency corruption.  This 
would in essence be a measurement of agency environmental factors that could explain 
differences found between departments.  Such a measure could also be used as a 
verification of the face validity of the agency-level evaluation of acceptance of deviant 
norms.   
  This jurisdiction-level contextual information would provide for a more in-depth 
study.  For instance, one could create scales reflecting city integrity based on information 
from citizen reviews, media outlets, or other sources.  Such measurement would produce 
a more complex model to facilitate the understanding of police corruption. 
Whistle-blowing. It might be  interesting to conduct a more focused evaluation of 
predictors of whistle-blowing, due to the results for the second scenario.  The covariate 
and sublevel findings suggest that further exploration of work group and departmental 
size or structure influence could be valuable.   
Normative versus noble cause corruption.  Due to potential differences suggested 
by theory and moderately supported in the bivariate correlations, it might be valuable to 
assess causes of noble cause corruption separately from those of normative forms of 
corruption.  Anomic conditions have the potential to impact the two differently and, 
based on the current study’s results, may have a stronger impact on noble cause 
corruption.  This investigation would require a wider range of acceptance of deviant 
norms scenarios and a more robust measure of anomie, perhaps exploring also the 
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different forms that anomie might take within the occupational structure of a police 
agency. 
Separate evaluations of department-level characteristics.  For the expanded 
evaluation of all the acceptance of norms scenarios, it may be important to explore more 
department-level characteristics.  Possible variables could include information on 
organizational structure, recruiting, functional management strategies, workgroup 
management, stress management, accountability procedures and reviews, whistleblowing 
procedures and safeguards, internal affairs procedures, and civilian reviews.  While these 
variables could not be evaluated through the complex model, they may be valuable to 
examine separately as predictors of acceptance of deviant norms and as correlates of 
anomie and decoupling. 
Summary. Overall, the current model can be used successfully in future research 
to expand knowledge of what may impact susceptibility to deviant norms both within and 
between departments.  Such an effort would require scale revisions and expanded 
sampling.  Additional measurement approaches could also add more substance to the 
analysis, or add complementary evaluations of study constructs.   
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Conclusions 
 Police corruption is a significant problem for law enforcement officials and for 
the populace that police agencies are sworn to protect.  A major goal of police corruption 
research is to provide departments with the information necessary to make constructive 
policy changes and to institute programs that can prevent or counteract corrupt behavior 
(Ivkovic, 2003).  Departments must understand the social forces and individual factors 
that influence the likelihood for officers in a given department to make unethical 
decisions in the course of their work, and to accept and condone the deviant behaviors of 
others.    
The current study attempted to inform policy using a unique multilevel approach, 
integrating criminological and organizational theories, to explain likelihood for police 
corruption on both the departmental level and the individual level.  The results of this 
study support the importance of evaluating susceptibility to corruption on both the 
departmental and individual levels, and provide guidance for future attempts to integrate 
organizational theories with traditional criminological theories.  The results also 
highlighted differences in susceptibility to deviance among departmental sublevels. 
Despite certain methodological limitations, this study provided insight into 
organizational/situational factors that may promote deviant subcultures within 
departments, and individual characteristics that may allow certain sworn personnel to be 
more susceptible to deviant influences.  Future research, using the multilevel model and 
with improved formulations of constructs and an expanded sample, could  contribute 
further to the knowledge that can assist law enforcement administrators and other policy 
makers in preventing and responding to corruption within police agencies.
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Appendix A: Sample of Initial Request for Participation Letter 
 
  
X PD Employees: 
 
I am pleased to announce that we have the honor of being selected as one of a number 
of police departments nationwide to participate in the National Police Research 
Platform.  The Platform is supported by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. 
Department of Justice, and is expected to lead to improvements in police organizations 
that will directly benefit law enforcement personnel. 
  
What does this mean for us?  The research team is asking that members of the X Police 
Department, sworn and civilian, participate in a few online surveys over the next year to 
give your opinions about police work. The survey will be on the Internet, and is being 
conducted by professors at the University of South Florida and the University of Illinois 
at Chicago. The Internet surveys are completely anonymous (no names or Ids) and 
voluntary, and I encourage all of you to participate and to be candid. Only members of 
the research team will have access to the information you provide and they are 
prohibited by federal law from releasing any information which could identify you.  
 
The first survey is on -----------------. It is very brief ― it might take 8-9 minutes. You can 
complete the questionnaire by clicking the link below. You will not need any kind of ID 
or password. Once you start you need to finish in one session, as the software is 
designed to forget you once it stores your answers. 
                      
 http://xxxx 
 
Reports based on surveys from many departments around the country will be presented 
so that no one person, unit or assignment is discussed in isolation. The results will help 
the country better understand the issues that police officers and staff face, and may 
provide feedback which we may use to improve our organization and better serve the 
community.  
 
If you have questions prior to participating in this survey I encourage you to contact the 
Project Director, Susan Hartnett, at the University of Illinois at Chicago 
(shartnet@uic.edu or 312-355-0317). A local contact person is Lorie Fridell at USF at 
813-974-6862. 
 
Thank you in advance for helping to improve the department and the profession.  
 
[Chief of Police of Department X]  
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Appendix B: Survey Instructions 
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Appendix C: Sample of Follow-up Request for Participation Letter 
 
 
 
Police Department Employees of Department X:   
 
Last week we announced that both sworn and unsworn personnel of X PD have been asked to 
complete an Internet survey on stress in the workplace as part of a national project.  Thank you 
to those of you who have already taken the survey. 
 
Our response rate to date is only xx percent and I hope we can bring that up.  Other agencies 
around the national are achieving as much as 80% participation and I want us to look good 
alongside them. 
 
I hope those of you who have not already taken the survey will consider taking it, as everyone's 
opinion is valued and achieving a high response rate is the only way for the researchers to truly 
understand current police issues.  
 
As a reminder, the Internet survey is completely anonymous (no names or Ids) and voluntary, 
and I encourage you to participate and to be candid. Only members of the research team will 
have access to the data and they are prohibited by federal law from releasing any information 
which could identify you. You can access the survey through your computer account by clicking 
the following link: 
 
http://xxxx 
 
You will not need any kind of ID or password. Once you start you need to finish in one session, 
as the software is designed to forget you once it stores your answers. 
                      
Reports based on surveys from many departments around the country will be presented so that 
no one person, unit or assignment is discussed in isolation. The results will help the country 
better understand the issues that police officers face, and may provide feedback which we may 
use to improve our organization and better serve the community.  
 
If you have questions prior to participating in this survey you can contact Dr. Dennis Rosenbaum 
at the University of Illinois at Chicago at 312-996-0764 or our local contact at USF, Dr. Lorie 
Fridell (813-974-6862). 
 
Thank you 
 
[Chief of Police of Department X] 
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Appendix D: Decoupling Measure 
 
 
  260 
Appendix E: Individual Measure of Anomie (Menard, 1995) 
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Appendix F: Adult Moral Disengagement Scale (Detert et al., 2008) 
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Appendix G: Acceptance of Deviant Norms (Klockars et al., 2000) 
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  264 
Appendix G (Continued) 
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Appendix H: Demographics/Control Variables 
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